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This thesis explores the use of generous behavior as a costly signal to convey 
information about an unobservable social characteristic to other individuals in one's 
social environment. Building on recent contributions in this spirit, I develop a 
theoretical framework that contrasts signaling activities without social benefits with 
activities that benefit the observers in situations in which individuals compete for 
access to a scarce social good. The objective of the first part of the thesis is to 
characterize the possible separating equilibria in each case. While one obtains a 
multiplicity of equilibria when the agents employ neutral signals to convey 
information, one can make a unique prediction with respect to the individuals' 
equilibrium behavior if they use beneficial signaling activities, the agents are of two 
discrete types, behave symmetrically within their respective types, and the observers 
of the signals adopt non-decreasing beliefs vis-à-vis the signalers' relative quality. In 
view of their sharp divergence, the second part of the thesis investigates 
experimentally the precision of these predictions. The results provide support for 
many elements of the theory. Among others, the behavior of individuals in the 
treatments with beneficent signals is much more closely in line with the theoretical 
predictions than expected given the complexity of their behavioral implications, 
especially when it comes to the similarity of the participants' behavior within them. 
Behavior in the treatment with neutral signals, in turn, is consistent with multiple 
equilibria. The final part of the thesis explores what kind of signaling activity 
individuals trying to communicate their intentions to potential interaction partners 
will use in various social settings if given a choice. To this end, the framework 
developed in the first part is extended to allow the signalers to choose endogenously 
a signal from a “menu” of signaling activities rather than exogenously prescribing a 
messaging tool. Besides revealing that the uniqueness result of the framework 
without choice no longer obtains, the results indicate that the players may, under 
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As far back in history as hunter-gatherer societies, humans have formed 
alliances and engaged in coalitions with non-relatives in groups that have grown 
steadily over the centuries. In modern societies, cooperative social interaction even 
extends to complete strangers in one-shot, anonymous settings. People, for instance, 
routinely give directions to strangers, vote, recycle, and participate in community 
goings-on such as blood drives, Neighborhood Watch programs, and clean-up 
campaigns. Indeed, generous behavior towards others is nowadays so common that 
one does not tend to notice it or question why someone would (ever) bother to incur 
a cost – be it in terms of time or money – to contribute to the welfare of another 
individual, or group of individuals, (s)he does not know and may never interact with 
again.1 Yet, even though ubiquitous, people do not interact cooperatively with 
everybody at all times, and may even vary in their willingness to do so when facing 
the same environmental conditions. Rather, cooperative social interaction tends to 
depend on countless factors, including institutional, cultural, and technological 
factors, individuals’ emotional predisposition, as well as their ability to communicate 
with each other prior to interacting with one another (e.g., Richerson et al. 2003). 
While neoclassical economic theory works well in predicting behavior in a 
wide range of environments beyond traditional economic markets, including politics, 
law, and various household- and family-related matters, it tends to yield inadequate 
projections in the context of cooperation. One of the central challenges in this regard 
is individuals’ apparent departure from self-interested utility maximization. The 
                                               
1.1 There is a subtle difference between cooperative behaviors, which involve the provision of a direct 
benefit to others at some personal cost (i.e., a generous deed), and an individual engaging in a pro-
social activity, in which case (s)he incurs a cost to maintain an individually costly behavior 
(Henrich & Henrich 2006). As this distinction is not essential for the purposes of the work presented 
in this thesis, the terms will at times be used synonymously.  
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theories of repeated games and conditional reciprocity go some way to explaining 
cooperation among kinfolk and in settings involving small groups whose members 
interact quite frequently.2 However, since generous behavior among unrelated 
individuals in one-shot encounters does not comply with the basic tenets of these 
approaches, the proximate cause(s) of this behavioral pattern remain(s) a puzzle. The 
work presented in this thesis strives to illuminate this aspect of human social 
behavior by investigating a mechanism that allows individuals to forestall 
exploitation, in effect, by sharing information before interacting. 
Approach. The inspiration for the approach promoted in each of the 
subsequent chapters is that (one of) the main objective(s) of a rational individual 
becoming involved in a social group is the maximization of his/her access to or 
control over limited resources, which naturally entails both cooperative and 
competitive interaction between the group members. For, besides increasing the risk 
of exploitation, competition for resources, and exposure to diseases, the formation of 
alliances – the likely origin of today’s vast societies – yields a plethora of benefits 
related to the acquisition, production, processing, and access to resources (e.g., 
Boone 1992; Cosmides & Tooby 1992; van Vugt et al. 2007). In order to minimize 
the risks linked to the interaction with others, it is clearly of paramount importance to 
be able to identify reliable interaction partners and to advertise one’s own qualities as 
an associate so as to be able to gain access to the most lucrative alliances. 
The fundamental issue from this perspective is how individuals resolve the 
informational asymmetry characterizing this environment. After all, individuals’ 
intentions once part of an alliance, their “social quality” so to say, is not observable 
to others without prior interaction. As preliminary knowledge about others is 
implausible in one-shot encounters with strangers, the question arises how people 
decipher each other’s intentions in this type of setting. The remedy explored in this 
thesis, which has a long history in both the social and natural sciences, is that 
individuals seeking to gain access to profitable alliances may engage in costly 
signaling in order to inform other individuals of their objectives.  
A signal is an observable measure acquired by an individual with private 
information (e.g., regarding some unobservable trait) in order to transmit credibly 
said information to a less informed individual, or group of individuals. The idea is 
                                               
1.2 Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) considers these and a number of alternative approaches to explaining 
cooperation among humans in social settings in some detail.   
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that a reliable signal must be costly to the signaler to the extent that it could not be 
afforded by an individual with less or none of the trait in question. Key is that the 
members of a social group vary in some unobservable trait, that accurate information 
about this variation is valuable, that successful deceit regarding the true nature of the 
attribute would benefit the signaler at the expense of the observers of the signal, and 
that the cost of the signal is negatively correlated with the signaler’s endowment of 
the trait. Typical examples of this kind of “handicap” include the tails of peacocks to 
advertise gene quality (Zahavi 1975), investment in schooling to signal ability 
(Spence 1973, 1974), and conspicuous consumption such as the purchase of jewelry 
and luxury cars to suggest wealth (Veblen 1899). The essence of the signaling 
mechanism is that both parties to the exchange gain from the signaler’s investment as 
the signals indicate qualities that make it advantageous for the observers to interact 
with the signaler. Importantly, the agents behave in a purely self-interested manner.  
In the spirit of this concept and a recent contribution by Gintis, Smith, and 
Bowles (2001),3 the work underlying this thesis builds on two observations. For one, 
recent anthropological evidence suggests that generous behavior towards others may 
constitute a costly signal. Potlatches, for instance, may be used to signal physical 
condition, knowledge, and leadership ability (e.g., Smith & Bliege-Bird 2005). 
Second, variation in traits associated with successful cooperative interaction (e.g., 
reliability) within any given group necessarily entails that profitable social goods 
such as alliances, mating opportunities, or leadership positions constitute as limited a 
resource as any other. In particular, combining these notions, I explore the use of 
generous behavior as a costly signal to convey information about an unobservable 
social characteristic to others in an environment in which the individuals compete for 
access to a scarce social good.  
 Contributions. For insight into the usefulness of this unconventional 
messaging tool, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework that contrasts traditional 
signaling activities, which do not feature social benefits (termed “neutral signals”), 
with activities that provide a direct benefit to the observers, or receivers, of the 
signals (referred to as “beneficent signals”). The objective is to characterize the 
possible separating equilibria in each case (if any). The main feature of the model, 
besides individuals differentiated in their social attributes striving to alleviate the 
asymmetric information within their social environment using costly signaling, is 
                                               
1.3 The details of their work are discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2).  
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that the receivers prefer to interact with signalers of high social quality, an 
opportunity the signalers compete for with each other.  
In keeping with the literature, one obtains a multiplicity of equilibria when the 
agents employ neutral signals to convey information to the receivers. It should, 
however, be noted that the present setup is virtually the exact opposite of the 
canonical signaling model, i.e., it features competition among multiple signalers 
facing (in effect) a single receiver. Quite on the contrary, one can make a unique 
prediction with respect to the individuals’ equilibrium behavior if they employ 
beneficial signaling activities, they are of two discrete types, behave symmetrically 
within their respective types, and the observers of the signals adopt non-decreasing 
beliefs4 vis-à-vis the signalers’ relative quality. To be precise, the signaler types 
randomize continuously on separate but contiguous interval supports (comprising 
strictly positive signaling magnitudes) and the receivers adopt appropriate threshold 
beliefs. What is more, the result is quite general in that it does not depend on the 
exact value of the signal-dependent benefit, so long as it is strictly positive, nor does 
it fall victim to equilibrium refinements. 
Not only is the setup, notionally, a natural extension of conventional models, 
requiring mostly mild assumptions, but so is the intuition for the results. While use of 
neutral signals allows for a plethora of “belief-based” equilibria, as soon as the 
signaling activity yields even a small benefit to the receivers, the players’ interaction 
transforms into an all-pay auction in the sense that the signalers effectively employ 
the magnitude of their signals as a “bid” for an alliance with a receiver. The 
uniqueness result, in effect, follows straightforwardly from the fact that the receivers 
can retain (some of) the benefit associated with the beneficial signaling activity, 
which induces them to seek the signaler sending the highest signaling magnitude, 
thereby restricting the impact of their beliefs on the equilibrium outcome. 
In view of the sharp divergence of the equilibrium predictions across the 
signaling activities, Chapter 3 investigates experimentally their precision. Based on a 
subject pool of 165 individuals in three treatments – one with neutral and two with 
(different) beneficent signals – the experiment provides strong support for many 
elements of the theory. Among others, the behavior of the individuals in the 
treatments with beneficent signals is much more closely in line with the theoretical 
                                               
1.4 That is to say, the receivers associate higher levels of the signal with a (weakly) higher probability 
of the signal having been sent by a signaler of (the) high(er) type. 
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predictions than expected given the complexity of their behavioral implications, 
especially when it comes to the similarity of the participants’ behavior within them 
(comparative statics). Behavior in the treatment with neutral signals, as projected, is 
consistent with multiple equilibria. Adjustments over the course of the experiment 
furthermore suggest that experience and the adaptation of their beliefs to the events 
in earlier rounds shape the participants’ behavior. 
While the experimental setup does not constitute an innovation within the field 
of experimental economics, it is original in seeking validation of the framework 
developed in Chapter 2 in an environment that does not make the mixed strategy 
outcome in the treatments with beneficent signals explicit. In other words, granted an 
explicit frame, it allows for only one decision per decision-round. It is, in this 
context, particularly remarkable that even the participants in the treatment with 
neutral signals coordinate on quite complex outcomes, namely, a threshold-like 
separating arrangement involving “pooling” on the part of the signaler types on 
distinct signaling magnitudes as well as a configuration very similar to that predicted 
for the treatments with beneficent signals. For, the latter is suggestive of the fact that 
the signal-dependent benefit could be used as an equilibrium selection device.  
The final chapter, Chapter 4, is based on the notion that an individual trying to 
communicate his/her intentions to potential exchange partners can, in principle, 
choose among a variety of signaling activities. After all, the development of 
progressively larger and more complex social groups will have required 
appropriately adapted strategies and flexible responses to one’s environment so as to 
achieve maximal success in one’s various cooperative and competitive interactions 
with other individuals (e.g., Boone 1992). In this vein, the model developed in this 
chapter explores which kind of signal an individual is likely to use in a given social 
setting. To this end, the framework developed in Chapter 2 is expanded to allow the 
agents to choose endogenously a messaging tool from a collection of activities.  
Besides highlighting the tradeoff between the signaling activities’ relative cost 
and the signal-dependent benefit(s), if any, to the receiver, the results indicate that 
the uniqueness result of the framework without choice no longer obtains. Not only 
may several types of equilibrium coincide, but some instances support continua of 
equilibria, just as traditional economic signaling models. Moreover, under some 
conditions, the signalers may – in equilibrium – opt for inefficient signaling 
activities. More intriguingly, depending on the parameterization of the game, there 
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need not exist a universal “best.” The main divergence between the setups with and 
without choice to account for these findings is the option to separate such that the 
signaler types use different signaling activities when given choice, which can be 
supported as an equilibrium even if the cost of the signaling activities does not vary. 
The driving element in this regard is that the receivers may adopt a more widespread 
configuration of beliefs, especially off the equilibrium path.  
Even though one of the most elementary themes of economics and a quite 
intuitive aspect in the context of “communication,” choice of signaling activity (or 
messaging tool, more generally) has not been considered within frameworks 
amenable to costly signaling. Yet, the introduction of choice into signaling 
frameworks allows for a more careful delineation of the type of signaling activity to 
be expected in a particular situation, which is useful since the equilibria supported by 
conventional signaling models can often be satisfied by different types of signaling 
activities.5 Along similar lines, other than noting that signaling is fundamentally a 
wasteful activity, the welfare implications of various signaling activities in terms of 
identifying whether there exists such a thing as a “(unanimously) best” signal have 
thus far not been resolved. Though constrained as the settings being considered 
(only) differ according to the cost of the signaling activities and the signalers (only) 
face a single audience (i.e., the receivers are assumed to be homogeneous), the 
framework sheds some light on these matters.  
Concluding Remarks. In sum, the work presented in this thesis merges two 
issues thus far commonly considered distinct entities – human social interaction and 
the theory of costly signaling. It does so by adopting a somewhat unusual perspective 
on the efficacy of cooperation, defined as individually costly generous behavior 
towards others. Namely, it is based on the notion that individuals operating in a 
social group choose to do so out of self-interest, entailing that all interactions within 
the group, including cooperative ones, ultimately have a competitive basis. Rooted in 
this foundation, the two theoretical frameworks suggest how individuals may be able 
to decipher each other’s intentions in this type of environment, which turns out to be 
possible in a manner that can be validated empirically under laboratory conditions. 
The critical element is that the signaling activity provides a direct benefit to the 
receiver; if not, one does not arrive at a sharper prediction. If the signalers are given 
                                               
1.5 By identifying conditions for equilibrium for each kind of signaling activity, Chapter 2 also 
provides some insight into this issue.  
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a choice of activity, the precision of the unique prediction is diluted to the extent that 
more than one outcome is possible, including ones involving apparently inefficient 
choices of signal. Nevertheless, overall, the findings developed in the following 
entail that competition and signals comprising a direct benefit to their observers may 
play an important role in individuals’ attempts to form cooperative alliances with 











GENEROUS BEHAVIOR: AN  
UNCONVENTIONAL APPLICATION  






One of the most distinctive features of human social behavior is that humans, 
in contrast to most other primate societies, are strongly interdependent and routinely 
coordinate their actions with individuals they are not related to, do not know, and 
may never interact with again. In doing so, they achieve a broad range of mutually 
beneficial outcomes. A pervasive, cross-cultural pattern in this context is individuals’ 
pursuance of generous acts towards others within their social environment. Examples 
include sharing resources or information with individuals beyond the immediate 
family, doing volunteer work in the community, helping strangers, and more broadly, 
the adherence to and enforcement of social norms. All of these activities (primarily) 
benefit others while involving a cost for the individual carrying out the act.  
The activities are peculiar since they, in effect, correspond to individuals 
providing local “public goods” to others – be it an individual or an assortment of 
other individuals – without paying careful attention to the history and probability of 
reciprocation of the beneficiaries of their generous acts. On the contrary, in apparent 
contradiction to their self-interest, the actions do not balance accounts with others but 
appear to involve an asymmetric or even entirely one-directional flow of good deeds. 
As a result, although rich, explanations relying on notions of reciprocity 
(Trivers 1971) do not provide sufficient insight into the forces driving individuals’ 
conduct in these instances. For in contrast to two-person interactions, many of which 
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meet the criteria of some form of reciprocity, generous behavior within a broad 
social arena cannot be made contingent on reciprocation.1 
Yet, generosity is not extended universally or randomly. Rather, generous 
behavior seems to be employed strategically. Susceptible contexts as well as the 
characteristics of the involved providers and recipients tend to be constrained and 
patterned (e.g., Smith & Bliege-Bird 2000, 2005). Likewise, even the members of the 
most closely related group of cooperative individuals face conflicts of interest, which 
tend to pose a barrier to mutually beneficial interaction. The question thus arises how 
providing a benefit to individuals not known to return the good deed could be 
worthwhile, or equivalently, how potential interactants discern each other’s 
intentions with any degree of reliability.  
In keeping with recent work in biology and anthropology (e.g., Zahavi & 
Zahavi 1997; Smith & Bliege-Bird 2000; Bliege-Bird et al. 2001; Gintis et al. 2001), 
this chapter promotes the idea that generous behavior in a social context can be 
profitable if it has a sufficiently large impact on the outcome of one’s future 
interactions to offset its immediate cost. For instance, beneficent acts might enable 
individuals to advertise various socially important qualities in a reliable manner, 
thereby disclosing their value as future interactants. The provision of a beneficial 
resource or service would then not only benefit the recipients and/or observers, who 
acquire the resource or service as well as useful information about the provider, but 
also the contributor. The latter is the case not because (s)he expects future 
reciprocation (in kind), but because the provided information influences the 
observers’ optimal behavior in such a way that the contributor also gains, for 
example, by gaining access to contested social goods such as alliances, mating 
opportunities, or leadership positions. In other words, even though the nature of the 
activities is fundamentally different – i.e., they benefit the observer(s) – just as the 
famous idea that socially useless activities can convey information to prospective 
collaborators (Spence 1973, 1974), a beneficent act may represent a costly signal of 
some unobservable, heterogeneous social quality.  
The condition underlying this perspective is that the amount of generosity an 
individual can, or is willing to, provide depends on his/her underlying social quality. 
                                               
2.1 Conditional reciprocity is the most popular explanation for cooperative interaction within the field 
of economics. Note that (evolutionary) biologists consider a much broader range of mechanisms 
(West et al. 2007). Section 2.5 discusses a number of alternative explanations. 
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If so, generous behaviors can be used to transmit information about individual 
differences in social quality, which in turn can be used by others with respect to their 
choices when interacting with the relevant individual (Leimar 1997). It follows that if 
access to valuable social goods is restricted, say, because possible interaction 
partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, and generosity represents an 
avenue whereby individuals can gain access to one such good, individuals competing 
for the good would be challenged to be more generous than others or else forego the 
most valuable opportunities. The upshot would be what has been called “competitive 
altruism” (Roberts 1998; Lotem et al. 2002; Barclay & Willer 2007).  
Note that it is not argued that costly signaling will eradicate the risk of 
defection (or exploitation) in social situations. Rather, the idea is that it could be a 
tool not only to help individuals advertise themselves as attractive exchange partners, 
but to enable them to predict which potential associates are not likely to defect on 
them. After all, the parties to an interaction have a mutual interest in sharing 
information about their relevant qualities even if their interests are strongly opposed.  
Based on a recent contribution in this spirit (Gintis et al. 2001), I develop a 
model of individual behavior that contrasts signaling activities without social 
benefits with activities that benefit the observers in situations in which individuals 
compete for access to a scarce social good. The objective is to characterize the 
possible separating equilibria in each case. Paralleling traditional signaling models, 
the framework comprises a two-sided transaction within the context of which 
incompletely informed, self-interested agents are looking to interact with one 
another. The setting is framed in terms of the signalers striving to form coalitions 
with the receivers.2 In contrast to standard models, besides considering beneficent 
signals, the framework features competition among the signalers as opposed to the 
receivers. Conceptually, this implies that the intensity of the signal may affect the 
outcome of the agents’ interaction. The main result of this chapter is the derivation of 
a unique separating equilibrium in mixed strategies for a class of signaling games 
involving beneficent signals and symmetric signalers of two discrete types, subject 
only to a non-decreasing beliefs restriction on the part of the observers of the signals.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the 
theoretical underpinnings of the framework. Section 2.3 thereupon introduces and 
                                               
2.2 Although one could think of alternative backdrops, Section 2.4 highlights the relevance of this 
perspective in the context of human social interaction. 
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solves the model both with a restricted set of players and within a general  -player 
framework. Section 2.4 discusses the results. Section 2.5 reviews the related 
literature, followed by concluding remarks in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Foundation 
Notwithstanding the fact that costly signaling has a long history in a number of 
disciplines, a first attempt to model the idea that individually costly behavior that 
yields a benefit to others can constitute a costly signal has been made only recently 
(Gintis et al. 2001). Building on anthropological fieldwork, the authors set out to 
provide an explanation for the evolution of group-beneficial behavior – the 
unconditional provision of a benefit to a collection of other individuals.3 The 
approach is founded on the notion that the fitness or material benefits derived from 
group-beneficial activities, if they result in advantageous alliances (e.g., mating 
opportunities or coalitions) for those using them as a costly signal, could account for 
the evolutionary proliferation of the relevant behaviors.  
Their framework involves a series of one-period, multi-player public-goods 
games. As the players’ interaction is not repeated, without signaling, the unique 
equilibrium of the game prescribes universal defection as the players’ dominant 
strategy. When accounting for signaling benefits and focusing on separating 
equilibria in pure strategies, it can be shown that “signaling of underlying quality by 
providing a benefit to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and may 
proliferate [in a population] when [initially] rare” (p. 104). This result holds provided 
that individuals of high quality are not too common and the cost of signaling is 
sufficiently high for individuals of low quality. 
Formally, every period features a group of   individuals of two discrete types, 
high or low quality; information on type is private. Prior to interacting with another 
group member, an individual can signal his/her type by executing a non-excludable, 
individually costly, group-beneficial action.4 If deemed adequate by a receiver, the 
provision of the benefit can result in an alliance with one or more receivers. Note that 
a signaler can ally with many receivers. A given receiver, in turn, is assumed to ally 
                                               
2.3 Lotem et al. (2002) develop a model in a similar spirit, i.e., regarding the evolution of cooperation 
via costly signaling. Yet, in contrast to Gintis et al. (2001) and the present approach, their framework 
not only involves repeated interaction, but comprises cooperation even in the absence of signaling. 
2.4 The cost of the activity is assumed to be strictly positive and lower for individuals of high quality. 
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with only one signaler. Every alliance yields a fixed positive benefit for the signalers, 
while the receivers obtain a type- and signal-dependent payoff. Hence, in its essence, 
the static model corresponds to a tournament among the signalers for alliances.  
While my framework parallels the static elements of this approach, it differs in 
three essential respects. From a technical standpoint, rather than allowing for only 
two levels of the signal, I consider a continuous action space on the part of the 
signalers. An immediate implication of this extension is the relevance of a much 
more extensive array of configurations of the receivers’ beliefs, which are explicitly 
addressed. It turns out that these adaptations in conjunction with the assumptions of 
conventional economic models of costly signaling not only render my framework 
more general, but move the nature of the signal – i.e., neutral or beneficent – to the 
center of the analysis. This contrasts sharply with the framework by Gintis, Smith, 
and Bowles (2001; henceforth GSB), in whose case the nature of the signal is not 
decisive for the equilibrium: Neutral and even harmful signals can satisfy the same 
separating equilibrium as generous activities. Moreover, a wide range of parameter 
values gives rise to a non-signaling equilibrium.5 Although the main part of my 
analysis involves signals with strictly private benefits for the receiver once (s)he 
chooses his/her ally – one might think of the receiver having to return the benefits of 
the signalers (s)he does not ally with – it can easily be extended to encompass signals 
with non-excludable benefits to others (cf. Section 2.4). 
From a conceptual point of view, my analytical angle differs from that of GSB 
in that I do not consider evolutionary mechanisms. Instead, I home in on the 
signaling issue. Given a link between the signal (neutral or beneficent) and the 
sender’s unobservable quality, I show that under a certain set of circumstances the 
signaling activity can be sustained in a one-shot environment. In effect, the 
underlying disparity is in the research questions. Whereas GSB investigate how a 
group-beneficial signal can arise in a framework that encourages defection, given 
standard assumptions, I try to determine what a separating equilibrium involving 
beneficent signals in conjunction with competition among the signalers would look 
like, if it exists, and how it contrasts with the equilibrium given neutral signals.  
                                               
2.5 My model furthermore diverges from GSB’s framework in that I do not consider a cost to monitor 
signals. While requiring amendments to the receiver’s payoff function, for a sufficiently small cost, 
the results will qualitatively be the same as those derived in the following. 
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As such, the game developed in the following is a one-period, non-cooperative 
game of incomplete information involving two populations of risk-neutral 
individuals – signalers (he) and receivers (she). The signalers, who are differentiated 
in social quality, try to transfer information about their “type” to the homogenous 
receivers by simultaneously investing in a costly signal; the receivers are assumed 
worthwhile allies. I (exogenously) distinguish between neutral signals, which do not 
benefit the receivers, and beneficent signals, which confer a benefit6 (positive 
externality) on them. Observation of the intensity of a signal is presumed to facilitate 
detection of an individual’s willingness to invest in a collective good once part of an 
alliance, although the choices within the alliance are not explicitly modeled. Based 
on the informational content of the signals, the receivers choose to provide access to 
profitable alliances to some of the signalers. In particular, a signaler will gain access 
to an alliance if he is able to signal that he is most likely to be of high social quality. 
By the nature of this game, the appropriate equilibrium concept is the perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, i.e., establishing a strategy profile according to which 
the receivers’ beliefs about the signalers’ types, conditional on having observed their 
signals, and the signalers’ best-response functions are self-confirming. For 
transparency, the model is initially presented with a restricted set of players – two 
signalers and one receiver. Having established the main arguments of the analysis, 
the framework is generalized to   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 receivers.  
 
2.3 The Model 
2.3.1 The Simplest Case: Two Signalers and One Receiver 
Let   ∈ ℝ 
  refer to the observable signal regarding some unobservable social 
characteristic, say, reliability. Attention is restricted to two types of individuals in 
terms of their social quality – high (H) and low (L). The amount, or value, of the 
social characteristic held by each type of signaler is denoted by θ  ∈ {θ
 , θ }, with 
θ  > θ  > 0. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) signify the prior probability that a signaler is of high 
type; it is assumed common7 knowledge. The cost for signaler   of sending a signal 
                                               
2.6 If the benefit was large enough to offset the signalers’ cost, the signals could be considered socially 
beneficial. The term “beneficence” is intended to indicate that they, in all cases, benefit the receivers. 
2.7 For the purposes at hand, this assumption seems reasonable as the proportion of individuals of high 
and low quality is likely to be known within a given society (cf. Harsanyi 1967–68). 
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of level    when endowed with amount θ  of the social characteristic is given by 
c(  , θ ). It is assumed to take the following linear form:  
c(  , θ ) =  
γ ∙     if θ = θ
 
 γ ∙      if θ = θ
 ,
 
where γ  > γ  > 0 represent the signaler types’ marginal cost of signaling. Note that 
the cost of not signaling is zero, the cost of signaling increases at a constant rate with 
the level of the signal, and the cost and marginal cost of signaling are assumed to be 
lower for signalers of high type.  
The interaction of the two signalers and the receiver proceeds as follows: 
1) Nature randomly and independently determines each signaler’s type – high 
(H) or low (L) – with probabilities λ and (1 − λ), respectively.  
2) Each signaler is privately informed of his type. 
3) The signalers simultaneously choose a signaling level    ≥ 0 contingent on 
their type.  
4) After observing both signals, the receiver decides which signaler to choose 
as her ally. She can form an alliance with exactly one signaler. 
5) The payoffs are realized.  
The players’ payoffs are as follows. If   ∈ {1, 2} denotes the receiver’s choice of 
Signaler 1 or 2 conditional on having observed both of their signals (   and   , 
respectively), signaler  ’s payoff is given by: 
  
  (  ,   ),  , (θ , θ )  =   ∙ [1 − (  −  )
 ]− c(  , θ ). 
Entry into an alliance yields a commonly known fixed positive “prize” of value 
  > 0 for the chosen signaler (first term on the right-hand side of the expression). It 
can be thought of as a material benefit such as economic resources, political power, 
status, or the like, acquired as part of the alliance or because of it. The specification 
captures that a signaler only nets a positive payoff if he is, in fact, chosen as the 
receiver’s ally, i.e., an alliance with the receiver represents an indivisible object of 
limited supply. As investing in a signal is costly, not being chosen as the receiver’s 
ally entails a loss. The receiver’s payoff, in turn, is given by: 
   (  ,   ),  , (θ , θ )  = θ  + A ∙    , 
where θ   signifies the type-dependent value of the chosen signaler, and A ∙    
represents a possible signal-dependent benefit for the receiver, with parameter A ≥ 0. 
Without loss of generality, an alliance yields the receiver a benefit in the form of the 
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chosen signaler’s type-dependent value (θ), which can be thought of as his efficacy 
or competence as an ally (e.g., in achieving a mutual benefit), and potentially a 
signal-dependent benefit proportional to the magnitude of the chosen signaler’s 
signal. Note that all this specification requires is that the signal benefits the receiver – 
it may or may not benefit other individuals in a signaler’s social environment.  
The central payoff-relevant term for the purposes of the analysis is the receiver’s 
signal-dependent benefit (A), which depending on its magnitude captures two distinct 
effects of the intensity of the signal on the receiver’s payoff. If A = 0, the signalers 
are using a neutral signal, i.e., the receiver does not benefit from the activity beyond 
receiving information about the signalers’ types (an example would be conspicuous 
consumption). This setting is similar to Spence’s seminal signaling model (1973, 
1974) in that the receiver is concerned about the type of individual she allies with 
given the signal she observes. Yet, whereas the signaler in Spence’s model receives a 
reward that depends on his perceived type, the signaler in this paper receives a fixed 
reward when “hired.”  Moreover, as indicated, the present framework does not 
comprise competition among the receivers; only the signalers compete with each 
other. It is in this respect that the emphasis here is on the signalers’ behavior and 
competitive relationship, while Spence’s account pays particular attention to the 
receivers’ response to their uncertain environment.  
If A > 0, even if small in magnitude, the signalers are using a beneficent signal, 
i.e., the receiver benefits from the signaling activity itself.8 More precisely, the 
receiver obtains a private benefit proportional to the magnitude of the signal sent by 
the chosen signaler. A scenario illustrating this case might involve an individual with 
specialized knowledge relating to some project requiring the collaboration of several 
individuals, acquired at a cost (e.g., effort), sharing information fragments with other 
members of his social environment in order to signal his cooperative intent. In the 
instance of an alliance, the receiver might then privately be provided with all 
essential details. As she is only acquainted with parts of the information, she does not 
benefit from the information provided by the signaler she does not choose as her ally; 
though, as long as the receiver allies with the individual sending the highest signal, 
this assumption is effectively arbitrary (cf. Section 2.4). 
                                               
2.8 Since standard signaling models assume competition among the receivers, any benefit of a signal 
(e.g., if education increases the productivity of workers, in which case the signal is not wasteful per 
se) is not recouped by the receivers as they compete it away; it is fully appropriated by the signaler.  
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The players’ equilibrium strategies clearly depend on the type of signal 
employed by the signalers as well as the configuration of the receiver’s beliefs about 
the signalers’ types when assessing the signals. The approach taken in the following 
is constructive: For each kind of signal, I construct symmetric separating equilibria in 
the sense that signalers of high type choose a higher level of a signal than signalers 
of low type, while the signalers behave symmetrically within their respective types. 
Both expositions pay careful attention to the configuration of the receiver’s beliefs 
and comprise statements relating to the uniqueness of the equilibrium profiles.  
 
2.3.1.1 Optimal Behavior of the Receiver 
By backward induction, consider first the receiver’s optimal strategy. Since 
θ  > θ  > 0 and (if applicable) anticipating a signal-dependent benefit, an alliance 
will occur even if the population is composed exclusively of signalers of low type. 
This implies that the receiver obtains a non-negative payoff regardless of the type of 
her ultimate ally.9 Yet, by the same token, she would strictly prefer to ally with a 
signaler of high type. The receiver will thus optimally want to behave as follows.  
 
Observation 2.1 If A = 0, conditional on observing a signal from each signaler, 
the receiver will ally with the signaler who she assesses to 
have the highest probability of being of high type. If A > 0, 
and if the signalers appear to be of the same type, she will ally 
with the signaler who bestows the highest benefit on her. In 
case of a tie (i.e., the signalers send signals of the same 
magnitude and the receiver considers them to be of the same 
type), a natural strategy is the random selection of one of the 
individuals as her ally.  
 
Her payoff is maximized in each case since she obtains θ  > 0 or θ  > 0 as well as 
the highest possible signal-dependent benefit, if any. Note that attention will be 
restricted to equilibria in which the receiver randomizes 50:50 when indifferent.10 As 
the receiver’s optimal beliefs depend on the type of signal used, in the following, this 
generic strategy profile will be augmented with the appropriate beliefs.  
 
                                               
2.9 The foregoing is equivalent to noting that the receiver’s outside option is zero. This not only 
implies that she has an incentive to participate (always) in the interaction, but also that   > 0, to 
induce active participation by the signalers.  
2.10 As ties constitute zero-probability events, any other tie-breaking rule would also work (and be 
quite general); for, the randomization strategy does not (fundamentally) influence the signaler types’ 
expected payoffs. 
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2.3.1.2 Neutral Signals (  =   )  
Turn to the optimal behavior of the signalers and, as a point of reference, 
consider first the case when A = 0. That is, the signalers employ signaling activities 
that do not yield a signal-dependent benefit to the receiver, who therefore only 
receives her ally’s type-dependent intrinsic value as payoff. The receiver’s decision 
problem, correspondingly, amounts to: 
max
 ∈{ , }
[Pr(θ |   ) ∙ θ
  + Pr(θ |   ) ∙ θ
 ], 
where Pr(θ |   ) and Pr(θ
 |   ) denote the receiver’s beliefs about the probability 
that signaler  , having chosen   , is of high or low type, respectively. Since θ
  and θ  
are constant, this problem is equivalent to the receiver maximizing the conditional 
probability of allying with a signaler of high type (cf. Spence 1973). Signaler  ’s 
decision problem, in turn, is given by: 
max
  
 [E[   |   ]− c(  , θ )],    where      =  




∙   if Pr(θ |   ) = Pr θ
      
 0      if Pr(θ |   ) < Pr θ
       
  
for   ≠   ∈ {1, 2} . 
Paralleling standard signaling games, the derivation of an equilibrium for this 
setting requires one to postulate a set of conditional probabilistic beliefs for the 
receiver and determine whether they are self-confirming – that is to say, establish 
that the beliefs feed back upon themselves in the form of the receiver’s after-the-fact 
observations not causing revisions in her original beliefs. To this end and in view of 
the restrictions on the equilibrium outcome (i.e., separation and symmetry within the 
signaler types), consider the following “threshold” beliefs: 
For   0 ≤     <  
∗, Pr θH      = 0, 
for                ≥  
∗, Pr θH      = 1. 
A signaler contemplating a signal strictly below  ∗ will refrain from sending a non-
zero signal as signaling is costly and he does not increase his probability of winning 
when raising it above zero. Likewise, a signal strictly above  ∗ is not sensible since 
he would incur additional costs without a corresponding benefit. Therefore, given the 
hypothesized beliefs, the signalers will either choose to set   = 0 or   =  ∗. If the 
receiver’s beliefs are to be confirmed, it must be that signalers of low type set    = 0 
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and signalers of high type    =  ∗. Namely, the signalers self-select according to 
their type.11   
Algebraically, the constraints on the signaler types’ behavior such that the 
receiver’s beliefs are confirmed can be derived by analyzing whether signaling at the 
“prescribed” level and/or imitation of the other type of signaler are profitable. As 
shown in Appendix 2.1.a (Section 2.A), the proposed symmetric separating 
equilibrium holds as long as: 
 
2 ∙ γ 




Uniqueness. Since the threshold value falls within a range of signaling 
magnitudes, paralleling standard signaling models, the proposed equilibrium is not 
unique.12 Rather, it depends inherently on the configuration of the receiver’s beliefs. 
One could thus construct a wide range of other symmetric separating equilibria as 
well as pooling (and hybrid) profiles – both in pure and mixed strategies. Note that 
this result can easily be generalized to non-linear cost functions.  
 
Observation 2.2 If A = 0, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria, even in pure 
strategies. 
 
Remark. By restricting their model to discrete signals, GSB in effect assume 
threshold beliefs on the part of the receivers. In other words, an equilibrium featuring 
continuous neutral signals and threshold beliefs is, in principle, equivalent to 
restricting the analysis to two distinct levels of the signal.  
 
2.3.1.3 Beneficent Signals (  >   ) 
As soon as A is taken to be even slightly positive, i.e., the signalers employ 
signals that yield a benefit to the receiver, the foregoing symmetric separating 
equilibrium with threshold beliefs on the part of the receiver breaks down. Suppose 
the receiver has threshold beliefs and the signalers send    =    =  
∗. Since the 
                                               
2.11 Under complete information, provided A = 0, both types of signaler would set   = 0 and the 
receiver would choose to ally with a signaler of high type, who would obtain a payoff of   while a 
signaler of low type would receive 0. If both signalers are of the same type, the receiver might adopt 
one of several tie-breaking rules, including choosing randomly or selecting the signaler sending the 
highest signal, implying that there exist several possible outcomes. Note that the(se) outcomes depend 
on there being (at least) two types of signaler. With only one type and/or a positive level of A 
(however small), all equilibria (if any) would be in mixed strategies as it would always be possible to 
deviate to a slightly higher signaling magnitude, thereby ensuring selection as an ally. 
2.12 As detailed in Appendix 2.1.b, contrary to conventional signaling models, equilibrium refinement 
via the “intuitive criterion” (Cho & Kreps 1987) may not have bite in the present environment. 
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receiver’s payoff function now comprises a signal-dependent benefit, given that she 
believes both signalers to be of high type, she will choose to ally with the one 
sending the highest signal. Accordingly, either of the two signalers can gain from 
choosing a signaling intensity marginally greater than  ∗, as such a choice ceteris 
paribus will guarantee that he wins the prize while only incurring a small increase in 
cost – a profitable deviation.  
This reasoning contrasts sharply with the setting when A = 0, where signaling 
   >  
∗ is dominated by    =  
∗, since the probability of winning does not change 
when moving from the former to the latter signal while c(   =  
∗, θ ) < c (   >  
∗, θ ). 
If A > 0, the signalers’ probability of winning the prize increases discontinuously 
with the magnitude of the signal they send, thereby bringing about the equilibrium’s 
collapse. Note that this argument holds for any non-decreasing configuration of 
beliefs, i.e., Pr(θ |   ) being non-decreasing in   .
13 To be precise, if A > 0 and the 
receiver has non-decreasing beliefs, any pure-strategy separating equilibrium derived 
for the case when A = 0 will break down. This is true regardless of the fact that the 
specific equilibrium profile will differ if the receiver’s beliefs differ.  
 
Observation 2.3 Given non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver, the 
transition from A = 0 to A > 0 corresponds to signals above  ∗ 
being strictly preferred to signals at  ∗. 
 
Accordingly, given non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver, the only 
payoff-relevant comparison for each signaler is between the magnitude of his own 
signal and that of his opponent. This suggests that if A > 0, the setting transforms 
into a contest of the form of a (perfectly discriminating) all-pay auction. That is to 
say, since raising his signal can increase a signaler’s probability of winning, the 
signal effectively corresponds to a costly “bid” for an indivisible object – the alliance 
with the receiver – for which several signalers compete.  
In fact, with non-decreasing beliefs, the setting is fully equivalent to an 
incomplete-information all-pay auction with two discrete types of bidders who face 
asymmetric bidding costs and are competing for a prize   by submitting the   ’s as 
their bids. The reasoning is straightforward: Given A > 0, the receiver will optimally 
choose to ally with the highest “bidder,” while the cost of submitting a “bid” is sunk. 
                                               
2.13 Given the nature of the game and restrictions on the equilibrium, decreasing beliefs seem unnatural 
– they would prescribe that higher signals are taken to correspond to lower social quality. The 
remainder of this chapter therefore only considers non-decreasing beliefs.  
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This shift in the structure of the interaction, again, is true for any non-decreasing 
configuration of beliefs, i.e., any equilibrium that satisfies non-decreasing beliefs 
must correspond to an equilibrium of the all-pay auction.14 Note, moreover, that 
neither of the preceding two arguments depends on the linearity of the cost function. 
 
Proposition 2.1  If A > 0, any equilibrium in the present game with non-
decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver is an equilibrium 
of the two-type incomplete-information all-pay auction with 
prize   in which the   ’s are the bids, and where the types have 
asymmetric bidding costs corresponding to γ  > γ  > 0. 
Conversely, any equilibrium of the all-pay auction for prize   
with two types of bidders and incomplete information that 
would be consistent with non-decreasing beliefs constitutes an 
equilibrium in the present game. 
 
The correspondence to an all-pay contest is one of the main conceptual features of 
this model and, in some way, drives all of the arguments and derivations to follow.  
With this background, turn to the players’ decision problems. Given A > 0 and 
non-decreasing beliefs, the receiver’s problem amounts to: 
max
 ∈{ , }
[Pr(θ |   ) ∙ θ
  + Pr(θ |   ) ∙ θ
  + A ∙    ], 
while signaler  ’s decision problem is given by: 
max
  
 [E[   |   ]− c(  , θ )],  where      =  
        if    >   
 
 
∙    if    =   
 0       if    <    
  for     ≠   ∈ {1, 2} . 
Observe that if an equilibrium in line with the aforementioned restrictions (i.e., 
separation and symmetry) exists, it must be optimal for signalers of low type to 
choose signals below the support (of signal intensities) of signalers of high type.15 
Signalers of low type must therefore be optimizing against the strategy of low types 
only; likewise, given the strategy of signalers of low type, signalers of high type 
                                               
2.14 Even with A = 0, strictly increasing beliefs imply an equivalence with an all-pay auction. This 
case, however, is unlikely to be consistent with any kind of equilibrium. Although increasing beliefs 
entail that the receiver allies with the highest “bidder,” under these circumstances, the receiver will be 
certain that the chosen ally is of high type (due to the signalers’ discrete types). In contrast, if A > 0, 
the signals are driven up on account of the signal-dependent benefit. The probability of allying with a 
high type therefore does not necessarily reach 1. 
2.15 Even though the restrictions on the equilibrium imply that both types of signaler may, in 
equilibrium, end up with a negative payoff, presuming their outside option is zero and given the 
receiver’s optimal strategy as well as the signalers’ risk neutrality, participation in the contest 
nonetheless makes sense provided the expected equilibrium payoff is (at least) zero. If so, 
participation is profitable since each type of signaler has a strictly positive probability of winning the 
prize (i.e., λ ∈ (0, 1)).  
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must be optimizing against the strategy of high types only. This implies that part of 
the probability of winning of a high type and the probability of losing of a low type 
can be taken as exogenously fixed ((1 − λ) and λ, respectively). A high type, for 
instance, will win with probability (1 − λ) plus λ times the probability of beating 
another high type. The setting would thus be probabilistic only in the sense that each 
type of signaler recognizes the existence of the other type, as per the rules of the 
game, but otherwise plays as if he would be playing against his “own” type only.  
This reasoning suggests that while the types’ supports inherently affect one 
another, the equilibrium strategy of each type of signaler can be analyzed 
independently. Specifically, from an intuitive point of view, the upper bound of 
signalers of low type, in effect, constitutes a (fixed) lower boundary for the signals of 
signalers of high type. In view of their uncertainty (ex ante) regarding their 
opponent’s type, even if the actual opponent turns out not to be of low type, signalers 
of high type would not want to extend their support to zero (to minimize cost). For, 
they must base their strategy on their expectation of the other signaler’s type. To 
maximize their probability of winning the prize (and guarantee victory against all 
low types), exploiting the asymmetry in the marginal cost of signaling, signalers of 
high type will thus always want to situate their support above the support of signalers 
of low type. Along similar lines, the presence of signalers of high type will not 
induce low types to signal more than the magnitude corresponding to their (expected) 
break-even payoff. Given their marginal cost, the restrictions on the equilibrium 
entail that the cost of surpassing their break-even signal exceeds the associated 
benefit in terms of the extra mass of signalers beaten. Signalers of low type must 
therefore expect to make a loss.16  
The analytical independence of the types’ equilibrium strategies entails that, 
except for a fixed exogenous probability of losing, which effectively discounts the 
prize for winning the contest, for signalers of low type the game is strategically 
equivalent to a complete-information all-pay contest. This is convenient, as Baye et 
al. (1990, 1996) have shown that all equilibria for this class of auctions are in mixed 
strategies. The argument for a mixed-strategy outcome in the present game follows 
from the fact that, if two signalers are perceived to be of the same type, it is always 
profitable (within the bounds of the equilibrium supports) to deviate from a pure 
                                               
2.16 The same reasoning applies to signals at and beyond the maximum “auction bid,” i.e., their 
“valuation” of the alliance without uncertainty. 
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strategy by signaling slightly more than the other signaler, thereby guaranteeing 
oneself the prize. Note that this line of reasoning establishes mixing by both types.  
 
Observation 2.4  Given a fixed exogenous probability of winning or losing, each 
type of signaler effectively optimizes against his “own” type, 
as would be the case under complete information. The 
equilibrium if A > 0 will therefore be in mixed strategies. 
 
Using these ideas, I shall now construct a feasible symmetric separating 
equilibrium. Let G ( ) denote the signalers’ symmetric equilibrium signal 
distribution (c.d.f.) when of type τ ∈ {L, H}, i.e., the probability that the chosen signal 
is no greater than some level   (Pr(   ≤  ) ), and let  
 ( ) denote the density function 
associated with G ( ), if it exists. I shall derive an equilibrium in which G ( ) is 
(absolutely) continuous – meaning density   ( ) exists and the distribution does not 
contain any atoms – and the supports of the types’ mixed strategies are intervals. In 
particular, let the support of signalers of low type be defined as [   ,  
 
] and the 
support of signalers of high type be defined as [   ,  
 
], where    and   
 
 represent 
the respective lower and upper bounds. Given this notation, in keeping with the 
aforesaid restrictions on the equilibrium, the supports must be such that  
 
≤    .17, 18   
These auxiliary assumptions entail the following expected payoffs for the 
signalers. Consider a signaler of low type sending a signal   . Given equilibrium 
behavior by the other players, with probability λ, he faces a signaler of high type and 
loses with certainty; with probability (1 − λ), he faces another low type and incurs a 
strictly positive probability of entering into an alliance with the receiver. Therefore:  
E   
 (  )  = Pr(winning) ∙ (payoff as winner) + Pr(losing) ∙ (payoff as loser) 
                = (1 − λ) ∙  G (  ) ∙ (  − γ
  ∙   ) +  1 − G
 (  )  ∙ (−γ
  ∙   )  + λ ∙ (−γ
  ∙   )                   
                = (1 − λ) ∙ G (  ) ∙   − γ
  ∙   . 
Similarly, the expected payoff of a signaler of high type is given by: 
            E   
 (  )  = (1 − λ) ∙    − γ
  ∙     + λ ∙  G
 (  ) ∙    − γ
  ∙     +  1 − G
 (  )  ∙ (−γ
  ∙   )  
                 = [1 − λ ∙ (1 − G (  ))]∙   − γ
  ∙   . 
In view of the correspondence of the present game to an all-pay contest, one 
approach to deriving an equilibrium would be to translate the setting into a complete-
                                               
2.17 If   
 
=   , then – for separation – both distributions must not contain an atom at this point. 
2.18 It follows that the receiver will (again) adopt threshold beliefs, with the threshold set at  
 
. 
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information all-pay auction with players differing according to their “valuations” as 
opposed to their bidding costs.19 To do so, one would simply divide E[  
 (  )], with 
τ ∈ {L, H}, by the types’ respective marginal cost of “bidding” (γ). For reference, the 




 and    =
 
  
. When maintaining the original formulation of the game, the 
mainspring of the signalers’ decisions is their expected break-even payoff given the 
strictly positive probability of encountering a competitor of the other type.  
Consider first signalers of low type. The restrictions and auxiliary assumptions 
on the equilibrium entail that the lower bound of the support of this type’s 
equilibrium distribution is at zero. As I am looking for a continuous distribution 
function, at   , signaler   will lose with certainty (all mass is above the lower bound), 
implying that a strictly positive lower bound will leave him with a negative payoff. 
By reducing his signal to zero, the signaler prevents a sure loss and guarantees 
himself a profit of zero – a profitable deviation. This argument (also) means that the 
expected equilibrium payoff of this type of signaler given the strategy of the 
competing signaler is zero. To be precise, since the support of the mixed strategy 
extends to zero, and the payoff at the lower bound is zero, the equilibrium payoff 
must be zero at every point along the support. The upper bound of this type’s 
equilibrium strategy,  ̂ , is thus given by (Appendix 2.2.a): 




Note that  ̂  is essentially the probability-weighted auction valuation of this type of 
signaler. The intuition for the upper bound parallels that for the lower bound. 
Suppose  
 
<  ̂ . Given continuous randomization, a signal at the upper bound 
guarantees victory against all other signalers of low type (all mass is below the upper 
bound). This, however, implies that a signal at  
 
 must yield a positive expected 
payoff, which contradicts the equilibrium payoff of zero. Similarly, an upper bound 
such that  
 
>  ̂  is not consistent with equilibrium, as it would imply a negative 
expected payoff. In short, an upper bound other than  ̂  contradicts randomization 
across the full support and can therefore not be an equilibrium strategy. 
Turn now to the strategy of signalers of high type. Suppose that there is no gap 
between the types’ supports, i.e.,    =  ̂ . I will show presently that there are, in fact, 
                                               
2.19 To the best of my knowledge, the present variant of a (standard) all-pay auction has not yet been 
analyzed in the literature, i.e., incomplete information in conjunction with discrete types. 
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no other equilibria. Since signalers of low type make zero profit at  ̂ , given that 
their marginal cost of signaling is lower, signalers of high type must make a positive 
profit as this point. Hence, as I am looking for a mixed strategy, this type of signaler 
must expect to make a positive profit at every point along his support. The upper 
bound of the support of the equilibrium strategy of signalers of high type,  ̂ , can 
correspondingly be derived by computing their payoff at  ̂ , where they win with 
probability (1 − λ) and, using that the payoffs must be the same, determining the 
point at which they win with certainty. As shown in Appendix 2.2.a, it is given by:  







which, too, is a probability-weighted transformation of this type’s auction valuation.  
Having established the equilibrium supports and payoffs, the signaler types’ 
equilibrium distribution functions follow straightforwardly from their respective 
expected payoff functions. They are given by (Appendix 2.2.b): 
G (  ) =
γ 
(1 − λ) ∙  









Proposition 2.2 There exists an equilibrium according to which signalers of 
low type randomize continuously on [0,   ̂ ], signalers of high 
type randomize continuously on [ ̂ ,   ̂ ], and the receiver 
adopts threshold beliefs, with the threshold set at  ̂ . The 
types’ equilibrium strategies are given by G (  ) and G
 (  ). 
 
Existence can be verified by establishing (1) that the payoffs are constant along 
the signaler types’ supports and no higher elsewhere, which curtails imitation of the 
other type’s behavior, and (2) that the receiver’s beliefs conform to behavior. 
Appendix 2.2.c features the derivations verifying existence of the equilibrium for the 
signalers. Accordingly, given the prize for entry into an alliance and the cost of 
investing in the signal, in equilibrium, the signalers make rational signaling choices.  
Consistency of the receiver’s beliefs with equilibrium behavior follows from 
the structure of the signalers’ payoffs and strategies. That is, if the receiver’s beliefs 
are to be confirmed, the signalers have to self-select according to their type in the 
sense that signalers of low type choose signaling levels between 0 and  ̂ , while 
signalers of high type choose magnitudes between  ̂  and  ̂ . If so, the receiver’s 
beliefs are not disconfirmed by the observed signal intensities and subsequent 
experience having entered into an alliance with a signaler, which must entail that 
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they are “accurate,” or self-confirming. Threshold beliefs with the threshold set at  ̂ , 
such that signals beyond  ̂  are (also) taken to indicate high quality, i.e.,    
Pr(θ |    >  ̂
 ) = 1, unambiguously satisfy this requirement. Note that, due to the 
analytical independence of the signalers’ equilibrium strategies, the definition of the 
receiver’s beliefs for signals at  ̂  (exactly) does not affect the players’ payoffs.20 
Intuition. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the intuition for the equilibrium. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the signaler types’ equilibrium densities for λ = ½ , γ  = 1, 
γ  = ½ ,   = 6, and threshold beliefs on the part of the receiver. On account of the 
linearity of the cost function, both densities are uniform. Suppose a signaler of low 
type slightly increases the intensity of his signal, say, by ε. This step yields a 
marginal benefit (shaded region) – in terms of the probability mass of signals of the 
other signaler, provided that he is also of low type – of ℎ  ∙ ε, where ℎ  denotes the 
height of the density of this type of signaler. He is indifferent between the higher 
signal and the original one if this benefit exactly offsets his additional cost, γ  ∙ ε. In 
the case at hand, this is precisely what happens for both types of signaler: A change 
in signal intensity results in the same change in the signaler’s probability of winning. 
 
Figure 2.1. A Sketch of the Signaler Types’ Equilibrium Densities and the 
Receiver’s Equilibrium Beliefs 
 
 
Figure 2.2 underlines this point by illustrating the signaler types’ expected 
payoff functions. Clearly, both types make a loss relative to their equilibrium payoff 
when exceeding the bounds of their equilibrium supports, which implies that neither 
type of signaler has an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy. In the 
context of a given signaler type trespassing into the other type’s equilibrium support, 
this is true either because the marginal cost of the higher signal exceeds its marginal 
benefit (low type), or because the expected cost savings from reducing the signal fall 
                                               











   = 12  ̂  = 9  ̂  = 3 0 ε 
ℎ  
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short of the expected marginal loss in the signaler’s probability of winning (high 
type). Along similar lines, signalers of high type do not have an incentive to surpass 
the upper bound of their support as the probability of winning does not change (it 
remains one) while their cost of signaling increases.  
 
Figure 2.2. A Sketch of the Signaler Types’ Expected Equilibrium Payoffs 
 
 
Uniqueness. Having established the existence of the equilibrium described in 
Proposition 2.2, the question arises whether there are other equilibria that satisfy the 
aforesaid restrictions.21 To arrive at an answer to this question, consider the main 
assumptions underlying the derivations hitherto: continuity of the equilibrium 
distribution functions G ( ), for τ ∈ {L, H}, and disjoint but contiguous supports. If 
atoms along, gaps within and between the supports, and overlaps of the supports can 
be ruled out, there do not exist any pooling equilibria nor separating equilibria of an 
alternative configuration, which – in conjunction with the arguments establishing 
existence – implies that there do not exist any other equilibria for the given class of 
games. For transparency, I shall initially focus on separating equilibria and then 
show that pooling equilibria are not sustainable. 
Maintaining the assumptions of symmetric behavior within the signaler types 
and non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver, consider first the existence of 
atoms along the types’ supports. Specifically, suppose that the strategy of signalers 
of low type features an atom at 0 ≤   ≤  ̅  . Moreover, suppose both signalers are 
                                               
2.21 I give an intuitive account of the relevant arguments. The technical details can be adapted from 
Baye et al. (1990, 1996). Even though the authors’ treatment only deals with a single type, it can 
straightforwardly be extended to the two-type case considered here.  
Slope: −γ  < 0 
Slope: γ  − γ  < 0 
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sending a signal of the magnitude of the atom. Can one of them gain by deviating? 
Yes. If one of the signalers considered increasing his signal by ε > 0 but small, his 
cost would increase by γ  ∙ ε. Yet, concurrently, his probability of winning would 
increase discontinuously since each signaler’s signal distribution function will 
comprise a discrete upward jump (equal to the size of the mass point) at the location 
of the atom. As a result, the marginal benefit of increasing his signal from mass point 
  to some nearby signal   + ε would exceed the small additional cost of sending the 
higher signal. This implies that the higher signal would indeed be profitable, and that 
an atom at 0 ≤   ≤  ̅   cannot be an equilibrium strategy. The same argument, with 
 ̅  ≤   ≤  ̅  , also rules out mass points along the support of signalers of high type.  
Gaps between the types’ supports can be ruled out as follows. Suppose  
   >  ̅ . Irrespective of the receiver’s beliefs for signals between  ̅  and   , 
signalers of high type can deviate by choosing a signal within the gap interval. For, 
this move will reduce their cost of signaling without affecting their probability of 
winning. Say a signaler of high type would signal  ̅  with probability one, a pure 
strategy, as opposed to choosing   . He would continue to win against all signalers 
of low type but incur a strictly lower cost than at    >  ̅ , which yields him a higher 
expected payoff.22 A lower bound at    >  ̅  can thus not be an equilibrium strategy. 
The same logic rules out gaps within the supports.  
Finally, suppose the supports overlap – ceteris paribus. There must therefore 
exist two signals, say,   and   for   <   , that belong to both types’ support. Between 
  and  , the signaler types face the same marginal benefit of increasing their signal, 
yet a signaler of high type faces a strictly lower cost (since γ  > γ ). As the payoff 
of signalers of low type is constant between   and  , by definition of an equilibrium 
in mixed strategies, signalers of high type must have a higher payoff at  , which 
contradicts equilibrium. Note that this argument rules out all pooling and partial-
pooling equilibria.23, 24 Hence, in contrast to the setting with neutral signals (A = 0), 
                                               
2.22 Note that this argument depends on there being no atoms (already established), because if there 
was one at   , deviation below that level would reduce the signaler’s probability of winning. 
2.23 Alternating pieces of support, i.e., low-high-low-etc., can be ruled out immediately as they are 
inconsistent with non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver. 
2.24 The restrictions on the equilibrium, especially the one on the receiver’s beliefs, are critical for the 
foregoing line of reasoning. Without the specification of non-decreasing beliefs, there appear to exist 
other separating equilibria. For example, if the high types’ support comprises atoms at regular 
intervals and the receiver believes that signaling levels between the atoms correspond to low quality, 
randomization across the atoms would seem to be an equilibrium – presuming signalers of low type 
randomize continuously on [0,  ̅ ]. 
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the use of beneficent signals (A > 0) gives rise to a near definitive prediction for the 
signalers’ equilibrium strategies. 
 
Proposition 2.3 The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.2 is unique 
amongst equilibria satisfying symmetry within the signaler 
types and non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver.  
 
Remarks. Observe that the equilibrium does not depend on the exact value of 
A – as long as it is strictly positive, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.2 
will hold.  The linearity of the cost function, too, is not as restrictive as it may seem. 
For, as stated, the breakdown of the representative equilibrium derived for the setting 
with neutral signals and the all-pay auction structure of the interaction are 
independent of the nature of the cost function. The central requisite is that the 
signaler types face asymmetric marginal costs such that signaling is cheaper for high 
types. While non-linear (e.g., exponential) changes in the cost of signaling would 
clearly affect the structure of the payoff functions and thus the bounds of the 
equilibrium supports, the general pattern of the equilibrium with non-linear costs 
would qualitatively remain the same as the profile derived for a linear cost function. 
Likewise, it is to be expected that the results extend to any finite number of signaler 
types. The relevant equilibrium will tend to feature separate but contiguous strategies 
equal to the number of types being considered, ranked according to the relative size 
of the marginal cost of signaling of each type. As a final note, many of the results 
(especially with respect to the outcome’s uniqueness) are likely to hold in the 
presence of asymmetries among the signaler types in the sense that signalers of a 
given type do not necessarily behave the same.25 
 
2.3.2 The General Case 
So far, the framework only considered a restricted set of players. It can, 
however, easily be generalized to comprise   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 receivers. In 
fact, the extension is almost trivial. For, with the exception of the players’ expected 
payoff functions, none of the main arguments and derivations establishing the results 
for the simple case fundamentally relied on the number of signalers and receivers. In 
                                               
2.25 As the framework is set in a world of non-transferrable utility, the receiver cannot make payments 
to the signalers, which renders welfare considerations somewhat problematic. In particular, policy 
interventions that reduce the level of (wasteful) costly signaling, e.g., taxation of signaling, are 
unlikely to bring about Pareto improvements because less signaling makes the receiver worse off (she 
obtains a lower benefit). 
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the setting with beneficent signals, for instance, all that mattered for a given signaler 
was the presence of a competitor for the indivisible alliance with the receiver. 
Consider a social environment with   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 homogeneous26 
receivers, ceteris paribus. It is easy to see that even in the general case, there will be 
a multiplicity of equilibria if the signalers employ neutral signals (A = 0). The case 
of beneficent signals (A > 0) is similarly straightforward if one assumes that the 
signalers are not restricted with respect to the number of alliances they can enter, i.e., 
if, in the extreme, a single signaler could ally with all27   receivers (cf. GSB). The 
receivers’ homogeneity in conjunction with the aforementioned restrictions on the 
equilibrium entail that, given the signalers’ behavior, each receiver will ultimately 
want to ally with the signaler sending the highest signal. In other words, all   
receivers optimally behave the same.  
To highlight the quantitative differences between the simple and general cases 
if A > 0, I shall briefly outline the main elements of the analysis with many players. 
If δ  ∈ {1, … ,  } denotes receiver  ’s choice of signaler   ∈ {1, … ,  } conditional on 
having observed each of their signals (   through   , respectively), signaler  ’s 
payoff is given by: 
  
  (  , … ,   ), (δ , … , δ ), (θ , … , θ )  =   ∙    (δ ,  )
 
   
− c(  , θ ), 
where  
 (δ ,  ) =  
1  if δ  =   
  0  otherwise
   for    = 1, … ,  . 
Similarly, receiver  ’s payoff is given by: 
  
  (  , … ,   ), (δ , … , δ ), (θ , … , θ )  = θ   + A ∙     . 
Provided non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receivers, the general 
setting, too, corresponds to a two-type incomplete-information all-pay contest about 
                                               
2.26 Although this might seem a strong assumption, it is reasonable if one presumes that the average 
quality of the social goods the signalers are competing for is the same. Recall that the receivers are 
assumed to be worthwhile allies (also cf. Spence 1973, 1974).  
2.27 For the purposes at hand, this assumption seems sensible. It implies that if   <   , the signalers 
compete for a limited number of profitable alliances; if   =  , it would be feasible that each signaler 
allies with one receiver, but given that a signaler obtains a prize for each alliance he enters into, the 
signalers will attempt to achieve as many alliances as possible. The latter continues to hold if   >  . 
If, in turn, signalers were restricted to ally with a single receiver, consistency of the setting would 
require that   <   . Otherwise, signaling would not be necessary as the number of receivers would 
correspond to or exceed the number of signalers. The result of this modification would be that, given 
non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receivers, the   signalers sending the highest signals would 
achieve an alliance. As such, the game would be transformed into a matching contest.  
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prize  , in which the   ’s are the players’ bids.
28 To write down the signaler types’ 
expected payoff functions and use them to construct the generalized version of the 
symmetric separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.2, consider the 
following revised notation. Let   ( ) refer to the signalers’ (absolutely continuous) 
symmetric equilibrium signal distribution (c.d.f.) when of type τ ∈ {L, H}, and let the 
associated density function be denoted by ℊ ( ).  
Now consider a signaler of low type sending a signal   . By separation, he only 
stands a chance of winning if all other signalers are also of low type, which occurs 
with probability (1 − λ)   . If so, his probability of winning, presuming the receivers 
and all other signalers behave according to their respective equilibrium strategies, is 
given by the product of the equilibrium distribution functions of all of his 
competitors   = 1, … ,   − 1, which – by symmetry – amounts to [  (  )]
   . The 
expected payoff of signalers of low type is therefore given by: 
E   
 (  )  = (1 − λ)
    ∙  [  (  )]
    ∙    ∙   − γ  ∙     +  1 − [ 
 (  )]
     ∙  −γ  ∙     
+ (1 − (1 − λ)   ) ∙ (−γ  ∙   ) 
                = (1 − λ)    ∙ [  (  )]
    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙   . 
The expected payoff of a signaler of high type follows from a similar logic. 
The main difference is that the intensity of his signal relative to that of other 
signalers depends on how many equally potent signalers   = 0, … ,   − 1 exist in his 
social environment. The expected payoff of this type of signaler is thus given by: 
E   






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)     
∙ {[  (  )]
  ∙ (  ∙   − γ  ∙   ) + (1 − [ 
 (  )]
 ) ∙ (−γ  ∙   )}, 
where the term following the summation sign describes all possible combinations 






Manipulation yields the following simplified expression: 
E   






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙ [  (  )]
   − γ  ∙   . 
It is not hard to verify that the supports of the types’ equilibrium mixed 
strategies are on [0,    ] for signalers of low type and on [   ,    ] for those of high 
                                               
2.28 Note that the general setting could also be translated into a complete-information all-pay auction. 
For reference, the types’ “auction valuations” of the alliances are given by    =
 ∙ 
  
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type, where     = (1 − λ)    ∙
 ∙ 
  
 and     = (1 − λ)    ∙
 ∙ 
  




(Appendix 2.3.a). Note that the upper bounds once again constitute probability-
weighted transformations of each type’s auction valuation (cf. Footnote 2.28). 
Having established the equilibrium supports and payoffs, the signaler types’ 
equilibrium distribution functions can be derived to be (Appendix 2.3.b): 
  (  ) =  
γ  ∙   








∙  λ − 1 +  
γ 
  ∙  
∙     −   




It is easy to check that, for   = 2 and   = 1, these expressions reduce to the 
distributions derived for the simple case. Moreover, arguments corresponding to 
those establishing the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the simple case 
can be used to establish the following result; Appendix 2.3.c features the derivations 
verifying existence of the equilibrium for the signalers. 
 
Proposition 2.4 The unique symmetric non-decreasing beliefs equilibrium of 
the game with beneficent signals,   ≥ 2 signalers, and   ≥ 1 
homogeneous receivers, has signalers of low type randomizing 
continuously on [0,    ], signalers of high type randomizing 
continuously on [   ,    ], and all   receivers adopting 
threshold beliefs, with the threshold set at    . The types’ 
equilibrium strategies are given by   (  ) and  
 (  ). 
 
Intuition. Despite the correspondence of the main arguments and derivations, 
as the generalized densities are not uniform, the intuition for the result in the game 
with   signalers and   receivers is somewhat more involved. The gist of the 
difference is that, in the general case, the distribution of players sending higher 
signals than oneself moves to the center stage. That is, victory in the setting with 
many players requires sending the highest signal of the group. In order to be selected 
as the receivers’ ally, signaler   has to outperform the winner of the   − 1 other 
signalers. In this sense, he effectively competes against the highest signal of all other 
signalers (the second-highest order statistic) as opposed to all competing signals (the 
whole distribution). Since the simple case only comprised two signalers, this 
distinction of the competing signals was irrelevant, the result being a uniform 
distribution of the winning signal. Competition against the highest competing signal, 
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however, entails that the distribution of the winning signal is skewed towards the 
right (i.e., towards higher signals). In consequence, an increase in an individual’s 
signal yields a disproportionately higher gain in his probability of winning when the 
starting signal was high to begin with. In fact, a signaler’s chance of winning 
increases linearly as he increases his signal (as the cost of signaling is linear). 
Nevertheless, given the asymmetry in the types’ marginal cost of signaling, in this 
case, too, it is not profitable for a signaler of low type to imitate a signaler of high 
type as the marginal cost of increasing the signal would exceed the associated 
marginal benefit. Likewise, a signaler of high type would incur a loss when deviating 
to a signaling intensity below     or exceeding    .29 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In view of the essential simplicity of the setup, the main finding is quite 
striking. Provided a number of mostly mild restrictions are satisfied, use of signaling 
activities that provide a (private) benefit to their recipients in an environment 
featuring competition among the signalers gives rise to a unique symmetric 
separating equilibrium.30 Signaler competition in conjunction with neutral signals, in 
turn, does not lead to a sharp prediction. To delineate further the intuition and scope 
of these results, I shall comment on the breadth of the analysis and findings and 
contrast them with those by GSB and the standard signaling literature.   
Among the most notable aspects of the analysis is the intuitive merit of the 
results’ comparative static properties. Given, among others, common information 
about the composition of the social environment, the findings suggest that 
individuals will be no more pro-social than is necessary to achieve the desired social 
good. When using neutral signals, given a set of beliefs on the part of the observers 
of the signals, the main determinant of the signalers’ behavior is their cost of sending 
                                               
2.29 To complete the framework, rather than considering two separate populations of agents, or 
equivalently, a single population comprising two kinds of agents, it would be necessary also to 
consider the case when each individual takes both roles, i.e., sends and receives signals (cf. GSB). 
This augmentation clearly requires that   =   (cf. Footnote 2.27). The main adjustment to the 
analysis and results would be that the signaler sending the highest signal cannot ally with himself, 
implying that the signaler sending the second-highest signal will achieve at least one alliance.  
2.30 The equilibrium can be perceived in two ways – ex ante or ex post. Assuming, as is done 
throughout the analysis, that the distribution of types is known (ex post), the signaler types’ 
equilibrium strategies (in the simple case) are given by G (  ) and G
 (  ). Conversely, if the 
distribution of types is taken to be unknown (ex ante), one can think of each signaler as optimally 
playing according the weighted sum of their “ex-post” strategies: (1 − λ) ∙ G (  ) + λ ∙ G
 (  ).  
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a particular signal intensity, i.e., the higher the cost, the lower the signals. With 
beneficent signals in use, the composition of the population of competitors gains in 
importance (for the signalers’ strategy). If the group has a large proportion of high-
quality individuals, entailing that high competing signals are likely, the signalers will 
tend to send high(er) signals themselves (i.e., the upper bound of the high types’ 
support increases). They will, however, evade a fixed level of the activity (pure 
strategy), thereby avoiding preventable over- or under-bidding. Paradoxically, the 
unique nature of the outcome suggests that competition between asymmetric (in 
terms of their quality) individuals may be a key factor in groups’ attempts to achieve 
collectively beneficial outcomes. 
More unexpectedly, as long as it is strictly positive, the equilibrium profile for 
the setting with beneficent signals does not depend on the exact size the marginal 
benefit of the signal (A). One might thus make the case that, in the limit, the 
equilibrium could be used to select the corresponding equilibrium when signalers use 
neutral signals. To be precise, as A tends to 0, the separating equilibrium 
characterized in Proposition 2.4 continues to hold, which may suggest that the same 
equilibrium should also be the favored (refined) profile when analyzing settings 
involving neutral signals.31  
Turning to the reach of the framework, the two main (in part implicit) features 
of the setting with A > 0 are that the receiver has to “return” the benefit of the 
signaler she does not choose as her ally and that she cannot (per se) reject an alliance. 
While it may seem restrictive that the receiver cannot retain the benefit of all 
signalers, it is easy to show that the analysis and equilibrium straightforwardly 
extend to this case. In particular, suppose the receiver’s payoff function takes the 
following form – ceteris paribus: 
   (  ,   ),  , (θ , θ )  = θ  + A ∙     + B ∙    ,  where     ≠   . 
It is not hard to see that, as long as A > B, the equilibrium will not be affected, as the 
receiver continues to strive for an alliance with the signaler sending the highest 
signal (i.e.,    ≥   ). In short, if the benefit provided by the signaler not chosen as 
the receiver’s ally ( ) is lower than that by the chosen signaler ( ), the analysis goes 
through as presented. On the other hand, if A = B, one is effectively revisiting the 
                                               
2.31 If the receivers adopt the same decision rule as their counterparts in the case with beneficent 
signals (i.e., always selecting the signaler sending the highest signal), the equilibrium outcome may 
also arise in the setting with A = 0, although it is unlikely to be unique. 
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setting with individuals sending neutral signals (A = 0). For, if all signalers provide 
the same level of benefit, rather than caring about the individuals’ signals, the 
receiver is exclusively concerned about the sum of the signals. Consequently, 
paralleling the relevant analysis, she will not (be able to) rely on the size of the 
signal-dependent benefit to guide her selection of an ally. Rather, the outcome(s) will 
depend entirely on her beliefs. Note that it does not matter whether other signalers 
benefit from the signals, i.e., there is no strategic effect. They will simply be able to 
spend more on their own signals, which does not qualitatively affect the equilibrium.  
The assumption that the receiver cannot reject an alliance is equivalent to 
assuming that her outside option is zero or even negative. Bearing in mind the 
environment motivating this chapter, this is not as unreasonable as it may seem. 
After all, in its essence, the model explores a mechanism by which individuals can 
detect the intentions of potential exchange partners. It is, in this context (as well as 
more generally, cf. Spence 1974), not rational to ignore and/or not take into account 
the information available at any one time. Indeed, when social groups of non-kin 
were initially forming and progressively growing, engaging in (profitable) coalitions 
was paramount in order to cope with the pressures of surviving in the new 
environment (van Vugt et al. 2007). Having identified someone as a cooperative 
interactant, people are unlikely to have rejected interaction with them. 
More generally, observe that – akin to GSB and most orthodox economic 
signaling models – none of the agents in the present framework is driven by any form 
of other-regarding preferences. Their behavior is a purely self-interested best 
response to the information available to them at the time of their decisions. This is an 
advantage of the costly signaling approach to explaining cooperative social 
interaction as it can cope with the most prominent criticisms of standard explanations 
while maintaining the basic tenets of classical economic theory (e.g., Smith 2003; 
van Vugt et al. 2007). That is, it embraces unreciprocated behavior by presuming 
that the cost of generous behavior, via the disclosure of information about an 
individual’s attractiveness as an exchange partner, is compensated by future benefits 
(captured by   in the present framework). Likewise, although it could be, the 
provision of benefits does not need to be sustained by a social norm or explicit 
enforcement by the members of a given population. As individuals can avoid 
interaction with those who are unlikely to reciprocate their good deed(s), the 
approach furthermore does not fall victim to a second-order free-rider problem. This 
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is not to say that costly signaling is (necessarily) the sole explanation for cooperative 
interaction within broad social contexts. The approach is an alternative to other 
angles. In fact, in practice, it is likely that a number of explanations operate in 
concert to give rise to the behavioral patterns we observe on a day-to-day basis.  
In contrast to GSB, the equilibrium in the case of beneficent signals neither 
prescribes a specific composition of the population of individuals, nor can it be 
satisfied by neutral (or harmful) signals. Whilst the need for a specific composition 
of the population in part stems from the evolutionary components of GSB’s analysis, 
both divergences expand the applicability of the present results. Given (exogenously) 
a signal of a certain kind (neutral or beneficent), two types of signaler, an intuitive 
condition on the cost of signaling, and non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the 
receiver(s), this chapter provides conditions for equilibrium for each signal that can 
only be satisfied by the particular signal being investigated. If the signalers use 
neutral signals (A = 0), irrespective of the exact configuration of the receiver’s 
beliefs, none of the equilibria is unique (cf. Spence 1974; Mailath 1988a), whereas 
with beneficent signals (A > 0), all equilibria but one can be ruled out.   
The intuition for this disparity is rooted in the signalers’ cost-benefit ratios. If 
A = 0, the receiver’s objective, using the informational content of the signals she 
observes, is to maximize the probability of allying with a signaler of high type. 
Given threshold beliefs, the signalers will optimally signal just enough to be 
considered high types. Any signal beyond the threshold level entails a loss as the cost 
of doing so exceeds the associated benefit in terms of the extra mass of competitors 
beaten. In sharp contrast, although the receiver continues to seek an ally of high type, 
if A > 0 and provided that the receiver adopts non-decreasing beliefs, the signalers 
can gain from increasing their signals beyond the threshold level. On account of the 
signals’ intrinsic benefit, while the receiver did not consider signals above her belief 
threshold superior, striving to obtain the maximum possible signal-dependent benefit, 
she will want to ally with the signaler sending the highest signal. Therefore, up to a 
point, the benefit of increasing one’s signal in terms of the extra mass of competitors 
beaten always at least offsets the associated cost. In effect, this suggests that GSB’s 
equilibrium can be satisfied by more than one kind of signal since their discrete (“on-
off”) message space precludes changes in the signal intensity.  
The relevant comparison with Spence’s seminal work imposes a fixed number 
constraint on the quantity of available positions at the firms (Spence 1974, p. 84ff). In 
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this case, given a continuous type space, the multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated as 
the competing receivers will set the available number of positions such that all 
signalers with an ability above a certain threshold can obtain a position. Even though, 
in the present discrete environment with A = 0, multiplicity persists, the results are 
not incompatible. For, given appropriate separating beliefs on the part of the receiver, 
the signalers optimally send the “appropriate” separating signal. As this outcome, 
again (i.e., as in conventional models), depends intrinsically on the belief threshold, 
competition among the signalers only appears to matter to the extent that type 
matters. The fixed versus variable reward structure associated with the presence (or 
lack thereof in the present setup) of competition among the receivers seems to be of 
secondary importance; a fixed reward simply entails that the number of available 
positions is binding ex ante. The distinctive aspect of the setting with A > 0 is the 
attainment of uniqueness in a discrete setup with a binding constraint on the number 
of “positions” for which the signalers compete. It suggests a nontrivial role for the 
degree of dispersal of any benefits associated with the signaling activities between 
the signalers and the receivers (cf. Footnote 2.8).32 
On a final note, the auction characteristics of the framework do not undermine 
the fact that the interaction being analyzed is a signaling game. Among others, in 
accordance with this kind of sender-receiver game, the messages have a direct effect 
on the signalers’ and receivers’ payoff functions. As such, the game also 
unambiguously contrasts with cheap-talk games, which involve costless, non-binding 
messages. Further distinctive differences are that the analysis does not require a 
commonality in the players’ interests, nor do the sender types have to have different 
preferences over the receivers’ actions (Farrell & Rabin 1996; Crawford 1998).  
 
2.5 Related Literature 
In the spirit of recent research by economists studying cooperative interaction 
among unrelated individuals, which frequently incorporates ideas and techniques 
from other disciplines (see Dawes & Thaler (1988) for an overview of some of the 
early work), this chapter takes up a concept with a long history in both the social and 
                                               
2.32 Unlike the case with neutral signals (Appendix 2.1.b), belief refinements such as the “intuitive 
criterion” (Cho & Kreps 1987) do not rule out the equilibrium when A > 0. While it might be possible 
to alter the model and analysis to be able to apply the refinement and arrive at the same equilibrium, I 
would argue that the assumption of non-decreasing beliefs is a more natural point of departure. 
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natural sciences. It explores the idea that individually costly activities can be used to 
mitigate informational asymmetry. What renders the present paper interesting is the 
combination of the central premises of both literatures within a theoretical 
framework while drawing attention to two more unconventional aspects – signaling 
activities that yield benefits to the observers and competition among the signalers for 
some end. To accentuate the broader context and contribution of this chapter, this 
section surveys the related literature in both the social and natural sciences.  
A rich and well-studied class of (possible) explanations for a substantial 
proportion of the ever-growing body of evidence33 that individuals behave 
cooperatively even when they do not necessarily expect to deal with each other in the 
future invokes conditional reciprocity, especially direct reciprocity (which is rooted 
in personal experience with others). Relevant accounts are based on such concepts as 
reciprocal altruism, tit-for-tat, repeated play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the like 
(Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Kreps et al. 1982; Axelrod 1984). Relying 
intrinsically on recurring social encounters, the concept holds that individuals 
respond in-kind to the behavior of others. While certainly appropriate to explain a 
wide variety of social phenomena, in the context at hand, lack of contingency and 
attention to the recipient’s history and/or future probability of reciprocation imply 
that the fundamental conditions for this explanation are violated.  
An alternative explanation, based on reputation and status benefits associated 
with generosity, promotes what is commonly referred to as “indirect reciprocity” 
(Alexander 1987). According to this concept, individuals acquire information about 
potential interaction partners by observing them or by gathering (reputational) 
information from third parties about their past behavior with others. In its purest 
form, it constitutes a complete bookkeeping strategy. When considered from a 
“reputation building” perspective, beneficent behavior effectively enables individuals 
to signal their quality as cooperators (or cooperative intent) to future associates using 
reputational effects (Henrich & Henrich 2006). Even if the initial recipient of a 
generous act does not reciprocate, as long as sufficiently many individuals within 
his/her social environment pay attention, the contributor can nonetheless recoup his 
original costs via the benefits (s)he receives from individuals who observed his/her 
generosity and now give to him/her.34  
                                               
2.33 Fehr & Gächter (2000) provide an overview of a number of relevant studies.  
2.34 This argument is similar to the “broadcast efficiency” idea outlined in Footnote 2.36. 
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While strategies based on indirect reciprocity have been shown to be 
evolutionarily stable under certain conditions (Boyd & Richerson 1989), this is only 
likely in small groups, where it is possible to keep track of everyone’s actions and to 
target one’s cooperation at reciprocators. Note that this limitation also restricts the 
usefulness of direct conditional reciprocity. To overcome this problem, it has been 
proposed that reputation could be an indirect benefit of generous behaviors. The 
purpose of establishing a reputation by way of costly displays of generosity would be 
the facilitation of trust in subsequent pair-wise interactions (e.g., Roberts 1998). In 
its essence, this angle is clearly a costly signaling argument, although as is common 
in indirect-reciprocity models (Smith & Bliege-Bird 2005) the focus is on the 
potential benefits achieved during the cooperative interaction following the 
individually costly reputation-building display. Accounts based on indirect 
reciprocity also do not tend to consider the possibility that potential interaction 
partners may prefer not just good intrinsic qualities, but signaling displays that 
provide additional benefits simply as a function of the costly display.  
Explanations based on costly signaling do not necessarily require the former 
and allow for the latter. The idea is that, in a signaling equilibrium, the recipients 
and/or observers of some generous act will confer benefits on the signalers because 
doing so is their best response given the information available to them (e.g., Gibbons 
1992; Smith 2003). That is, the signals indicate qualities that make it advantageous to 
interact preferentially with the signalers. Even though, on the face of it, analogous to 
conditional reciprocity – “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine” – the underlying 
mechanism does not require any form of other-regarding preferences (or the like). 
Quite on the contrary, the agents behave in a purely self-interested manner.35 
The costly signaling angle to explaining generous behavior provides an 
alternative to these theories, involving mutualism rather than reciprocity or coercion 
                                               
2.35 Another broadly related branch of literature concerns a behavioral propensity termed “strong 
reciprocity” (Gintis 2000; Fehr et al. 2002; Bowles & Gintis 2004). It builds on a growing body of 
experimental evidence indicating that people are both conditionally altruistic cooperators and 
conditionally altruistic punishers (Fehr & Henrich 2003). The essence of strong reciprocity as an 
explanation for human social behavior is that agents are willing to engage in costly actions to reward 
cooperative behavior and punish free-riding by other group members, even if the relevant actions 
provide no apparent present or future material rewards. The merit of this concept is fiercely contested 
(e.g. Fehr & Henrich 2003; Lehmann et al. 2007), however, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
explore the details of the debate. The concept is relevant in the present context as it involves 
behavioral outcomes individuals might employ as beneficent costly signals. Rather than anticipating 
reciprocation in-kind, the agents (potentially) derive benefits from future profitable interactions. From 
this perspective, the individuals’ actions essentially correspond to “gifts” that signal their intention to 
invest in a relationship (Camerer 1988).  
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(“tolerated theft;” Blurton Jones 1984; Hawkes 1992). The key conditions (Zahavi 
1975; Grafen 1990) to be satisfied in order for the present line of reasoning to apply 
are (1) that the signaling activity must convey information about variation in the 
quality being advertised, and (2) that the signal must impose a quality-dependent cost 
on the signaler(s). The latter condition clearly ensures the former condition, but only 
if both are satisfied can signaler and receiver benefit. Yet, the theory of costly 
signaling as an explanation for generous behavior also has a central weakness: the 
good or service provided may be incidental to the signaling equilibrium, i.e., anti-
social behaviors could, in principle, perform the same function (Smith & Bliege-Bird 
2000; Gintis et al. 2001; Smith 2003). Therefore, depending on the setting, while 
signaling may be a necessary component of the explanation of generous behavior, it 
is not sufficient.36 As discussed in the previous section, this limitation does not apply 
to the present paper as the signals are not chosen endogenously. Rather, given a link 
between signal and quality and the appropriate assumptions on the marginal cost of 
signaling, the framework extracts conditions for a separating signaling equilibrium 
for each type of signal (neutral and beneficent).   
Before turning to the second branch of related literature, i.e., economic models 
of pro-social behavior and signaling, it is worth noting that interaction involving 
competition between “signalers” also has a quite extensive history in the natural 
sciences, ranging from work on food solicitation involving sibling competition to 
threat displays and sexual advertisement (for an overview, see Johnstone 1998, 
1999). The central premise of these works is that the level, or intensity, of a signal 
affects the outcome of the interaction. Although Spence (1974) alludes to the 
possibility of competition among signalers, the matter does not seem to have been 
explored in much detail. In fact, economists have only recently become interested in 
related issues, focusing mainly on the matching aspect of the interaction (Hopkins 
                                               
2.36 In many cases, this problem is not decisive, as the weakness can be mitigated by supplementing 
the equilibrium with an argument justifying why generous activities are preferred to other types of 
behaviors an individual could use to convey information to others. The two most intuitive alternatives 
to this end are (1) that the activity is integral to the quality being signaled, and (2) that the signal 
serves to attract an audience and may thus increase “broadcast efficiency” (Boone 1998; Smith & 
Bliege-Bird 2000; Hawkes et al. 2001; Smith 2003). The broadcast efficiency argument applies when 
beneficent signals attract a larger audience – as measured by observers per unit signal – than 
alternative signals of equivalent cost. A third option would be to invoke group selection among 
alternative evolutionarily stable equilibria (Boyd & Richerson 1990). The practicability of this 
mechanism is, however, still being debated (cf. Alcock 1998). 
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2010). As such, this model contributes to the signaling literature by exploring an 
intuitive extension to the traditional approach.37 
The economic work most closely related to the present chapter explores the 
possible motivation(s) for pro-social behavior. It is rooted in the ever-growing body 
of evidence that suggests that individuals are not solely interested in their material 
payoff and are more cooperative than assumed in the standard literature (e.g., 
Ledyard 1995), although there are also examples of individuals behaving according 
to their self-interest (e.g., Smith & Williams 1990; Güth et al. 1997). To render these 
observations coherent, a substantial amount of work has investigated the explanatory 
power of interdependent preferences. According to these models, individuals seek to 
maximize utility functions that depend on the consumption (or other characteristics) 
of others (for an overview, see Sobel 2005). In the context of seemingly altruistic 
behavior, in particular, one can distinguish two strands of work. One posits that 
individuals are “purely” altruistic (e.g., Olson 1965) – they receive utility from the 
total amount of public good created via donations. The alternative approach, 
pioneered by Becker (1974) and expanded by Andreoni (1989), holds that the act of 
giving itself affects a person’s utility function, i.e., giving to charity or some other 
public good provides a “warm glow” to the givers that is an increasing function of 
the amount given. The costly signaling angle contrasts with both of these ideas in 
that the signalers do not obtain an intrinsic utility from being generous, although it 
could be extended in this direction.  
Models viewing contributions to public goods or non-monetary gifts as signals 
have, among others, been proposed by Camerer (1988), Glazer and Konrad (1996), 
and Bénabou and Tirole (2006). The framework most closely in spirit to the present 
approach is that by Camerer (1988), who explores the idea that gifts could signal an 
individual’s intention with respect to future investment in a relationship. However, 
paralleling GSB, his model is discrete; in contrast to GSB, he does not consider the 
possibility of competition among the signalers. Glazer and Konrad (1996) suggest 
that contributions to a public good can constitute signals of wealth to achieve social 
                                               
2.37 While this statement is – to the best of my knowledge – accurate in the context of cooperation (and 
the “pure” signaling literature), the issue of competition among the informed agents in an environment 
of asymmetric information has received some attention in industrial organization (e.g., Mailath 1988b, 
1989; Matthews & Fertig 1990; Ippolito 1990; Hertzendorf & Overgaard 2001; Daughtey & 
Reinganum 2007, 2008a; Adriani & Deidda 2011). However, the relevant literature is only 
tangentially related to the present work in that the setups usually do not consider Spence-type signals, 
i.e., signals with differential costs (according to type), or differ in other respects from the setup at 
hand (e.g., sequential moves). 
Chapter 2. Generous Behavior  41 
 
status. A player derives utility from (unobservable) private consumption and income 
status, defined by other individuals’ beliefs about his/her income net of his/her 
contribution to some public good. Their approach is similar to the present one in that 
a player signals wealth in order to interact with people of the same or higher social 
status. However, the main driver of their results is the other individuals’ beliefs about 
the contributor’s wealth – the signal itself is “neutral” (i.e., it does not benefit the 
receivers) and the signalers do not compete with each other for some end.  
Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) contribution is the most detailed exploration of 
the motivations shaping individuals’ social conduct. They suggest that individuals 
are heterogeneous in their attitude towards altruism and greed, care about their social 
reputation and self-image, and may be influenced by explicit incentives (rewards and 
punishment). In fact, these motives are likely to interact in order to shape behavior. 
Their approach combines the motives for pro-social behavior suggested by the 
aforementioned works – they consider an intrinsic motive, an extrinsic motive, and a 
(self-)reputational motive. Given a signal, the observers infer the contributor’s 
motivation. Set within a learning model, the main result of this multi-dimensional 
signaling analysis is the (informational) crowding out of pro-social behavior as 
explicit incentives spoil the reputational value of good deeds, thereby creating doubt 
as to an individual’s true motivation (“over-justification effect”). The basic idea of 
the present framework is certainly subsumed in their general model. However, the 
particular aspects being explored – the role of the benefit of a signal (versus none) in 
conjunction with signaler competition – are not considered. My framework could 
surely be extended to incorporate explicit incentives, although it is questionable 
whether they apply in the relevant contexts. 
To sum up, though related to a number of deep literatures, this chapter 
promotes an unconventional angle to a century-old puzzle. Whereas the signals being 
explored can easily be interpreted as (local) public goods, the framework does not 
involve other-regarding preferences of any kind – the players engage in purely self-
centered optimization of their utility. Likewise, although signaling could enhance the 
signalers’ reputation, the present results hold even without accounting (explicitly) for 
subsequent interaction. Hence, using a simple setup, this chapter illustrates that 
generous behavior towards others can emerge in a one-shot framework, deriving a 
prediction that is not diluted by the existence of a multitude of possible outcomes.  
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2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to shed light on the proximate causes of a 
seemingly irrational behavioral pattern – the recurrence of generous behavior 
towards others within a broad social context. It postulates that generosity towards 
others may constitute a signal of cooperative intent that benefits signalers not 
because they receive compensation in-kind, but because they gain access to 
profitable social goods. Presuming that access to these goods is restricted, the 
framework incorporates the notion that signalers may be rivals for the same 
endeavor, implying that they compete with each other by way of the magnitude of 
the signals they send. The main, in part implicit, premises of the analysis are that 
individuals are motivated by self-interest, face asymmetric information about the 
social characteristics of other members of their social environment, that variation in 
behavior is linked to variation in underlying social quality, and that individuals prefer 
to interact with individuals of high quality.  
Even though the analysis gives rise to a variety of interesting results, it prompts 
a number of queries for future work. From a technical point of view, for instance, an 
informative extension would be to move beyond a fixed prize for signalers when 
achieving an alliance, say, by introducing a bargaining stage with respect to the 
appropriate prize level before entering into an alliance with the receiver. Similarly, 
rendering the receivers heterogeneous by assuming that some proportion of them has 
non-Bayesian beliefs, or by modeling their preferences more explicitly, would render 
the interaction more realistic. By accounting for the receiving side of the interaction, 
both of these angles would move the analysis closer to the standard signaling 
literature. Within the former, the ultimate prize is likely to approximate more closely 
a type-dependent reward structure, whereas within the latter, the receivers are likely 
to compete with each other in order to ally with the “best” signaler(s). More explicit 
modeling of the receivers’ utility functions would permit a more careful 
consideration of the notion of “future benefits” of generous behaviors, be it via 
discounting or reputational effects. In a similar spirit, the introduction of a second 
stage would provide further insight into the individuals’ interaction upon entry into 
an alliance. An alternative angle would be to introduce noise into the signals, which 
makes accurate inferences by the receivers more difficult. Repetition of the 
interaction could account for possible dynamics such as reputation formation via 
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active signaling in early periods, the benefits of which can be reaped in later periods 
during which signaling is no longer necessary. One could then also explore the 
effects of shocks to the players’ fortunes and changing circumstances. 
More broadly, this chapter has individuals signal about one particular social 
characteristic. As it is in many cases unlikely that individuals are able to distinguish 
precisely their various social characteristics, an interesting extension would be a 
multi-dimensional signaling approach. Although technically challenging, it could 
clarify more precisely the interaction of the various motives for individuals’ social 
behavior (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Within such a framework, it would 
furthermore be possible to explore the issue of which underlying qualities individuals 
signal about (and, correspondingly, how they do so, e.g., via which kind of signal(s)), 
as well as who the intended audience is (and how it reacts to various signals). In this 
way, the conditions for signaling within a social environment could be defined more 
accurately, and it may be possible to determine within a theoretical context – 
although empirical work will be crucial to guide the analyses’ assumptions – how the 
various mechanisms to explaining cooperative behavior interact with one another.   
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2.A Appendices 
Appendix 2.1. The Simplest Case – Neutral Signals (A = 0) 
This appendix establishes the representative separating equilibrium if A = 0 and 
argues that the “intuitive criterion” may not have bite in the environment at hand. 
(a) Equilibrium 
In view of the postulated threshold beliefs and restrictions on the equilibrium, 
the expected payoff for each type of signaler is given by: 
                                            E   
 (0)  = (1 − λ) ∙  
 
∙  , and0 
E   
 ( ∗)  = λ ∙  
 
∙   + (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ∗.0	
These expressions give rise to the following constraints:  
 “Individual Rationality” Constraint (IR) – E[  
 (  )] ≥ 0 for τ ∈ {L, H} 
Signalers of Low Type: (1 − λ) ∙  
 
∙   ≥ 0         ≥ 0 
Signalers of High Type: λ ∙  
 
∙   + (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ∗ 	 ≥ 	0  







 “Incentive Compatibility” Constraint (IC) – E[  
 (  )] ≥ E[  
 (   )] for 
τ ∈ {L, H} 
Signalers of Low Type: (1 − λ) ∙  
 
∙   ≥ 	λ ∙  
 
∙   + (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ∗ 




Signalers of High Type: λ ∙  
 
∙   + (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ∗ 	 ≥ 	 (1 − λ) ∙  
 
∙   




Note that, in both cases, only IC is binding because with λ ∈ (0,1),   > 0, and 
γ  > γ  > 0, the right-hand side of IC is always at least equal to zero, implying 
that if IC is satisfied IR is also (at least) satisfied. The ordering presented in the 
main text follows. It is easy to check that the expected equilibrium payoff for the 
highest feasible threshold level is positive (entailing that the same holds for 
lower values), and that neither type can increase his payoff by deviating to other 
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(b) Intuitive Criterion 
In conventional signaling games, the “intuitive criterion” (Cho & Kreps 1987) 
can be used to eliminate a given perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if there is a 
signaler of type θ who is guaranteed a deviation payoff strictly greater than his 
equilibrium payoff for any belief of the receiver in response to the deviating 
message, as long as she does not assign a non-zero probability to the deviation 
having been made by a type θ for whom this action is equilibrium dominated. 
The upshot is the elimination of all equilibria except for the “least-cost” 
separating equilibrium (Riley 1979) – which in the present context would be the 
outcome where    = 0 and    =  ∗ =
 
 ∙  
 – from the relevant setups. Seeing as 
the present framework involves two (competing) signalers, the refinement does 
not apply straightforwardly. Therefore, in the following, I apply an extended 
version of the arguments that strives to maintain the spirit of the originals.  
 






 (cf. main text), and turn to the issue of identifying signaling 
levels that are equilibrium dominated for signalers of low type no matter what 
the response of the receiver to them. Consider the best possible scenario for a 
signaler of low type deviating from his equilibrium strategy, i.e., he is taken to 
be of high type and chosen as the receiver’s ally with probability one even if the 
other signaler is of high type and sends  ∗, implying that he would also be 
deemed of high type. Given these beliefs and letting     denote the low type’s 
deviating signal, deviation will be profitable if   − γ  ∙    ≥ (1 − λ) ∙  
 
∙  , which 
will be true provided that    ≤ (1 + λ) ∙
 
 ∙  
 . It follows that deviation will be 






) as long as 
(1 + λ) ∙ γ  ≥ γ . In short, in this case the “intuitive criterion” does not apply as 
the equilibrium-dominated signals lie above the highest possible value of  ∗.   
 
Supposing (instead) that some signaling levels are dominated for signalers of 
low type, i.e., (1 + λ) ∙ γ  < γ , can a signaler of high type profitably deviate to 







extend downward from 
 
 ∙  
. Consider the worst possible scenario for a high type 
deviating from his equilibrium strategy  ∗ to, say,  ∗ − ε, for ε > 0. Namely, 
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although the deviant is considered to be of high type, he will lose with certainty 
against another high type behaving according to his equilibrium strategy. Since 
the receiver judges both signalers to be of the same type, this decision rule is a 
valid best response as she may adopt any arbitrary rule if indifferent. If so, the 
signaler will have an incentive to deviate if the constant loss in his probability of 
winning is compensated by the linear reduction in his cost of signaling. To be 
precise, λ ∙  
 
∙   + (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ∗ ≤ (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙ ( ∗ − ε) obliges that:  




where ε in effect denotes the required (fixed) minimum savings in cost.  
 
A pessimistic (in the above sense) high type can, in general, profitably deviate 
from his equilibrium strategy into the interval of equilibrium-dominated signal 
intensities for signalers of low type if the pre-deviation magnitude exceeds the 
sum of the highest possible non-dominated signaling level for low types and the 
lowest necessary deviation (Figure 2.A.1); i.e.:  
 ∗ ≥     
  + ε   , 
where     
  = (1 + λ) ∙
 
 ∙  
 and ε    = λ ∙
 
 ∙  
 . Accordingly, there will exist a 
region of signaling levels between     
  + ε    and 
 
 ∙  
 that can be eliminated 
via the “intuitive criterion” if: 
    










Importantly, note that even if     
   is close to 
 
 ∙  
 (e.g., if λ is small), it will not 
be possible to rule out the equilibria between     
   and     





 , which is inadmissible by construction, the discrete nature of the 
game – ε in particular – prevents the argument from capturing (and eliminating) 
all equilibria except for the “least cost” configuration at 
 
 ∙  





  + ε    will thus always survive the refinement.  
 
In essence, what happens is that the presence of a second signaler brings into  
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Figure 2.A.1. Neutral Signals – Application of the “Intuitive Criterion” 
 
 
play the receiver’s decision rule when indifferent between the two signalers. 
While it may be possible that the extended version of the “intuitive criterion” 
rules out more equilibria when based on a less pessimistic outlook on the part of 
signalers of high type, the refinement’s scope will always be limited. After all, 
any signal between 0 and 
 
  
 could, in principle, profitably be sent by a signaler 
of low type if he is in with a chance of winning the prize. 
 
Appendix 2.2. The Simplest Case – Beneficent Signals (A > 0) 
This appendix proves Proposition 2.2. 
(a) Sufficient Conditions. Bounds of the Equilibrium Supports   
Signalers of Low Type 
Given the lower bound (cf. main text), the upper bound of the low types’ support 
( ̂ ) follows straightforwardly from the fact that players randomizing over a 
number of different strategies must be indifferent (in terms of their payoff) 
between them. A signaler of low type must therefore obtain the same payoff 
when signaling zero as when signaling at the upper bound of his equilibrium 
distribution, namely, zero. In fact, it must be that E   
 (  )  = 0 for all    along 
the equilibrium support. Furthermore, in keeping with the restrictions on the 
equilibrium, a signal at the upper bound of the equilibrium distribution entails 
that the individual wins against all other signalers of low type (all mass is below 
 ̂ , which occurs with probability (1 − λ)), while he loses against all signalers of 
high type (all mass is above  ̂ , which occurs with probability λ). Note that, 
under these conditions, E   
 (  )  = 	E   
 ( ̂ ) . Accordingly:  
(1 − λ) ∙ G ( ̂ ) ∙   − γ  ∙  ̂  = 0,	
which – using that G ( ̂ ) = Pr(   ≤  ̂
 ) = 1 – can be manipulated to yield: 
















Signaling levels affordable to low 
types given optimistic beliefs ε    
  
Equilibria eliminated via 
(extended) “Intuitive Criterion” 
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Signalers of High Type  
The upper bound of the high types’ support ( ̂ ) can be derived using a similar 
line of reasoning. A signaler of high type must obtain the same payoff when 
signaling  ̂  as when signaling at the upper bound of his equilibrium 
distribution. Moreover, given the restrictions on the equilibrium, a signal at the 
lower bound entails that the individual wins against all individuals of low type 
(all mass is below  ̂ , which occurs with probability (1 − λ)), while he loses 
against all other individuals of high type (all mass is above  ̂ , which occurs 
with probability λ). Accordingly, endpoint  ̂  can be constructed as follows. 
E   
 ( ̂ )  = (1 − λ) ∙    − γ  ∙ (1 − λ) ∙
 
γ 








This payoff is clearly strictly positive and constant. Observe that a signal at the 
upper bound guarantees victory, i.e., G ( ̂ ) = Pr(   ≤  ̂
 ) = 1. Under these 
conditions, E   
 ( ̂ )  = 	E   
 ( ̂ ) , which again must be true for all    along 
the equilibrium support. This implies that: 




which can be manipulated to yield:  








(b) Necessary Conditions. Equilibrium Distributions 
Given the bounds of the equilibrium supports, the equilibrium distribution 
functions follow from the signaler types’ expected payoff functions.  
Signalers of Low Type  
As the strategy’s support is conjectured to be on [0,  ̂ ] and, given 
randomization, this type’s expected equilibrium payoff will be zero: 
E   
 (  )  = (1 − λ) ∙ G
 (  ) ∙   − γ
  ∙    = 0.	
 Manipulation then yields: 
G (  ) =
γ 




Chapter 2. Generous Behavior  49 
Signalers of High Type  
As the strategy’s support is conjectured to be on [ ̂ ,  ̂ ], by construction, this 





 (  )  =  1 − λ ∙  1 − G
 (  )   ∙   − γ
  ∙    = (1 − λ) ∙   − γ













Note that the equilibrium densities (  (  ) for τ ∈ {L, H}) are uniform and 
represent the ratio of the marginal cost of an extra unit of the signal and the 
marginal benefit of the (ensuing) extra probability of winning against a signaler 
of the “own” type.  
 
(c) Existence 
The following derivations establish that the signalers do not have an incentive to 
deviate from their conjectured equilibrium strategies by confirming (1) that the 
payoffs are constant along the support of each type’s equilibrium distribution 
function, and showing (2) that each type of signaler makes a loss when imitating 
a signaler of the other type. Fulfillment of both conditions in conjunction with 
beliefs conforming to behavior proves existence of the equilibrium profile.   
(1) Are the payoffs constant along the support of the types’ equilibrium 
distribution functions? 
Profits are constant if, after a small change in the signal intensity, the 
marginal benefit (the extra probability of winning) and the extra cost of the 
higher signal cancel out exactly. 
Signalers of Low Type: Raise signal from e to 2 ∙ e, for e > 0 but small. 
 Marginal Benefit: (1 − λ) ∙   ∙ (2 ∙ e − e) ∙
  
(   )∙ 
   
 Marginal Cost: γ  ∙ ε 
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Signalers of High Type: Raise signal from ( ̂  + ε) to ( ̂  + 2 ∙ ε), for	e > 0 
but small. 




 Marginal Cost: γ  ∙ ε 
 Marginal Benefit = Marginal Cost 
 
These derivations can clearly be reproduced for all signal intensities along 
the conjectured equilibrium supports. As profits are constant, the signalers 
are indifferent between the signals along their respective distributions, 
which is consistent with continuous randomization. 
 
(2) Can either type of signaler increase his payoff by imitating the other type? 
Suppose a signaler of low type were to imitate a signaler of high type, i.e., 
consider   
  >  ̂  such as   
  =  ̂  + e, for e > 0 but not so big that the sum 
exceeds the support of signalers of high type. Note that deviation to   
  < 0 
is ruled out by definition. The signaler is certain to win against all other low 
types (with probability (1 − λ)) as well as some high types (with probability 
G    
  ). His expected payoff from imitation is thus given by: 
E   
    
    = (1 − λ) ∙    − γ  ∙   
   + λ
∙  G    
   ∙    − γ  ∙   
   +  1 − G    
    ∙  −γ  ∙   
    
= λ ∙ G    
   ∙   − γ  ∙ ε. 
Consistency with equilibrium requires that E   
 (  
 )  < 0. Substitution of 
G    
   and subsequent manipulation reduce the expression to γ  > γ , 
which is satisfied by assumption. Accordingly, signalers of low type do not 
have an incentive to deviate. 
 
Instead, consider a signaler of high type imitating a signaler of low type, 
i.e., suppose   
  <  ̂  such as   
  =  ̂  − ε, for e as above. Note that   
  >  ̂  
would not occur since victory is already guaranteed with a signal at  ̂  (i.e., 
the cost of signaling would increase while the probability of winning would 
remain unchanged). The signaler is certain to lose against all other high 
types (with probability λ), yet, he will win against some low types (with 
probability G    
  ). The expected payoff from imitation is thus given by: 
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E   
    
    = (1 − λ) ∙  G    
   ∙    − γ  ∙   
   +  1 − G    
    ∙  −γ  ∙   
    
                                           +	λ ∙  −γ  ∙   
   
                                 = (1 − λ) ∙ G    
   ∙   − γ  ∙   
 .	
Consistency with equilibrium requires that E   
 (  
 )  < (1 − λ) ∙   − γ  ∙
(1 − λ) ∙
 
  
. Substitution of G    
   and subsequent manipulation reduce the 
expression to γ  > γ , which again is satisfied by assumption. Signalers of 
high type therefore do not have an incentive to deviate either.  
 
(d) Equilibrium Beliefs. Signals at  ̂  
Given the mixed nature of the signaler types’ strategies, Bayes’ Rule cannot 
straightforwardly be applied to obtain the receiver’s beliefs when observing a 
signal at  ̂  (exactly) as the probability of sending a signal at a single point is 






Yet, recall that the proportion of high and low types in the population of 
signalers is common knowledge, as is the value of an alliance with the receiver 
and the signalers’ cost function, all of which are non-zero constants. The 
probability assignment for this signaling magnitude can therefore be derived via 
the signalers’ uniform densities, i.e., the constant height of the densities at each 
point along the equilibrium supports (both of which include  ̂ ). In particular, 
paralleling Bayes’ Rule, the beliefs at  ̂  can be expressed as the ratio of the 
probability of the event that “a signaler of type θ sends a signal at  ̂ ” divided by 
the probability that a signal at  ̂  is sent. Namely: 
Pr(θ |	 ̂ ) =
λ ∙   ( ̂ )
λ ∙   ( ̂ ) + (1 − λ) ∙   ( ̂ )
. 
It is easy to verify that the denominator is a non-zero constant and that the sum 
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Appendix 2.3. The General Case 
This appendix proves Proposition 2.4. 
(a) Sufficient Conditions. Bounds of the Equilibrium Supports   
Signalers of Low Type 
Given the lower bound (cf. main text), in the general case, too, the upper bound 
of the low types’ support (   ) follows from the fact that players randomizing 
over a number of different strategies must be indifferent (in terms of their 
payoff) between them. In fact, barring the revised notation, the relevant 
conditions and arguments are identical to those presented in Appendix 2.2.a. 
Accordingly, endpoint     can be constructed as follows.  
(1 − λ)    ∙          
   
∙   ∙   − γ  ∙     = 0,	
which – using that         = Pr    ≤   
   = 1 – can be manipulated to yield:  




Signalers of High Type 
The upper bound of the high types’ support (   ) can likewise be derived via an 
argument paralleling that outlined in Appendix 2.2.a. The main quantitative 
difference is that the probability of victory following a signal at the lower bound 
of the distribution is given by (1 − λ)   , while the probability of defeat is given 
by (1 − (1 − λ)   ). Accordingly, endpoint     can be constructed as follows. 
E   
        = (1 − λ)    ∙    ∙   − γ  ∙ (1 − λ)    ∙
  ∙  
γ 
  + (1 − (1 − λ)   )








Using that         = Pr    ≤   
   = 1:  




which can be manipulated to yield: 
    = (1 − λ)    ∙
  ∙  
γ 
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(b) Necessary Conditions. Equilibrium Distributions 
Given the bounds of the equilibrium supports, the equilibrium distribution 
functions once more follow from the signaler types’ expected payoff functions. 
Signalers of Low Type  
As the strategy’s support is conjectured to be on [0,    ] and, given 
randomization, this type’s expected equilibrium payoff will be zero: 
E   
 (  )  = (1 − λ)
    ∙ [  (  )]
    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙    = 0.	
Manipulation then yields: 
  (  ) =  
γ  ∙   






Signalers of High Type   
The derivation of the equilibrium distribution function for signalers of high type 
is slightly more complicated, as this type’s expected payoff function cannot 
easily be solved for   (  ). However, as it must hold at each point along the 
support, the equilibrium distribution can also be derived by maximizing 
E   
 (  ) , although this approach depends critically on the assumption that the 
equilibrium distribution functions are continuous. The appropriate optimization 
problem is given by: 
max
  






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙ [  (  )]
   − γ  ∙     .	







∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙   ∙ [  (  )]




Using the fact that         = 0, i.e., the probability of winning when signaling 




∙  λ − 1 +  
γ 
  ∙  
∙     −   
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(c) Existence 
The following derivations establish that the signalers in the generalized version 
of the game do not have an incentive to deviate from their conjectured 
equilibrium strategies either. As before, this is achieved by confirming (1) that 
the payoffs are constant along the support of each type’s equilibrium distribution 
function, and showing (2) that each type of signaler makes a loss when imitating 
a signaler of the other type. Fulfillment of both conditions in conjunction with 
beliefs conforming to behavior proves existence of the equilibrium profile.   
(1) Are the payoffs constant along the support of the types’ equilibrium 
distribution functions? 
Given the complexity of the equilibrium distributions, computing the 
marginal benefit and cost of a small increase in the signal intensity is not 
straightforward. Therefore, in this case, constancy of the expected payoffs is 
verified by comparing the payoff when choosing a given signaling 
magnitude with that when opting for a (slightly) higher intensity. Payoffs 
are constant if E[  
 ( )] = 	E[  
 (  + ε)] for τ ∈ {L, H}, e > 0 but small, and   
as well as   + e within the bounds of the types’ respective equilibrium 
supports.    
Signalers of Low Type  
(1 − λ)    ∙ [  ( )]    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙  
= (1 − λ)    ∙ [  (  + ε)]    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙ (  + ε) 
Substitution of   (∙) and subsequent manipulation reduce this expression to 
γ  ∙ ε = γ  ∙ ε.  
 
Signalers of High Type 






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙ [  ( )]   − γ  ∙   






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙ [  (  + ε)]   − γ  ∙ (  + ε) 
Using the binomial theorem, i.e., the fact that: 






∙      ∙   , 
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with   = (1 − λ),   = λ ∙   (∙),   =  , and   =   − 1, this expression can be 
rewritten as:  
(1 − λ + λ ∙   ( ))    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙  
= (1 − λ + λ ∙   (  + ε))    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙ (  + ε). 
Substitution of   (∙) and subsequent manipulation reduce it to γ  ∙ ε = γ  ∙ ε. 
 
These derivations can clearly be reproduced for all signal intensities along 
the conjectured equilibrium supports. As profits are constant, the signalers 
are indifferent between the signals along their respective distributions, 
which (again) is consistent with continuous randomization. 
 
(2) Can either type of signaler increase his payoff by imitating the other type? 
Suppose a signaler of low type were to imitate a signaler of high type, i.e., 
consider   
  >     such as   
  =     + ε, for ε > 0 but not so big that the sum 
exceeds the support of signalers of high type. Note that deviation to   
  < 0 
is ruled out by definition. The signaler is certain to win against all other low 
types (with probability (1 − λ)   ); he will also win against some high 
types, although his (marginal) benefit depends on the number of equally 
potent competitors. His expected payoff from imitation is thus given by: 
E   
    










∙    ∙   − γ  ∙   
   +  1 −       
   
 
  ∙  −γ  ∙   
    






∙ λ  ∙ (1 − λ)      ∙       
   
 
  − γ  ∙   
 . 
Using the binomial theorem (see above), this expression can be rewritten as: 
E   
    
    = (1 − λ + λ ∙      
  )    ∙   ∙   − γ  ∙   
 . 
Consistency with equilibrium requires that E   
 (  
 )  < 0. Substitution of 
     
   and subsequent manipulation reduce the expression to γ  > γ , 
which is satisfied by assumption. Accordingly, signalers of low type do not 
have an incentive to deviate. 
 
Instead, consider a signaler of high type imitating a signaler of low type, 
i.e., suppose   
  <     such as   
  =     − ε, for ε as above. Note that in this 
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case, too,   
  >     would not occur since victory is already guaranteed with 
a signal at     (i.e., the cost of signaling would increase while the 
probability of winning would remain unchanged). The signaler is certain to 
lose against all other high types (with probability (1 − (1 − λ)   )), but will 
win against some low types (with probability      
  ). The expected payoff 
from imitation is thus given by: 
E   
    
    = (1 − λ)    
                                      ∙        
   
   
∙    ∙   − γ  ∙   
   +  1 −       
   
   
  ∙  −γ  ∙   
    
                                           +	(1 − (1 − λ)   ) ∙ (−γ  ∙   
 ) 
                               = (1 − λ)    ∙       
   
   
∙   ∙   − γ  ∙   
 .	
Consistency with equilibrium requires that E   
 (  
 )  < (1 − λ)    ∙   ∙   −
γ  ∙ (1 − λ)    ∙
 ∙ 
  
. Substitution of      
   and subsequent manipulation 
reduce the expression to γ  > γ , which again is satisfied by assumption. 












SIGNALING USING BENEFICENT SIGNALS:  






In seeming contradiction to their self-interest, many individuals voluntarily 
engage in activities that are costly to them and benefit one or more others within their 
social environment, oftentimes strangers. More often than not, the “recipients” 
benefit more from the acts, if not primarily, than the “contributors,” who do not 
appear to exhibit profound concern for the beneficiaries’ history and likelihood of 
reciprocation. In essence, they are providing a (local) public good. Examples of such 
generous behavior penetrate all walks of life. People do volunteer work in their 
communities, donate blood, solicit and make donations to charity, help strangers, in 
some cases thereby putting themselves at risk of injury and, more broadly, adhere to 
and enforce social norms.  
A somewhat unusual approach1 to explaining the recurrent incidence of 
generous behavior within broad social contexts, which despite a long history in a 
number of disciplines has only recently been formally modeled (Gintis et al. 2001), 
invokes costly signaling (Spence 1973, 1974; Zahavi 1975; Grafen 1990) as a 
proximate explanation for the behavioral pattern. The idea is that generous acts 
towards others may allow individuals to signal reliably various socially important 
qualities, thereby benefitting themselves as well as potential future interactants (e.g., 
                                               
3.1 Over the years, quite a number of theories striving to resolve the apparent incompatibility of 
generous behavior with self-centered optimization of utility or fitness have emerged. The most 
widespread of these theories are direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), 
reputation-based explanations such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987; Nowak & Sigmund 
1998), coercion or tolerated theft (Blurton Jones 1984; Hawkes 1992), as well as various forms of pro-
social preferences (cf. Fehr & Gächter 2000). Yet, although rich, they tend to yield insufficient insight 
when it comes to explaining generous behavior towards strangers (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  
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Zahavi & Zahavi 1997; Smith & Bliege-Bird 2000). The essential requisite for this 
causal relation is a link between generosity and some unobservable social quality 
such that variation in generosity can be traced back to variations in the particular 
characteristic. Given this correlation, the recipients of the signal gain as they obtain 
the benefit inherent in the signaling activity as well as useful information about the 
signaler, while the individual performing the good deed benefits not because of 
reciprocation, but because the signal reveals qualities that make it advantageous for 
the observer(s) to interact preferentially with him/her. It may, for example, enable the 
receiver(s) to identify the signaler as a cooperator or defector. Note that the 
interaction need not be repeated – in a signaling equilibrium, the exchange of 
benefits represents each player’s best response given their information at the time 
(e.g., Gibbons 1992; Smith 2003). 
In keeping with this line of reasoning, costly signaling using beneficial 
activities facilitates individuals’ task of discerning others’ intentions in social 
contexts. Being able to do so is important since cooperative social interaction carries 
great potential benefits and costs, entailing that individuals are likely to choose their 
interaction partners carefully (Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Smith & Bliege-Bird 2005). 
This “selectiveness,” however, clearly restricts the supply of valuable social goods 
such as alliances, mates, or leadership positions. Correspondingly, if generosity can 
be used to convey information about a desirable social quality, say, by signaling 
reliability or trustworthiness, generous individuals are likely to be preferred as 
exchange partners. One would then expect that individuals be induced to compete to 
be more generous than others to gain access to the most profitable social 
opportunities (Roberts 1998).  
Combining the notions of signaler competition and signaling using beneficent 
signals in a one-period, non-cooperative, game-theoretic framework of incomplete 
information, one obtains equilibrium predictions that diverge substantially from 
those of standard economic signaling models, which comprise (socially) neutral 
signals and competition on the receivers’ side of the interaction (Chapter 2). In 
particular, the prediction for a class of signaling games involving beneficent signals, 
symmetric signalers of two discrete types, and non-decreasing beliefs on the part of 
the receiver is unique, separating, and in mixed strategies. In contrast, given neutral 
signals to convey information to the receivers (ceteris paribus), paralleling the 
literature, one cannot definitively predict the players’ equilibrium behavior, for there 
Chapter 3. Experiment  59 
 
exists a multiplicity of equilibria – even in pure strategies. In other words, signaler 
competition alone does not lead to a sharper prediction. The objective of this chapter 
is to explore experimentally the precision of these predictions and their divergence.  
While signaling games are ubiquitous in the theoretical literature, empirical 
and experimental work on them is quite limited. Early experimental work focused 
mostly on establishing the empirical usefulness of equilibrium selection devices (or 
refinements) in predicting behavior in classical signaling frameworks. The results 
suggest that the subjects tend to grasp the information-transmitting properties of the 
available signaling activities: Signalers often make active use of the signaling 
activities at their disposal and receivers make inferences based on the signals they 
observe, although variability is substantial (e.g., Miller & Plott 1985; Potters & van 
Winden 1996). However, while subjects engage in some strategic reasoning, they do 
not tend to reason as deeply as theory assumes. Accordingly, only simple 
refinements such as sequentiality and the Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” have some 
predictive power (Banks et al. 1994). Behavior typically adjusts to equilibrium only 
slowly (if at all), with the subjects following straightforward history-dependent 
learning processes. In fact, one can construct games in which play converges to 
equilibria that violate even the simplest equilibrium refinements (Brandts & Holt 
1992, 1993; Cooper et al. 1997 a, b).2 
A small number of experiments (Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 
2002 a, b; Barclay 2004, 2006) have explored the line of reasoning motivating the 
signaling approach to explaining generous behavior (in some cases implicitly). They 
show that people who voluntarily incur costs to provide a benefit to others are, 
indeed, bestowed with higher rewards from group members in subsequent 
interactions.3 This finding holds for indirect benefits such as the punishment of free-
riders as well as the provision of direct benefits to others, say, by making a high 
contribution to a public good. Though some of the studies touch on signaling as a 
possible medium driving the observed behavioral patterns, their focus is on whether a 
good reputation accrued in a first game is rewarded in successive games. The present 
experiment, in contrast, explores whether individuals comprehend the concept of 
                                               
3.2 More recent work has explored aspects such as the impact of meaningful context on strategic 
behavior (Cooper & Kagel 2003), individual versus team play (Cooper & Kagel 2005), learning 
across signaling games (Cooper & Kagel 2008), noisy signaling (Jeitschko & Normann 2009; de Haan 
et al. 2011), and the effect of the order of moves on the behavioral outcomes (Kübler et al. 2008). 
3.3 In all of these experiments, the participants are provided with a full history of the events in the 
current and preceding round(s). 
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using a beneficial activity to convey information and make active use of it when 
trying to initiate interaction with others in a one-shot environment.  
Notwithstanding its intimate ties to the signaling literature, the present 
experiment is most closely linked to the work on all-pay auctions. For the main 
conceptual feature of the theoretical framework with beneficent signals is the 
interaction’s correspondence to an incomplete-information all-pay contest with two 
types of bidders who face asymmetric bidding costs and are competing for a fixed 
prize. Even though the study of auctions has a long history in experimental 
economics (cf. Kagel 1995), only a few experiments have studied all-pay auctions. 
Paralleling work on other auctions, their results indicate that subjects tend to bid 
more aggressively than predicted. This finding obtains in a variety of setups, 
including assorted informational treatments, player characteristics, strategy spaces, 
prize dimensions, as well as multiple-unit designs (Millner & Pratt 1989;           
Potters et al. 1998; Barut et al. 2002; Rapoport & Amaldoss 2000, 2004; Gneezy & 
Smorodinsky 2006). 
The present setup is most closely related to that of Noussair and Silver (2006), 
who study an incomplete-information, single-unit all-pay auction with symmetric 
players whose valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution defined on a large 
but discrete interval. The main result of their investigation is that bidders with low 
valuations bid close to, but usually below, the equilibrium level, while bidders with 
high valuations overshoot the equilibrium. The crucial difference4 to the current 
setup is that the auctioneer, as is common in auction experiments, is an automaton – 
the winner is always the highest bidder. In the current framework, although the 
equilibrium strategy of the player with the equivalent role, the receiver, corresponds 
to selecting the “highest bidder,” depending on a subject’s beliefs having observed a 
particular signal, this may or may not be what actually happens. In this sense, this 
paper examines the behavioral implications of the fundamental difference between 
an auction and a signaling setup: Whereas the auctioneer only cares about a bidder’s 
action, the receiver in a signaling game is mainly interested in a signaler’s 
unobservable type.5 Although the players’ objective in both settings is to generate the 
                                               
3.4 Even though the present setup can be converted to a framework where the bidders face the same 
cost of bidding and instead differ in their valuation of the prize, the bidders might be considered 
asymmetric in the sense that the signaler types’ equilibrium strategies differ.  
3.5 (S)he may also care about the kind or level of signal sent, yet his/her main concern is the signalers’ 
type. Depending on the payoffs, this need not be the case, even though it is in the present experiment. 
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highest possible payoff, signalers simultaneously strive to convey information to the 
receivers, which the latter need to interpret. Given this dual role of signals, one might 
observe what appears to be “irrational” behavior by both signalers and receivers – 
signalers using unusual activities to convey their information and receivers 
responding in unexpected ways.  
The results of the present experiment provide strong support for many elements 
of the theory. The participants swiftly appear to recognize the information-
transmitting attributes of the (signaling) activities at their disposal, with the receivers 
mostly making appropriate inferences from the signals they observe. The signalers’ 
behavior, too, at the aggregate as well as in almost all individual sessions, 
consistently – though with notable variability in its course – approximately 
converges to some coordinated outcome, even when using neutral signals. Indeed, 
despite the intricate nature of the projected behavior, the signalers’ behavior when 
using beneficent signals is surprisingly close to that predicted by the theory, 
including the comparative static properties. Behavior in the treatment with neutral 
signals, in turn, is consistent with multiple equilibria.     
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
game, derives the theoretical predictions, and outlines a number of hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3.3 discusses the design and protocol of the experiment. Section 3.4 
analyzes the results, followed by a discussion in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Theoretical Predictions 
The signaling game studied in this chapter involves three players – two 
signalers (he) and one receiver (she). The signalers observe private information about 
their endowment of some unobservable social characteristic (θ) drawn from a 
discrete type space and may choose an action ( ) from a message space defined on a 
large, fine grid6 to convey information about their attribute to the receiver, who 
knows the distribution of the private information but not the information of a 
particular signaler. Given the signals, the receiver makes an inference regarding each 
signaler’s information, based on which she chooses an action ( ) from a discrete 
                                               
3.6 Despite the restriction to a discrete interval, the large number of strategies should – in the limit – be 
sufficiently close to a continuum to satisfy this prerequisite of the equilibrium analysis.  
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action space. The experiment investigates the following parameterization of this 
sequential interaction: 
1) The signalers are randomly and independently assigned a type – high (H) or 
low (L) – with equal probabilities. If of high type, a signaler is endowed 
with θ  = 80 units of the social characteristic; otherwise, he is bestowed 
with θ  = 50 units. 
2) Each signaler is privately informed of his type. 
3) The signalers contemporaneously choose a signaling level   ∈ [0, 125], with 
a precision of up to two decimal places, contingent on their type.  
4) After observing both signals, the receiver decides which signaler to choose 
as her exchange partner. She can form an alliance with exactly one signaler.  
5) The payoffs are realized. 
If   ∈ {1, 2} denotes the receiver’s choice of Signaler 1 or 2 conditional on 
having observed each of their signals (   and   , respectively), signaler  ’s payoff is 
given by: 
  
  (  ,   ),  , (θ , θ )  = 500 ∙ [1 − (  −  )
 ] − c(  , θ ), 
where θ  ∈ {θ
 , θ } signifies the amount, or value, of the social characteristic held by 
signaler  , and c(  , θ ) the cost for signaler   of sending a signal of level    when 
endowed with θ  of the social characteristic, which takes the following linear form: 






Note that the marginal cost of signaling is assumed to be lower for signalers of high 
type. In other words, entry into an alliance yields a (commonly known) fixed positive 
“prize” of value 500 for the chosen signaler, yet a signaler only nets a positive payoff 
if he is, in fact, chosen as the receiver’s ally. For, only then does he receive the prize, 
rendering the first term on the right-hand side of the signalers’ payoff function non-
zero.7 The receiver’s payoff, in turn, is given by: 
   (  ,   ),  , (θ , θ )  = θ  + A ∙   , 
where θ   denotes the type-dependent value of the chosen signaler, and A ∙    
represents a possible signal-dependent benefit for the receiver, with (fixed) parameter 
A ∈ {0, 0.1, 1}. If A = 0, the setting corresponds to the signalers using neutral signals 
                                               
3.7 Given the cost structure, to prevent subjects from forming a precise idea of the behavior the 
experimenter is looking for (demand effects), the signalers’ “choice set” exceeds 100, the “break-
even” level for a signaler of high type if he obtains the prize. 
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in the sense that the receiver does not benefit from the signaling activity beyond 
obtaining information about the signalers’ social characteristic. On the other hand, if 
A > 0, the signal is beneficent – the receiver obtains a private benefit proportional to 
the magnitude of the signal sent by the chosen signaler. That is to say, the signal by 
the chosen signaler has a positive externality.8 Note that she does not receive a 
benefit from the individual she does not choose as her ally.  
The appropriate solution concept for this game is the perfect Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium. Using the parameter values, the theoretical predictions can be 
summarized as follows. All proofs can be found in Chapter 2.  
Neutral Signals (  =  ). If the signaling activity does not convey a benefit to 
the receiver, the problem is equivalent to one in which the receiver maximizes the 
conditional probability of allying with a signaler of high type (cf. Spence 1973, 
1974).9 Accordingly, the equilibrium depends intrinsically on the receiver’s beliefs, 
enabling one to construct a wide variety of separating and pooling equilibria, both in 
pure and mixed strategies, as well as a broad range of hybrid equilibria. For instance, 
assuming “threshold” beliefs on the part of the receiver in that signals below some 
level  ∗ are associated with low type and those above said level with high type, one 
can construct the following representative range of symmetric separating equilibria:  
   
Signalers of low type set    = 0 and signalers of high type    =  ∗, 
where 10 ≤   ∗ ≤ 50 . The receiver adopts appropriate threshold beliefs. 
She chooses to ally with the signaler whom she assesses to have the 
highest probability of being of high type. In case of a tie (i.e., the 
signalers send signals of the same magnitude and the receiver considers 
them to be of the same type), she will randomly10 select one of the 
signalers as her ally.  
 
In terms of payoffs, a signaler of low type expects to receive 0.5 ∙ 0.5 ∙ 500 = 125, a 
signaler of high type between 0.5 ∙ 0.5 ∙ 500 + 0.5 ∙ 500 − 5 ∙ 50 = 125 and 0.5 ∙ 0.5 ∙
500 + 0.5 ∙ 500 − 5 ∙ 10 = 325, and the receiver anticipates a payoff of 50 or 80. 
                                               
3.8 It is useful to distinguish between signals yielding a benefit to others and “socially beneficial” 
signals. A (costly) signal can only be considered socially beneficial if the associated benefit is large 
enough to offset completely the signalers’ cost. As this is not necessarily the case in the present 
scenario, for transparency, I shall use the term “beneficence” to indicate that nonetheless, in all cases, 
the signal has a positive externality on the receiver.  
3.9 While the present setting is similar to Spence (1973, 1974), there is a fundamental difference in that 
I do not consider competition among the receivers. Instead, in my setup, and in further contrast to 
Spence, only the signalers compete. Moreover, the signaler in this paper receives a fixed reward when 
“hired,” whereas Spence’s signaler receives a reward that depends on his perceived type.  
3.10 I focus on equilibria in which the receiver randomizes 50:50 when indifferent. 
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The outcome with  ∗ = 10, the least-cost configuration of the indicated range, will 
henceforth be referred to as “LCS outcome.”  
Beneficent Signals (  >  ). If the signal comprises a benefit and the 
receiver adopts non-decreasing beliefs, the interaction transforms into an incomplete-
information all-pay auction with two discrete types of bidders, who face asymmetric 
bidding costs, competing for a fixed prize by submitting the   ’s as their bids. It can 
be shown that there exists a unique symmetric separating equilibrium according to 
which signalers of high type choose a higher level of the signal than those of low 
type and the receiver adopts threshold beliefs. It takes the following form:  
 
Signalers of low type randomize uniformly on [0, 10], while signalers of 
high type randomize uniformly on [10, 60]. The receiver adopts threshold 
beliefs (with the threshold set at   = 10), and if the signalers appear to be 
of the same type she will ally with the signaler who bestows the highest 
signal-dependent benefit on her, i.e., who sends the highest signal. In 
case of a tie, she will randomly select one of the signalers as her ally.  
 
Note that this equilibrium holds regardless of the specific value of A, so long as it is 
strictly positive.  
The expected equilibrium payoff can easily be established to be 0 for signalers 
of low type and 200 for high types. For a low type, for instance, consider his payoff 
for a signaling level of zero, with which he is bound to lose, the ensuing payoff 
likewise being zero. For a signaler of high type, in turn, consider a signal of 60, 
where he is guaranteed to win, yielding him a payoff of 500 − 5 ∙ 60 = 200. Both 
types of signaler make the same payoff at the opposite ends of their equilibrium 
supports, where their probability of winning is 0.5. In fact, they must obtain these 
payoffs for any signal within their respective equilibrium supports. The receiver’s 
expected payoff depends on the value of A. If it is equal to 1, she anticipates a payoff 
between 50 + 0 = 50 and 80 + 60 = 140, whereas a value of 0.1 entails a payoff 
between 50 + 0.1 ∙ 0 = 50 and 80 + 0.1 ∙ 60 = 86.  
 
3.2.2 Experimental Hypotheses 
Four properties of the equilibrium solutions are amenable for experimental 
investigation. It is clearly not reasonable to expect that behavior be precisely in line 
with the theoretical predictions; however, they ought to be prognostic in a qualitative 
sense. For one, the accuracy of both of the equilibrium solutions is testable. Hence, 
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considering the multitude of possible equilibrium solutions, in the case of neutral 
signals (A = 0), one would expect that the participants find it difficult to coordinate 
on a specific, well-defined outcome.  
 
Hypothesis 1 If A = 0, the participants struggle to converge to a definite 
outcome, if any.  
 
With beneficent signals (A > 0) in use, notwithstanding the relative complexity of 
the equilibrium solution, previous work suggests that one might expect to observe 
separation of the signaler types’ behavior and, at least at the aggregate level, 
randomization across the various signaling magnitudes along the equilibrium 
supports (cf. Camerer 2003).  
 
Hypothesis 2 If A > 0, the signaler types separate and, at least at the aggregate 
level, randomize approximately in line with the theoretical 
predictions, while the receivers choose the signalers sending the 
highest signals as their allies.   
 
As a corollary to these conjectures, one would expect an unambiguous divergence in 
aggregate behavior across signaling activities – ambiguity if A = 0 and clear 
separation if A > 0.  
 
Hypothesis 3 The aggregate behavior of the signalers (and potentially 
receivers) differs sharply across signaling activities (A = 0 vs. 
A > 0).  
 
Finally, as both activities are intrinsically beneficial and the theoretical prediction is 
thus identical, one would not expect a drastic difference in aggregate behavior for 
signals with benefits of different (marginal) magnitudes. 
 
Hypothesis 4 The aggregate behavior of the signalers and receivers is 
independent of the level of the signal-dependent benefit 
(A = 0.1 vs. A = 1).  
 
In view of the comparatively elaborate nature of the theoretical framework, to be 
able to test the hypotheses reliably against data, the experimental design comprised a 
number of substitutable elements. They are now presented and the necessity of their 
combined use is justified.  
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
As one purpose of this study is to compare the behavior when individuals 
employ beneficent as opposed to neutral signals, the experiment involved three 
treatments, one for each value of the signal-dependent benefit (A = 0, 0.1, and	1). It 
was conducted in September and October 2009 at the Scottish Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (SEEL), involving 165 subjects drawn from the general 
student population of the University of Aberdeen (U.K.) in 16 sessions11 – broken 
down by treatment, 60 in 6 sessions for A = 0, 54 in 5 sessions for A = 0.1, and 51 in 
5 sessions for A = 1.12 Recruitment took place via an online database (ExLab), which 
comprises a utility that regularly makes students aware of experiments for which 
they are eligible.13 All sessions were fully computerized14 and involved the same 
general modus operandi (summarized in Appendix 3.1, Section 3.A).  
Upon arrival, the participants received written instructions (Appendix 3.2) and 
were randomly assigned to computer terminals. Before the start of the experiment, 
the instructions were read aloud to ensure that all information was common 
knowledge; any clarifying questions about the setup were answered in private. 
Owing to the intricacy of the decision scenario, the instructions were framed in terms 
of a procurement contest: A government official (receiver) was looking to contract 
out the design and production of a new helicopter fleet for the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency to a supplier (signaler), who could either face high (low type) or 
low (high type) costs. Given the information about his/her cost, each supplier was to 
produce a prototype of the helicopter (s)he would deliver to the government official 
if awarded the contract. The suppliers’ decision variable was the quality of their 
prototype (signal), which was captured by way of discrete “quality units,” the unit 
cost of which differed according to their type. The choice of frame was based on its 
                                               
3.11 Students were invited for a total of nine timeslots. Upon arrival, if feasible, the participants of a 
given timeslot were randomly partitioned into two subsets (via the random assignment of seats; see 
Appendix 3.1 for details). Once established, the subsets within each timeslot were kept completely 
separate (controlled on different servers), but played the same treatment. “Session” refers to a subset 
of participants.   
3.12 A post-experimental questionnaire indicates that the participants had an average age of 26 years 
and about 43% were female. Few were formally trained in economics – only 8.5% were economics 
majors. Around 48% were social scientists, 37% natural scientists, and 15% humanities majors. 
3.13 The system allows the experimenter to keep track of the registration, participation, and earnings of 
individual subjects as well as the registered subject pool as a whole. Upon arrival, the protocol 
prescribed cross-checking the individuals’ Student IDs with the name and student number recorded by 
the system. It was thus ensured that no subject participated in more than one session.  
3.14 The experiment was conducted using the software tool kit z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Chapter 3. Experiment  67 
 
transparency, while safeguarding that it was sufficiently abstract in terms of the 
participants’ likely real-world experience so as not to generate demand effects. To 
make sure that all participants understood the instructions, which contained a 
numerical example and a summary table of all payoff-relevant information,15 each 
participant had to answer three control questions. The experiment did not proceed 
until all participants had answered all questions correctly.  
The decision phase consisted of 36 rounds of play. The participants moved 
through each round in groups of three – two signalers and one receiver. Apart from 
the frame, decision-making corresponded to the timing presented in Section 3.2. No 
further communication was permitted. The procedure therefore ensured that the 
participants’ interaction was as close to anonymous as possible. Earnings were 
recorded in “experimental dollars” (denoted $), which were exchanged into pounds 
sterling at the commonly known exchange rate of £1 per $100.  
The three main challenges from a design point of view were the facilitation of 
convergence given the complexity of the equilibrium solutions, the preservation of 
the game’s one-shot nature in each round and, in view of its all-pay contest 
characteristics, the assurance of positive overall earnings for each participant. To 
these ends, I applied the following four measures. At the beginning of each round, 
each participant was randomly (re)assigned a (new) role and randomly (re)assigned 
to a (new) group; at the end of each round, (s)he received extensive feedback, while 
payment was according to a lump sum and his/her earnings in only nine randomly 
selected decision rounds. Each of these design elements was publicly announced to 
the participants. 
Previous work on learning in games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria 
indicates that subjects tend to struggle to converge to the solution when asked to 
make (only) one decision per round, even in conjunction with a sizeable number of 
repetitions to aid learning (e.g., Brown & Rosenthal 1990; Rapoport & Boebel 1992). 
One way to evade this obstacle would be to implement a variant of the strategy 
method, which makes the mixed-strategy outcome explicit (Ochs 1995). As this 
approach undermines the present objective, the design involved a single decision per 
round. The frame alongside frequent repetition and the said features were deemed 
                                               
3.15 The example and summary table (among a number of other modifications) were introduced to the 
setup following the evaluation of two pilot sessions comprising 27 participants carried out in May and 
June 2009. 
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sufficient to clarify the framework and expedite adjustment by illuminating the 
thought processes of others.  
With this background, repetition was supplemented by role switching. While 
the effect has not yet been established conclusively (Binmore et al. 1985; Bolton 
1991), it is widely believed, that having each participant play all possible roles within 
a game facilitates learning. The idea is that it helps one gain a better understanding of 
the scenario as one has to work through the decision problems of all parties to the 
interaction. The subjects were informed of their role at the beginning of each round 
and could remind themselves on every screen throughout that round. Although 
allocation was random, the roles were assigned such that each participant played the 
role of receiver in ⅓ of the rounds. This mode of implementation was chosen to 
maintain the underlying probabilistic structure of the game. It moreover guarantees 
that each participant receives a positive payoff in at least ⅓ of the rounds and reduces 
the potential for boredom on the part of the receivers. A second measure to facilitate 
coordination was the provision of extensive feedback at the end of each round. Each 
participant was not only shown his/her own payoff for the particular round, but 
provided with a summary of all decisions within his/her group as well as the 
distribution of decisions within the population16 of signalers (broken down by type) 
within the given round, including whether or not a signaler was awarded a contract.17 
Although, in principle, the random allocation of the participants’ roles in each 
round should be sufficient to create a single-period environment, the measure was 
supplemented with the participants’ random assignment to new groups of three at the 
outset of each round. This design feature has the added benefit of preventing the 
emergence of concerns for the welfare of other group members. For it has, both 
theoretically and experimentally, been shown (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982; Camerer 2003; 
Duffy & Ochs 2009) that repeated play within a particular group generates 
reputational concerns and possible team sentiments (e.g., social norms), both of 
which dilute the mechanism underlying the costly signaling angle to explaining 
generous behavior, which is based on pure self-interest.  
The all-pay contest structure of the interaction in the treatments involving 
beneficent signals is mainly a concern if an individual continually makes irrational 
                                               
3.16 Given the partitioned setup within each timeslot, “population of signalers” refers to the signalers in 
a particular subset of participants.  
3.17 This is another divergence from Noussair and Silver (2006), who provide their participants with 
the full history of decisions. 
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decisions. Otherwise, role switching guarantees positive overall earnings, as ⅔ of the 
payoff-relevant rounds, in expectation, yield a non-negative payoff. To allow for 
irrational choices (as well as bad luck) in some of the rounds, each participant was 
endowed with an initial balance equivalent to the prize for procuring one contract 
($500) and final payment was based on a random-round payment mechanism. In 
particular, for each participant, the payment mechanism randomly selected three 
individual receiver rounds, three rounds in which (s)he was a signaler of high type, 
and three rounds in which (s)he was a signaler of low type. At the end of a session, 
the participants were paid the sum of their initial endowment and the earnings in the 
nine randomly selected decision rounds. Since the participants did not know ex ante 
which rounds would be selected for payment, the mechanism also diminished any 
possible income effects. Despite these provisions, there remains a small, strictly 
positive residual probability that an individual ends up with an overall loss or near-
zero payoff (taken to be a payoff of less than £3). To account for these possibilities, 
it was decided that the relevant participant(s) be compensated with a “show-up” fee 
of £3. This commonly known fail-safe was binding in a total of 14 cases (8.5%).18  
The experimental sessions lasted between 75 and 90 minutes, door to door. The 
participants earned an average of £13.57, with a minimum of £3.00 and a maximum 
of £31.00, for their involvement. Payment occurred individually and in cash in a 
separate room after the completion of a brief questionnaire. The subjects exited the 
laboratory separately immediately after payment. For the purposes of statistical 
analyses, a session constitutes a statistically independent observation, which entails a 
total sample size of 16 data points (with the aforesaid breakdown by treatment). 
 
3.4 Experimental Results19 
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the signalers’ aggregate behavior. For each 
treatment, broken down by signaler type, it presents the mean, median, mode, 
                                               
3.18 Six of the relevant individuals continuously made irrational signaling decisions (e.g., signaling up 
to 125 units when of either signaler type), entailing significant overall losses. The remaining eight 
participants mostly made reasonable choices, though several did choose extreme signaling magnitudes 
in at least one round (usually more). Five of them made outright losses due to the payment mechanism 
picking up some of their extreme choices or them presumably having bad luck in terms of being 
chosen as allies. The remaining three individuals ended up with near-zero payoffs due to many small- 
to medium-sized losses without corresponding offsetting gains.  
3.19 Unless stated otherwise, tables, figures, and statistical tests reported in this section are based on the 
participants’ behavior in all 36 rounds of play. 
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standard deviation, and range of signaling choices.20 For reference, the predicted 
means, medians, and modes for the treatment with neutral signals (A = 0), presuming 
one of the representative separating outcomes is attained, are 0 for signalers of low 
type and a point-prediction between 10 and 50 for those of high type; for the 
treatments with beneficent signals (A > 0), the respective predictions are 5 and 35. 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics on Signaling Activity, decomposed by Treatment 
and Signaler Type  
Statistical 
Measures 
  =     =     =  .  
Low Type High Type Low Type High Type Low Type High Type 
Mean 6.934 20.288 6.859 32.358 6.042 37.211 
Median 2 15 4 29 3 31 
Mode 1 20 0 20 0 30 
Standard 
Deviation 
16.012 21.089 9.826 18.784 11.599 24.809 
Range 125 125 78 100 125 125 
 
One of the most obvious features of the data is that the signalers choose to 
employ the signals at their disposal actively and variably. In fact, in all treatments, 
the signaler types separate in the sense that signalers of high type generally choose 
signals of higher magnitude than those of low type. This not only suggests that (most 
of) the participants seem to have grasped the decision scenario, but also that they put 
some thought into their choices when of a particular signaler type. At the same time, 
however, a non-negligible number of participants (across treatments and signaler 
types) make apparently irrational signaling choices; given the parameterization of the 
game, signaling levels beyond 20 for low types and 100 for high types yield a 
negative payoff regardless of the choices of the other players within a particular 
group and are therefore dominated by zero. As discussed in more detail below, while 
some of these choices occurred in early rounds and might thus be considered 
“practice,” their incidence in later rounds cannot be reconciled with rational (and if 
not that, at least observant) thought about the choices’ necessary implications. A 
straightforward consequence is that the means will be skewed towards higher signal 
intensities. Hence, to arrive at a reliable depiction of the signalers’ behavior, it is 
important also to consider the median signaling levels. Note, in this context, that the 
                                               
3.20 Figure 3.A.1.i. (Appendix 3.3) provides an alternative depiction of the distribution of signaling 
choices within each of the treatments. 
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medians and modes are integer values, which indicates that many signalers (though 
certainly not all; cf. Footnote 3.25) choose whole numbers as their signaling 
magnitudes. The relevant values furthermore suggest that the restriction of the choice 
set was not binding to most participants.  
 
Table 3.2. Selection of the Signaler Sending the Lower Signal by the Receivers 

















A = 0 121 720 16.81% 51 18.09% 
A = 1 37 612 6.05% 33 6.39% 
A = 0.1 72 648 11.11% 19 11.45% 
 
Legend: The values in this table are based on group-level data from all 36 rounds of play. In the 
second column, the choice between tied signals, i.e., the case when both signalers within a particular 
group choose the same signaling level, is counted as the receiver choosing the signaler having sent the 
higher signal as her ally. The fifth column explicitly counts out the number of ties; the sixth column, 
correspondingly, represents the percentage of receivers choosing the signaler who sent the lower 
signal when ties are not included in the total decision count (given in the third column).  
 
Table 3.2 presents an analogous descriptive account of the receivers’ aggregate 
behavior by supplying the raw and relative number of chosen signalers who sent the 
lower signal within a given group, as well as information on tied signaling choices. 
Gauged by the observation that more than 80% (when excluding ties) of the receivers 
choose the signaler who sent the higher signal as their interaction partner, they too 
make inferences consistent with careful thought about the decision scenario. In 
particular, the data suggest that – in line with the respective predictions – the 
receivers in the treatment with neutral signals are somewhat more likely to choose 
the signaler sending the lower signal, while their counterparts in the treatments with 
beneficent signals appear to take full advantage of the signal-dependent benefit.  
Hence, the aggregate data imply that the participants not only comprehend the 
decision scenario, but actively account for the information conveyed by the signaling 
activities at their disposal when making their decisions (across roles and signaler 
types). Not unexpectedly, especially on the part of the signalers, behavior in all 
treatments is quite variable. This is not only in line with the literature, but may be 
indicative of the attainment of the predicted equilibrium profiles. Recall that two 
prescribe random choice within the bounds of specified intervals (A > 0), while the 
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other allows for a plethora of possible outcomes (A = 0), in which case notable 
variability is not surprising either. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 3.4.1 describes 
in detail the behavior observed in the treatment with neutral signals (A = 0), 
followed by a similarly thorough survey for the treatments with beneficent signals 
(A > 0) in Section 3.4.2. Section 3.4.3 examines the changes and adjustments in 
behavior “over time” by comparing and contrasting the outcomes observed in the 
first 18 to those in the last 18 and last 9 rounds of play, at which stage one would 
expect the participants to have gathered experience with the game. Section 3.4.4, in 
turn, is devoted to a comparison of the observed behavioral outcomes across the 
three treatments. Each subsection starts out with a description of the signalers’ 
behavior followed by an account of the receivers’ conduct. 
 
3.4.1 Neutral Signals: Treatment with Parameter   =   
Signalers. Bearing in mind the somewhat vague equilibrium prediction for 
this treatment, consider Figure 3.1, which graphically summarizes the key features of 
the signalers’ behavior in this treatment (for all sessions combined), starting with the 
round-by-round average signaling levels plus/minus one standard deviation in the top 
panel. The outcome displays a high degree of separation (one-sided Wilcoxon 
Signed-Ranks Test: n = 6, T+ = 21, p = 0.016): The mean for signalers of low type 
oscillates around 5 and that of high types around 20, although the standard deviations 
in each round are substantial and continually overlap. The scatter plots in the second 
and third panel bear witness to the root cause for the observed deviations, 
highlighting the notable number of (extreme) outliers in virtually all rounds of play. 
Low types in particular repeatedly send signals of much higher magnitude than can 
rationally be explained, choosing up to 125 units. Nevertheless, during the course of 
the game, many of the participants appear to discover that high signals are inevitably 
unprofitable, correcting their choices downward (to choices below 20 for low types 
and 40 for high types). The upshot is that the “linear trend” – the simple linear 
regression of the raw signaling magnitudes on the rounds – for both signaler types in 
this treatment is slightly negative. The histograms in the bottom panels provide 
insight into the raw and cumulative frequency distributions of signaling choices for 
each type of signaler. Although both frequency distributions are uni-modal, the parti- 
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Figure 3.1. Parameter A = 0 – Graphical Overview of the Signalers’ Observed 
Behavior 
Observed Round-by-Round Average 
Signaling Levels and Standard Deviations 
 
Scatter Plots of the Observed Signaling Activity and Linear Trends  
  
Histograms of the Observed Signaling Behavior  
 
 
Legend: The class labels of the histograms denote the upper bounds of the given intervals, with all 
intervals except for “0” – which captures the number of signalers sending a signaling magnitude of 
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cipants’ behavior unmistakably diverges from the representative range of separating 
outcomes in that their choices are quite a bit more dispersed. Hence, the data at the 
aggregate level are consistent with a separating outcome, yet not one according to 
which the types coordinate on particular (separate) signaling levels.  
In order to obtain further insight into the participants’ behavior, it is at this 
stage informative to turn to the behavior observed in the individual sessions. To this 
end, Figure 3.A.2 (Appendix 3.3) presents the session-level round-by-round average 
signaling levels and standard deviations. At this level of (dis)aggregation, behavior 
can be sorted into distinct classes. Two sessions swiftly (by about Round 10) 
approach the least-cost separating (LCS) outcome (Sessions 1 and 2), two sessions 
tend towards a separating outcome quite similar to that predicted for the treatments 
with beneficent signals (Sessions 3 and 4), and two display no clear convergence to 
any kind of equilibrium (Sessions 5 and 6). In short, at the level of the individual 
sessions, in agreement with the theoretical prediction, the data are consistent with 
there existing multiple equilibria. This observation is plainly also in keeping with the 
substantial variability observed when aggregating the data.  
Table 3.A.1 (Appendix 3.4) presents descriptive statistics on signaling behavior 
for each individual session. Consider each class of outcomes in turn, taking as given 
appropriate behavior on the part of the receivers. The means and medians in Sessions 
1 and 2 are unmistakably in line with the LCS outcome. Indeed, in due course, they 
settle at values in very close proximity to the predicted levels. Moreover, contrary to 
the other sessions in this treatment, the standard deviations (across signaler types) are 
very low, which is clearly indicative of the signalers, within type, sending the same 
signals. The remarkably quick approximate convergence to this outcome suggests 
that, once the required depth of reasoning to establish the strategy configuration has 
been achieved, maintaining it is essentially straightforward. Yet, given the apparent 
lack of convergence in Sessions 5 and 6, attaining the relevant level of understanding 
(and conveying it to other participants) is not necessarily simple. 
The approximate outcome for Sessions 3 (tentatively) and 4 is not quite as 
close to a theoretical equilibrium as Sessions 1 and 2, yet one can easily make out a 
tendency towards the separating outcome predicted for the treatments with 
beneficent signals. While not as obvious a solution as for beneficent signals, the 
outcome can – in principle – also arise with neutral signals in use. The prerequisite 
for this result is that the receivers’ behavior is consistent with them recurrently 
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choosing the signaler having sent the higher signal as their allies. Even with neutral 
signals, this rule gives rise to competitive pressures along the lines of an all-pay 
auction. Accordingly, if so, the observed signaling behavior is a completely 
reasonable best response to the receivers’ conduct.  
The lack of convergence in Sessions 5 and 6 underlines the complexity of the 
setup and behavioral implications of the equilibrium predictions. Although Session 5 
ultimately appears to converge to a separating outcome, which in time may (or may 
not) have approached the outcome predicted for beneficent signals, the continual 
overlap in choices observed in Session 6 cannot be reconciled with any kind of 
equilibrium, as overlapping supports are not sustainable given the cost structure of 
the game. Hence, in sum, the signaling choices observed in the individual sessions 
within this treatment are consistent with at least two distinct equilibrium outcomes, 
though the apparent lack of convergence in two sessions highlights the fundamental 
difficulty of coordinating on an outcome.  
Receivers. In view of the central role of the receivers’ strategy in the ultimate 
configuration of the equilibrium in this treatment (predicted and otherwise), it is 
useful to spend some time trying to establish what the participants ended up doing 
when assigned this role. To this end, Figure 3.2 illustrates (for all sessions combined) 
the receivers’ choice of the signaler sending the high(er) or low(er) signal, having 
divided the signalers’ choices within any given group into three classes: both 
signaling less than 10, both signaling more than 10, and one signaling less and the 
other more than 10. Plainly, in each signal category, the receivers tend to choose the 
higher of the two signals they observe in any given group. In other words, in keeping 
with the aggregate picture (Table 3.2), the receivers’ behavior in this treatment is 
consistent with a decision rule of always choosing the signaler sending the higher 
signal. Figure 3.A.3 (Appendix 3.3), which depicts the receivers’ choice of signaler 
from a session-by-session perspective, further underpins this conjecture. 
In view of this discussion, the signalers’ behavior in Sessions 3 and 4 is 
certainly not unreasonable. The figures moreover suggest that, in line with the 
relevant predictions, the receivers in Sessions 1 and 2 are slightly less likely to 
choose the signalers having sent the higher signal – particularly if both signals fall 
below 10 – than those in the session(s) approaching the outcome for signaling using 
beneficent signals (particularly Session 4). While the sample is too small for a 
definitive statement in this context, to get a better sense of the distribution of choices 
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Figure 3.2.  Parameter A = 0 – Choice of Winning Signal(er) by Signal Category 
(Relative to the Total Number of Decisions within a Signal Category, excluding 
Ties), Aggregate Perspective 
 
 
Legend: This figure is based on group-level data from all 36 rounds of play, namely, the percentage of 
choices in favor of the high(er) or low(er) signal (excluding tied signaling choices) relative to the total 
number of decisions within a particular signal category; correspondingly, the height of the two bars 
within each signal category sums to 1 (or, equivalently, the height of all bars in the figure sums to 3). 
In this particular instance, “high” and “low” refer to the receiver’s choice of the signaler having sent 
the high(er) or low(er) signal within a given decision scenario as his/her ally, not signaler type. x and 
y, in turn, represent the signalers’ respective choices within a given group.  
 
in favor of the lower signals, Figures 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 (Appendix 3.3) zoom in on the 
relevant decisions; for the moment, focus only on those relating to the present 
treatment (and set of rounds). They yield two main messages. For one, the propensity 
to decide in favor of the lower signal is higher for (very) small absolute differences 
between the observed signal intensities, but is effectively independent thereof for 
differences beyond five or so units. In other words, rather than occurring 
“erroneously,” choices in favor of the lower signal tend to be genuine decisions for 
the relevant signalers, conceivably because the difference between the signals is 
perceived not to be large enough. Focusing on signals across the projected belief 
threshold of 10, one finds that the receivers in Sessions 1 and 2 are, indeed, 
somewhat more likely to choose the signaler sending the lower signal than those in 
Sessions 3 and 4, yet much less so than the receivers in Sessions 5 and 6, which may 
explain the indistinct outcomes in these sessions. 
In sum, the receivers’ behavior is broadly consistent with the signalers’ 
behavior in each of the individual sessions. While most receivers in this treatment 
appear to adopt the same decision rule as their counterparts in the treatments with 
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slightly less likely to choose the signalers sending the higher signal as their allies. 
Nevertheless, overall, the decisions in favor of the lower signal tend to be largely 
independent of the difference in magnitude between the signals.   
 
Result 3.1 [Hypothesis 1] In line with expectation, the participants’ behavior 
in the treatment with neutral signals, at the aggregate, does not 
converge to a definite outcome, although the signaler types 
display a high degree of separation. Rather, behavior in the 
individual sessions is consistent with three distinct sets of 
outcomes – two sessions tend towards the LCS outcome, two 
towards the outcome predicted for the treatment with beneficent 
signals, and two fail to converge to a coordinated outcome.  
 
3.4.2 Beneficent Signals: Treatments with Parameter   >   
Whereas the participants’ behavior in the treatment with neutral signals appears 
to converge to outcomes approximating equilibria in some of the individual sessions, 
this section describes behavior that, in large parts, is in very close proximity to the 
theoretical predictions. This finding is remarkable, as the structure of the unique 
projected outcome for signaling using beneficent signals is behaviorally quite 
intricate. It involves the signalers randomizing uniformly on separate but contiguous 
interval supports, while the receiver adopts non-decreasing (namely, threshold) 
beliefs, which “in practice” comes down to her always choosing the signaler having 
sent the higher signal as her ally.  
 
3.4.2.1 Treatment with   =    
Signalers. With this background, consider first the treatment comprising the 
higher benefit, i.e., A = 1, for one might expect the participants’ behavior to be 
driven more readily by a large than a small benefit, which would suggest more clear-
cut results in this case. Figure 3.3 provides the corresponding overview of the main 
features of the signalers’ behavior. Again, start with the round-by-round average 
signaling levels plus/minus one standard deviation presented in the top panel. 
In line with the predictions, the observed outcome is unmistakably separating 
(one-sided Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test: n = 5, T+ = 15, p = 0.031), with the 
projected means of 5 and 35 being approached swiftly from above in the case of 
signalers of low type and below by those of high type, respectively. Once more, the 
standard deviations for both signaler types are non-negligible and especially in the 
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Figure 3.3. Parameter A = 1 – Graphical Overview of the Signalers’ Observed 
and Predicted Behavior 
Predicted and Observed Round-by-Round Average 
Signaling Levels and Standard Deviations 
 
Scatter Plots of the Observed Signaling Activity and Linear Trends  
  
Histograms of the Observed Signaling Behavior and Predictions  
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first half of the game tend to overlap; in the latter part of play, most distinctly on the 
part of signalers of low type, the size of the deviations declines and they cease to 
intersect. The scatter plots in the second and third panel of the figure underline this 
account by illustrating that this treatment comprises only few outliers. Except for one 
signal at 100 by a signaler of high type in Round 5, signalers of this type tend to 
choose signaling magnitudes below 90 and, at least in the second half of the game, 
only a handful of signalers of low type signal more than 20. Particularly the former 
contrasts sharply with both of the other treatments. Note furthermore that, in line 
with the foregoing observations, the linear trend for signalers of low type tends 
downward while that for high types tends upward. Hence, at the aggregate level, 
signaling behavior appears to correspond quite well to the theory. In the individual 
sessions, too, the participants’ conduct broadly concurs with the predictions, though 
not surprisingly it is more variable than what is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
The raw and cumulative frequency distributions presented in the histograms in 
the bottom panels reveal several departures of the observed outcomes from the 
predictions. Yet, although the (raw) frequencies of neither type of signaler can be 
considered uniform with any degree of conviction, the majority of choices 
unmistakably falls in the anticipated neighborhoods. The cumulative distributions, 
too, are in close proximity to the projected shapes, despite signalers of low type 
tending to overbid slightly towards the upper end of their support and those of high 
type tending to underbid somewhat, particularly in the intermediate segment of their 
support (between about 20 and 40). 
Table 3.3 numerically corroborates both of the foregoing observations. 
Although more than 80% of both types of signaler choose signaling magnitudes 
within the projected supports, the right tails of the distributions are too thin for the 
outcomes to be classified as uniform randomization across the given intervals. 
Formal statistics draw an even more sharply delineated picture. They back up 
randomness of choice for signalers of high type, but not so for low types (Runs Test 
for Randomness; Low Type: 280 runs, z = – 2.488, p = 0.013; High Type: 283 runs, 
z = – 0.523, p = 0.601).21 Nor do appropriately fitted Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests 
                                               
3.21 The non-parametric One-Sample Runs Test of Randomness tests whether the order or sequence of 
a sample of observations is random (relative to some threshold value; Siegel & Castellan 1988). The 
test was carried out using the raw signaling levels from all sessions, distinguished by type of signaler, 
within a particular treatment. The threshold was taken to be the predicted mean. The interpretation of 
Chapter 3. Experiment  80 
 
allow for the conclusion that the observed cumulative distribution of signaling levels 
for either type of signaler is consistent with a uniform distribution (Low Type: 
n = 520, | d | = 0.287, p < 0.001; High Type: n = 492, | d | = 0.189, p < 0.001).22 
 
Table 3.3. Parameter A = 1 – Observed Frequencies and Mixed-Strategy 
Equilibrium (MSE) Probabilities for the Predicted Equilibrium Supports, 
decomposed by Signaler Type 
             Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Observed Frequency 0.62 0.22 0.17 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.06 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Legend: The class labels denote the upper bounds of the given intervals. All intervals except for the 
first one are open at the lower end. Note that for signalers of high type in the treatments with A > 0, 
“20” denotes the interval [10, 20].   
 
In sum, the behavior of both types of signaler (taking as given the receivers’ 
behavior) is mostly in line with the equilibrium predictions, and quite notably so. In 
case of the more subtle behavioral implications, however, one can make out 
unmistakable points of divergence. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that each 
participant only made one decision per round, even these aspects do not diverge 
drastically from the equilibrium path. 
Receivers. In contrast to the scenario with neutral signals, the receivers’ 
equilibrium strategy in this treatment is pinned down unambiguously – (always) 
choose the high(er) signal. This is indeed what happens (cf. Table 3.2): Close to 95% 
of the receivers choose the signaler having sent the higher signal in any given group. 
It therefore seems reasonable to infer that the receivers’ behavior in this treatment, 
too, is consistent with the signalers’ behavior.  
Paralleling the treatment with neutral signals, the receivers’ propensity to 
choose the lower signal in the few cases not in line with the equilibrium strategy is 
                                                                                                                                     
this test is that a significant result indicates that the signaling levels do not occur in a random order 
above and below the test value.  
3.22 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample Test is a non-parametric test of the goodness-of-fit of an 
observed cumulative (relative) frequency distribution (measured on at least an ordinal scale) and some 
specified theoretical distribution (Siegel & Castellan 1988). The assessment is based on the point of 
greatest divergence between the two distributions. The present analysis was carried out using the raw 
signaling levels from all sessions between the indicated minimum and maximum levels (i.e., the test 
was carried out using a restricted dataset, the size of which is denoted by n in the text). The results 
when using the unrestricted dataset do not differ qualitatively. The interpretation of the results is that a 
significant outcome indicates that the signaling levels are not distributed uniformly between the 
relevant bounds.  
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higher for (very) small absolute differences between the observed signaling 
magnitudes, but is essentially independent thereof for differences beyond three or so 
units (Figure 3.A.4, Appendix 3.3). Moreover, in this treatment less than 5% of the 
relevant receivers choose the lower signal when deciding between a signal falling 
below 10 and the other above 10 (Figure 3.A.5, Appendix 3.3). These findings 
suggest that once settled on the appropriate strategy configuration, the signal-
dependent benefit does not play a significant role. 
 
Result 3.2 (a) [Hypothesis 2, A = 1] In their essence, the behavioral outcomes 
(for both roles) in the treatment with A = 1 provide support for 
the theory. The signalers generally separate, with signalers of low 
types sending lower signals than signalers of high type, and the 
observed frequency distributions conform reasonably well to the 
projected outcome. The receivers, too, consistently choose the 
signaler having sent the higher signal.  
 
3.4.2.2 Treatment with   =  .    
In view of the results when the signal-dependent benefit is comparatively large, 
one might be curious whether the observed proximity to the theory is replicated when 
the signal-dependent benefit is substantially smaller, namely, 10% of the original 
level. In other words, in this case, the receiver collects only 10% – as opposed to the 
full level – of the signaling magnitude sent by the signaler she chooses as her ally as 
additional payoff beyond the intrinsic value of the chosen signaler. Recall that the 
theoretical prediction does not vary for the two values of the signal-dependent 
benefit. The obvious alternative would be the existence of a benefit “threshold,” 
entailing that the outcome in this case would tend to be more similar to the one in the 
treatment with no benefit to begin with. Once more, turn first to the participants’ 
behavior when assigned the role of signaler. 
Signalers. Figure 3.4 depicts the essential ingredients to surveying the 
signaling activity in this treatment. In congruence with the theoretical projection, the 
round-by-round average signaling levels plus/minus one standard deviation depicted 
in the top panel reveal that the signaler types undeniably separate (one-sided 
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test: n = 5, T+ = 15, p = 0.031). Moreover, both types 
appear to arrive quickly at signaling levels in close proximity to their respective 
predicted means (5 for low types and 35 for high types). In fact, towards the end of 
the game, signalers of low type tend to send signals strictly below their projected  
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Figure 3.4. Parameter A = 0.1 – Graphical Overview of the Signalers’ Observed 
and Predicted Behavior 
Predicted and Observed Round-by-Round Average 
Signaling Levels and Standard Deviations 
 
Scatter Plots of the Observed Signaling Activity and Linear Trends 
  
Histograms of the Observed Signaling Behavior and Predictions  
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mean, with very little variability. The standard deviations for signalers of high type, 
in contrast, tend to be quite sizeable – more along the lines of those observed in the 
treatment with no signal-dependent benefit. Even so, in the second half of the game, 
one observes only few overlaps. 
In contrast to its companion treatment, the scatter plots in the second and third 
panel indicate that a considerable number of signalers choose exceedingly high 
signal intensities, recurrently up to 125 units. In this case, however, nearly all of the 
signals one would classify as (extreme) outliers are sent by signalers of high type (as 
opposed to low types in the setting with neutral signals). Most low types tend to 
choose signaling levels below 15 and, in the second half of the game, below 10.  
Nonetheless, note that when ignoring signals beyond 80 by signalers of high type, the 
scatter plots look very similar to those when A = 1, also with regard to the linear 
trends, although the high types’ slope in this treatment is somewhat steeper. Hence, 
at the aggregate level, behavior again appears to correspond quite closely to that 
predicted by the theory. In the individual sessions, too, behavior tends to accord well 
with the projections. Indeed, two of the sessions (Sessions 2 and 5) turn out to be just 
about exactly “on target;” the outcome for signalers of high type in Session 1, on the 
other hand, differs notably from the predicted strategy configuration.23 
The histograms in the bottom panels place the comparatively extensive 
variability in signaling choices displayed by signalers of high type into perspective. 
For, remarkably, especially when compared to the corresponding graph in the 
companion treatment, the observed and predicted cumulative frequency distributions 
for this type of player hardly differ. Moreover, the (raw) frequencies in this treatment 
look quite a bit more uniform than the uni-modal appearance of its counterpart when 
A = 1. The behavior of signalers of low type is (again) also quite similar to the 
prediction. In other words, while one could easily detect over- (low types) and under-
signaling (high types) in the treatment with A = 1, such discrepancies are much less 
evident in this case. The figures presented in Table 3.4 further back up these 
observations. Even though certainly not faultless, close to 85% of the signaling 
choices fall into the predicted supports. What is more, the probabilities for signalers 
                                               
3.23 Figure 3.A.6 (Appendix 3.3) provides descriptive statistics for Session 2. While not perfect, 
behavior in this treatment is very close to that predicted by the theory, especially on the part of 
signalers of high type. 
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of high type, including the tails, are in a much closer neighborhood of the projected 
probabilities than those in the companion treatment. 
 
Table 3.4. Parameter A = 0.1 – Observed Frequencies and Mixed-Strategy 
Equilibrium (MSE) Probabilities for the Predicted Equilibrium Supports, 
decomposed by Signaler Type 
             Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Observed Frequency 0.67 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.13 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Legend: The class labels denote the upper bounds of the given intervals. All intervals except for the 
first one are open at the lower end. Note that for signalers of high type in the treatments with A > 0, 
“20” denotes the interval [10, 20].  
  
Do the statistics corroborate these impressions relating to the more subtle 
elements of the theory? Yes and no. The Runs Tests for Randomness of the chosen 
signaling levels indicate that the sequence of signaling choices of both signaler types 
can indeed be deemed random (Low Type: 284 runs, z = – 1.364, p = 0.173; High 
Type: 313 runs, z = – 1.466, p = 0.143). Yet, once again, the respective Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests indicate that the observed frequency distributions of signal choices 
cannot be considered uniform at any conventional level of significance for either 
type of signaler (Low Type: n = 535, | d | = 0.346, p < 0.001; High Type: n = 555,      
| d | = 0.133, p < 0.001). 
In sum, large parts of the signalers’ behavior in this treatment (taking 
appropriate behavior on the part of the receivers as given) appears to coincide even 
more closely with the theoretical predictions for beneficent signaling than that 
observed in the companion treatment.24 Indeed, in two of the individual sessions, the 
equilibrium distributions are obtained almost to the point. Curiously, these findings 
suggest that the pressure to exploit the strategic opportunities inherent in the setup 
may be inversely related to the size of the signal-dependent benefit. 
                                               
3.24 A visual inspection of the individual sessions in the treatments with beneficent signals reveals that 
both comprise one session that diverges notably from the predicted outcome (in both cases on the part 
of signalers of high type), and both comprise sessions in very close proximity to the theory. The latter 
include the behavior of signalers of low type, which – at the aggregate level – appears to deviate to 
some extent from the prediction. The comparative statement made here is based on the observation 
that two sessions in the present treatment are almost perfectly in line with the prediction and the others 
seem to exhibit less divergence from the projections than those in the companion treatment.  
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Receivers. Representing a scenario with beneficent signals, the receivers’ 
unique optimal strategy in equilibrium is also (always) to choose the high(er) signal. 
As in the companion treatment, this is precisely what happens (cf. Table 3.2): 
Around 90% of the receivers choose the signaler having sent the higher signal as 
their allies. Interestingly, this level is slightly lower than in the treatment with A = 1; 
in fact, it comes in almost exactly between the other two treatments. Even so, the 
receivers’ behavior in this treatment appears to be very much consistent with the 
signalers’ behavior. As in the other treatments, the propensity to choose the lower 
signal in the instances receivers do select this strategy is higher for small absolute 
differences between the observed signaling magnitudes, but effectively independent 
thereof for differences beyond around four units (Figure 3.A.4, Appendix 3.3). In the 
present case, however, about 9% of the receivers choose the lower signal if one 
observed signal is less and the other more than 10, about twice as many as in the 
companion treatment (Figure 3.A.5, Appendix 3.3).  
 
Result 3.2 (b) [Hypothesis 2, A = 0.1] Most attributes of the behavior observed 
in the treatment with A = 0.1 are closely in line with the 
theoretical predictions – perhaps more so than in the companion 
treatment with beneficent signals. Even though, at times, the 
outcome appears to be virtually in-between the other treatments, 
the present behavior differs distinctly from that with neutral 
signals, at the aggregate as well as within the individual sessions. 
 
3.4.3 Changes in Behavior “over Time” 
On account of the complexity of the framework and the predicted behavioral 
outcomes, it is to be expected that the participants require some time to work out 
their optimal course of action and learn the behavior of others. As such, the first half 
of the game may involve a variety of “practice” choices to become familiar with their 
likely consequences given the behavior of the other participants. In other words, 
experience with the game is likely to have a considerable impact on the participants’ 
conduct. To examine this, this section compares and contrasts the behavior observed 
in the first 18 (Rounds 1 – 18) rounds of play to that in the last 18 (Rounds 19 – 36) 
and last 9 (Rounds 28 – 36) rounds. Besides presenting descriptive statistics for the 
selected subsets of rounds, the focus will be on the scale and direction of change. A 
final theme will be a brief discussion of the changes in significances for the statistical 
tests reported for all 36 rounds of play (if any).  
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A = 0, Low Type A = 1, Low Type A = 0.1, Low Type
A = 0, High Type A = 1, High Type A = 0.1, High Type
Signalers. Whilst the linear trends in the various scatter plots are indicative, 
the data in each treatment comprise outliers. To elucidate the resulting skew of the 
average signaling level, Figure 3.5 presents the mean and median signaling levels for 
each (sub)set of rounds (including, for reference, all rounds of play). In conjunction 
with Figures 3.A.1.ii through iv (Appendix 3.3) and Table 3.A.2 (Appendix 3.4), 
which replicate the aforementioned descriptive statistics and box-plots for the first 
and last 18, as well as the last 9 rounds of play, there is considerable support for the 
importance of experience in shaping the observed outcomes. Not only do the means 
tend in the expected directions and are the standard deviations and ranges in most 
cases reduced, but so is the occurrence of (extreme) outliers. Indeed, in the last 
18 rounds of play – as projected – signalers of high type in the treatment with 
A = 0.1 always send strictly positive signals. Still, even though many participants do 
seem to acquire a working understanding of the game, some make irrational choices 
through to the very end (cf. Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.5. Graphical Comparison of the Mean and Median Signaling Levels 






A statistical comparison of signaler behavior across the various subsets of 
rounds using the session-level mean signaling levels (Table 3.A.3, Appendix 3.4) 
indicates that the most notable adjustments “over time” take place in the treatment 
with A = 1 (p ≤ 0.063). The main message of the relevant results is two-fold. For 
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levels very close to the theoretical means. Second, even though several of the 
adjustments are statistically significant, most participants appear to settle on levels 
close to those predicted within the first half of the game. Observe in this regard also 
that the incidence of tied signaling choices, which may be considered to capture the 
participants’ grasp of the strategic elements of the game, tends to decline over time in 
all treatments (from less than 8% to less than 5%), although the adjustments are not 
statistically significant (Table 3.A.4, Appendix 3.4). While these changes suggest 
that the understanding of the participants is sharpened with experience, most appear 
to have a good grasp of the game and the significance of choosing (slightly) different 
signaling magnitudes than other signalers from the outset.25 
 
Table 3.5. Percentage of Signals within the Predicted Equilibrium Supports “over 
Time,” decomposed by Treatment and Signaler Type 
(Sub)Set of 
Rounds 
  =     =     =  .  
Low Type High Type Low Type High Type Low Type High Type 
All Rounds 12.31 8.14 83.74 81.59 85.19 83.03 
First 18 Rounds 11.94 5.83 76.97 79.55 77.61 83.85 
Last 18 Rounds 12.68 10.41 90.22 83.73 93.38 82.37 
Last 9 Rounds 12.21 10.64 91.30 85.52 97.26 82.58 
 
Legend: For the treatment with A = 0, the percentage of signals at 0 and 10 (LCS outcome) is given. 
Recall that the supports for the treatments with A > 0 are predicted to be on [0, 10] for low types and 
[10, 60] for high types.  
 
Does progressive experience with the setup and the conduct of the other 
participants translate into the aggregate behavior’s proximity to the more subtle 
predictions of the theory on signaling using beneficent signals, i.e., uniform 
randomization across well-defined interval supports? Table 3.5 presents the 
percentage of signals falling within the projected equilibrium supports and/or (exact) 
“pooling” levels (LCS outcome). In keeping with the discussion so far, the behavior 
in the treatment with neutral signals, when aggregated, in not consistent with the 
LCS prediction (nor any of the other indicated separating outcomes), and does not 
move in its direction “over time” either. Within the treatments with beneficent 
signals, on the other hand, more than 80% of the signalers (overall) – and in the case 
                                               
3.25 An interesting observation in the context of strategic signaling choices is that carefully calibrated 
decimal configurations tend to be more important for lower signaling magnitudes (i.e., below 40) and 
close to focal points such as 0, 20, and around 35. Competition with higher signal intensities, in turn, 
tends to take place at integer level.  
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of low types, starting in the second half of the game, more than 90% – send signals in 
their respective equilibrium intervals. For low types, the percentage is strictly 
increasing over time, as is the levels for high types in the treatment with A = 1; in the 
companion treatment with beneficent signals, the percentage for high types is 
roughly constant around 83%. A uniform distribution along the intervals would 
require all observations to fall within the given bounds. While this is not the case, the 
high values do suggest that the observed bounds are not far off the mark. 
For inferences regarding the nature of the observed strategy, Table 3.A.5 
(Appendix 3.4) provides the observed and predicted frequencies for a mixed strategy 
along the projected intervals for the first 18, last 18, and 9 rounds of play. Paralleling 
the findings for all rounds, for signalers of low type and in the treatment with A = 1 
also for high types (although one can make out some adjustment in the appropriate 
direction over time), the observed frequencies tend to be skewed towards the lower 
ends of the intervals with fairly thin right tails. When A = 0.1, however, signalers of 
high type achieve distributions in a remarkably close neighborhood of the predicted 
mixing probabilities virtually from the outset of the game (bearing in mind that the 
participants only make one decision per round). Nevertheless, statistically speaking, 
none of the distributions can be considered uniform.  
In fact, most of the statistical results reported for all rounds of play are not 
qualitatively changed when zooming in on the subsets of rounds. As may be 
expected when inspecting the vertical differences in Figure 3.5, the separation results 
are both qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. The only significant result in the 
context of the tests for randomness of the signaling choices in the treatments with 
beneficent signals is the sequence by signalers of low type in the last 18 rounds when 
A = 1 (p = 0.009). All other choice sequences can statistically be considered random. 
Hence, while the descriptive statistics suggest that the participants gradually tend to 
choose more similar signaling magnitudes, the distributions as a whole appear to be 
sufficiently dispersed to be approximately in line with the equilibrium predictions. 
In sum, as the participants progressively gain experience with the setup and its 
behavioral implications, they appear to become more strategic in their signaling 
choices. Particularly in the treatments with beneficent signals, behavior appears to 
converge to levels in close proximity to the theoretical means, although most 
adjustments in the signaling levels in this regard occur in the treatment with the large 
signal-dependent benefit. What is more, in the last half and quarter of play, the vast 
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majority of signals falls within the projected bounds, with the observed frequencies 
not far from their predicted levels. 
Receivers. Some of the most substantial adjustments over time occur on the 
part of the receivers (Figure 3.6 and Table 3.A.6, Appendix 3.4). Especially the 
treatments with A = 0	and A = 0.1 appear to exhibit a notable decline in the relative 
number of choices in favor of the lower of the two signals in a given group. 
Accordingly, the clarification of the strategic elements of the setup with experience 
also appears to affect considerably the receivers’ conduct. Table 3.A.7 
(Appendix 3.4) provides statistical support for this idea by comparing the session-
level percentage levels (excluding ties) of receivers having chosen the signalers 
sending the lower signal as their allies across the various subsets of rounds; the 
results do not differ when including tied signaling choices. As indicated by the 
figure, the most notable adjustments occur in the treatment with neutral signals and 
that with a small signal-dependent benefit (p ≤ 0.094).  
 
Figure 3.6. Graphical Comparison of the Percentage of Receivers Selecting the 
Signaler Sending the Lower Signal (excluding Tied Signaling Choices) “over 
Time,” decomposed by Treatment  
 
 
Graphs analogous to Figures 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 (Appendix 3.3) further underpin 
these findings. In the context of the former, the curves depicting the receivers’ 
propensity to choose the signaler having sent the lower signal as their ally in the first 
18 rounds are consistently much flatter than the corresponding curves for the last 18 
and last 9 rounds of play, which tend to slope downward beyond (absolute) 
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half of the game are considerably less sensitive to differences in the signaling 
magnitudes than in the latter part of play. In the last 9 rounds, the curves are, again, 
fairly flat beyond differences of about four or so units, although this is reasonable 
given that one would expect the participants to have worked out the optimal strategy 
by then. As is the case in Figure 3.A.5, the treatments with beneficent signals are 
almost indistinguishable in the last quarter of play. When focusing on decisions when 
one signal is below and the other above 10 (Figure 3.A.5), the results are effectively 
the same. In the first half of the game, the receivers have a notably higher tendency 
to choose the lower signal than in the last half and quarter of the game, with the most 
significant downward adjustments occurring in the treatments with A = 0 and 
A = 0.1. More generally, the figures also seem to suggest that in the treatment with 
the higher signal-dependent benefit, the receivers’ strategy may be more obvious 
from the outset. The behavior in the companion treatment (A = 0.1) initially seems 
more similar to that in the treatment with neutral signals, although over time it 
converges to the predicted equilibrium strategy. In view of the relative degree of 
adjustment, it is therefore conceivable that large parts of the changes in the behavior 
of the signalers occur in response to modifications in the receivers’ behavior. 
 
Result 3.3 Experience with the setup is important in shaping the participants’ 
behavior across roles. The observed adjustments suggest that, 
over time, the strategic elements of the setup become 
progressively more apparent. As a result, the signaling choices in 
the treatments with beneficent signals approximately converge to 
the theoretical means and a notably lower proportion of receivers 
choose signalers having sent the lower of the two signals they 
observe in a given group as their allies. 
 
3.4.4 Comparison of Behavior across Treatments 
The discussion thus far was devoted to identifying the basic characteristics of 
the equilibrium predictions in each of the three treatments. Rooted in this foundation, 
this section seeks to gauge the accuracy of the theory’s comparative static properties. 
While the findings are qualitatively similar for all subsets of rounds, I focus on the 
results for the last 18 rounds of play, judging it most representative as the key 
behavioral adjustments will have taken place.  
Signalers. Recall that the comparative static results of the theory are quite 
succinct. Whereas they projected a sharp contrast in behavior between the treatments  
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Table 3.6. Statistical Comparison of the Signaling Activity across Treatments, 









A = 0 vs. A = 1 RRO – 0.884 > 0.204 
A = 0 vs. A = 0.1 RRO – 0.497 > 0.204 
A = 0.1 vs. A = 1 RRO 0.275 > 0.206 
High Type 
A = 0 vs. A = 1 RRO 2.622 0.052** 
A = 0 vs. A = 0.1 RRO 3.914 0.022** 
A = 0.1 vs. A = 1 RRO – 0.853 > 0.206 
 
Legend: RRO stands for Robust Rank Order Test. The test was carried out in its two-sided form, 
comparing the session-level mean signaling levels derived from the last 18 rounds of play within a 
particular treatment. The alternative hypothesis is given by H1:  ̅ 
  ≠  ̅ 
≻ , where  ̅ 
 , for   ∈ {0,0.1,1} 
and	  ∈ {1, . . , 5	or	6}, signifies the mean within a particular session. The order of comparison was such 
that the smaller sample was compared to the larger sample (e.g., A = 1	vs. A = 0). Hence, a positive 
value for the test statistic indicates that the values of the smaller sample exceed those of the larger 
sample. The (two-sided) p-values are the closest values derived by Feltovich (2005). * ≡ Significance 
at the 10% level; ** ≡ Significance at the 5% level; *** ≡ Significance at the 1% level. 
 
with neutral and beneficent signals, no divergence should be observed when 
comparing the treatments with beneficent signals. Table 3.6 presents the relevant 
statistical results, decomposed by signaler type.27 Despite a slight divergence in the 
descriptive graphs, the behavior of signalers of low type does not differ statistically 
across the treatments, though in view of the multiplicity of outcomes in the treatment 
with neutral signals, this finding is not necessarily surprising. On the part of signalers 
of high type, in turn, the analysis indicates a significant difference between the 
participants’ behavior when using neutral signals and either variant involving a 
signal-dependent benefit. However, no difference is detectable when contrasting the 
treatments with beneficent signals. These results thus provide strong support for the 
theory, although experience turns out to be important in this regard. For the results 
                                               
3.26 The Robust Rank-Order Test is a modification of the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-
Test designed to test for differences in central tendency between two independent samples from the 
same population without requiring assumptions on higher-order moments (Siegel & Castellan 1988; 
Feltovich 2003). Its second crucial advantage for the purposes at hand is that it is insensitive to small 
sample sizes. The most notable obstacle to using this test is that the available probability tables are 
quite coarse (cf. Feltovich 2005).   
3.27 Exploratory Kruskal-Wallis three-sample tests indicated that whereas the behavior of signalers of 
low type does not tend to diverge across the treatments (χ2 = 0.757, p = 0.685), the conduct of 
signalers of high type does differ (χ2 = 6.665, p = 0.038), which prompted the two-sample 
comparisons reported in Table 3.6. For reference, the Kruskal-Wallis k-sample test is a non-parametric 
testing procedure to assess whether a number of independent samples (jointly) were drawn from the 
same population (Siegel & Castellan 1988). The present analysis was carried out using the session-
level mean signaling levels within a particular treatment (decomposed by signaler type). The 
interpretation of the test is such that a significant result indicates that the samples were drawn from 
different populations. 
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are not quite as strong when based on the first 18 rounds of play (when comparing 
A = 0	vs. A > 0). 
Shifting gears, a comparison across treatments also sheds light on the 
consistency of the participants’ behavior. The most straightforward measure on the 
part of the signalers in this context is the lack of difference in the occurrence of tied 
signaling choices (Kruskal-Wallis three-sample test: χ2 = 0.559, p = 0.756). This 
suggests that the participants’ understanding of the game and acquisition of 
experience during its the course is similar across the treatments, a finding buttressing 
the procedure of the experiment. 
Receivers. The receivers, too, are consistent in their decisions across 
treatments. For instance, as indicated above, the propensity to choose the signaler 
having sent the lower of the two signals in any given group is largely independent of 
the absolute difference between the observed signaling magnitudes; the figure for the 
second half of play looks very similar to Figure 3.A.4 (Appendix 3.3), yet rather 
more condensed. Observe also that the ranking of the curves is precisely as one 
would predict. Namely, the treatment with a small signal-dependent benefit is 
“sandwiched” between the other treatments, with the receivers in the treatment with a 
large benefit being (comparatively) “most correct” in their choices. This suggests 
that the higher the benefit, the lower the probability that the signaler sending the 
lower signal is chosen as the receiver’s ally, which in turn implies that the 
participants do tend to realize that a higher benefit nets them greater direct benefits.28  
When focusing on the decision scenario where one observed signal is less and 
the other more than 10 (cf. Figure 3.A.5, Appendix 3.3), in line with the comparative 
static results on the part of the signalers, the receivers in the treatments with 
beneficent signals are – to all intents and purposes – equally likely to opt for the 
signaler sending the lower signal across the projected belief threshold of 10. Their 
counterparts in the treatment with neutral signals make about twice as many such 
decisions, although this outcome is consistent with the existence of multiple 
equilibria. The behavior in the individual sessions of said treatment (A = 0) is as 
discussed, with the receivers in the sessions approaching the LCS outcome somewhat 
less likely to choose the signaler sending the higher signal.  
                                               
3.28 A further interesting observation in this regard is that the curve for the treatment with A = 0.1 is 
more similar in shape to that for the treatment with A = 0 than the curve for A = 1 (especially for 
smaller differences), although the frequency of choices is unambiguously more similar to the latter. 
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On a final note, as indicated in Section 3.3, the participants completed a brief 
post-experimental questionnaire, which included questions relating to their beliefs 
when assigned the role of receiver. Although not incentivized, two of the subjective 
assessments are suggestive. Given the choice between a signaler sending a signal of 
10 and another sending a signal of 35, for instance, the vast majority of participants 
considered the former as having been sent by a signaler of low type and the latter by 
a high type. The levels are somewhat higher, beyond 90%, for individuals who 
participated in the treatments with beneficent signals. In the treatment with neutral 
signals, only about 78% of the participants assigned the lower signal to a low type 
whereas around 86% assigned the higher one to a high type. Interestingly, when 
focusing on the LCS sessions, 54% of the individuals assigned the signal of 10 as 
having been sent by a signaler of high type, which is clearly in line with the relevant 
strategy profile. Indeed, all of the assessments are consistent with the respective 
equilibria, as are the estimations on how many signalers of low and/or high type 
choose signals beyond the projected maximum levels (for A = 0, the questionnaire 
inquired about 0 and 10, whereas the levels were set at 10 and 60 for A > 0). As 
before, the responses diverge notably between the treatments. In the treatment with 
neutral signals, about 55% of the participants for low types and 62% for high types 
thought the relevant types would send more than the indicated magnitudes. In this 
case, too, the participants in the sessions approaching the LCS outcome were least 
likely to think so. In the treatments with beneficent signals, in turn, less than 25% of 
the participants deemed signals beyond the indicated levels likely. 
 
Result 3.4 [Hypotheses 3 & 4] The data lend strong support to the 
comparative static properties of the model. Comparisons of 
behavior across the treatments furthermore suggest that the 
participants’ understanding of the setup and propensity to learn 
the behavior of others are quite consistent.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
In its essence, the behavior observed throughout the experiment is not far off 
the predicted outcomes. The participants recognize that the signaling activities at 
their disposal convey information and, in most sessions, make choices consistent 
with separating outcomes in the sense that signalers of high type choose larger 
magnitudes than those of low type. The participants’ subjective assessments 
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accentuate this impression. Whereas, at the aggregate level, the observed separating 
outcome in the treatment with neutral signals does not appear to converge to a single 
coordinated outcome, the behavior in two-thirds of the individual sessions tends 
approximately towards feasible equilibria. Two sessions swiftly approach outcomes 
corresponding to the LCS outcome, two further sessions converge to outcomes 
roughly in line with the one projected for the treatments with beneficent signals, and 
the equilibration process in two appears not to have succeeded (or needed more 
rounds). Hence, when taken together, the behavior in this treatment is very much in 
accordance with the prediction of multiple equilibria. The choices in the treatments 
with beneficent signals, on the other hand, converge to outcomes very similar to 
those predicted by the underlying theory, both at the aggregate level and in the 
majority of the individual sessions, especially within the treatment with a small 
signal-dependent benefit. Indeed, as suggested by the observation that adjustments in 
the signaling choices over time mainly occur in the treatment with a large signal-
dependent benefit, convergence in the other settings appears to be quick. 
Nonetheless, in all treatments, experience seems to highlight the strategic attributes 
of the game, thereby sharpening the participants’ behavior. The theory’s comparative 
static properties, too, are satisfied. The purpose of this section is to explore the 
implications of these findings with respect to the breadth of the underlying theory. 
One of the most notable implications of the experiments’ main results, in this 
context, is their support for the theoretical finding that signaler competition alone 
does not lead to a (more) precise outcome. In the same spirit, and in line with the 
literature, the outcomes in the treatment with neutral signals emphasize that the 
coordination on a particular strategy configuration is not necessarily straightforward. 
Yet, at the same time, the occurrence of multiple equilibria in said treatment provides 
support for the conjecture advocated in Chapter 2 that the signal-dependent benefit 
can potentially be used as an equilibrium selection device. The reasoning underlying 
this claim is as follows. As two of the sessions with neutral signals also approximate 
the equilibrium predicted for the treatments with beneficent signals (on the part of 
both roles), though the outcomes in the treatments with beneficent signals display a 
higher degree of separation, one could argue that the presence of the signal-
dependent benefit helps select the equilibrium from a large(r) set. Beyond that, 
however, the intrinsic value of the signal may not play as much of a role in the 
participants’ decision process as the competitive pressures among the signalers.  
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Does it matter with respect to the nature of the observed behavioral outcomes 
that the receiver is not an automaton? The fact that most receivers seem to be playing 
the same strategy as an automaton in an auction setup, i.e., selecting the highest 
“bidder,” might suggest that it does not. Nevertheless, I would argue that it does have 
an impact – for two main reasons. First, the present results tend to contrast with the 
findings of Noussair and Silver (2006), who find that bidders with low valuations 
usually bid close to or below the equilibrium level while bidders with high valuations 
frequently bid too much. Second, the propensity to choose the signaler sending the 
lower signal is somewhat larger for small differences between the observed signals 
but otherwise largely independent thereof, and a non-zero number of receivers select 
the relevant signalers through to the very end (even in instances when one signal is 
above and the other below the projected belief threshold of 10).  
In the present case, signalers of low type in the treatments with beneficent 
signals tend to “underbid” while those of high type “underbid” in the intermediate 
portions of their support and “overbid” towards the upper end. Considering that the 
receiver in a signaling game does not select the highest “bid” with probability one, 
the observed divergence in behavior (compared to the pure auction setup) may not be 
unreasonable because the participants may want to make sure that they have the 
highest “bid” to guarantee that they are selected. This logic would not only explain 
why high types “overbid” and, in response, low types may be discouraged from 
sending high signals (and thus “underbid”), but also the “underbidding” in the 
intermediate intervals, the justification for the latter being that the relevant signalers 
place a higher (subjective) probability on encountering a low type as competitor than 
another high type.29 The tendency towards the lower “bid” for small absolute 
differences between the observed “bids,” and the occurrence of such choices 
throughout the game, further underline this argument, as this decision rule 
encourages high(er) signals.  
The fact that some experience is necessary for the comparative static properties 
of the model to obtain has to do with the receivers’ behavior in the treatment 
involving a small signal-dependent benefit. For, in line with the threshold hypothesis, 
the behavior of the signalers and receivers in the first half of the game exhibits a 
                                               
3.29 An alternative would be the presence of a certain degree of risk aversion, although one would – if 
it were the central driving force – expect more “overbidding” by signalers of high type (cf. Noussair & 
Silver 2006). 
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certain amount of similarity with the treatment with neutral signals. During the 
second part of the game, however, the receivers’ conduct in particular tends strongly 
towards the appropriate equilibrium strategy, presumably inducing the signalers to 
adopt suitable best responses. In other words, although the treatment does comprise a 
signal-dependent benefit, the small size initially (and for small differences between 
the observed signaling magnitudes to some extent also during the second part of 
play) tends to give rise to behavior at the interface of the two treatments. Only with 
experience does the significance of the benefit seem to become apparent, guiding the 
participants’ behavior towards the equilibrium.  
A final point concerns the proximity of the outcomes in either of the treatments 
with beneficent signals to the theoretical predictions, which stands in notable contrast 
to large parts of the literature on experiments involving games with unique mixed-
strategy equilibria. After all, recall that each participant only made one decision per 
round (with varying roles during the course of the game). It is certainly true that the 
statistical tests do not support uniformity of the observed frequency distributions. At 
the same time, however, more and more individuals, over time, choose signaling 
levels in the theoretical equilibrium supports for their type (signalers) and make 
inferences in congruence with the appropriate belief structure (receivers). One might 
therefore speculate that the signaling mechanism in the context of initiating social 
interaction is not an entirely unfamiliar concept, as mixed-strategy-play commonly 
requires considerable experience or repeated exposure (if at all achievable). 
In sum, in spite of its various simplifying assumptions and limitations, the 
theory overall appears to predict behavior remarkably well. The results, moreover, 
illuminate the depth of the predictions, providing support for the notion that the 
signal-dependent benefit may indeed constitute an equilibrium selection device. Even 
so, the observed outcomes are clearly not perfect, although the aggregate divergence 
of the behavior, particularly of signalers of low type, in the treatments with 
beneficent signals may to some extent be misleading – in several individual sessions, 
their conduct is very close to what it is projected to be. More generally, the 
robustness of the participants’ behavior in both roles underlines the consistency of 
the incentives across treatments and the similarity in the fundamental characteristics 
of the participants in the experiment (e.g., as regards their propensity to learn the 
behavior of others). As such, the present study provides valuable insight into the 
workings and scope of the framework of interest. 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore experimentally the precision of and 
sharp divergence in the predictions derived in its theoretical companion chapter 
(Chapter 2). Although one can discern some obvious deviations, the results provide 
strong support for the theory as the general behavioral patterns are very consistent – 
both from a static and comparative perspective. Yet, notwithstanding the apparent 
success of the model and experiment, one can think of a number of informative 
extensions to the underlying theory and thus testable hypotheses to arrive at a more 
refined picture of individuals’ behavior in the envisioned signaling environment. 
Many of the most interesting extensions to the theory – e.g., a noise factor in 
the signal-transmission process, measures to introduce receiver competition, and the 
like – are described in some detail in Chapter 2. Their main implication(s) would be 
to capture more readily the intricacies of human nature and to render the setup closer 
to conventional signaling models to facilitate comparison. As to the present work and 
data, from an analytical angle, the data (as is) could be manipulated in a number of 
additional directions to obtain further insight into the participants’ abilities and the 
forces driving their behavior. One such tangent would be to use the time to complete 
the control questionnaire to gauge the participants’ understanding of the setup. In a 
similar spirit, one could draw on more advanced econometric techniques to model 
the participants’ learning process in order to quantify the impact of experience on the 
observed behavioral outcomes. Both of these aspects are left for future work.  
From an experimentation perspective, an interesting augmentation to the setup 
so as to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the influence of the size of the 
signal-dependent benefit on the observed outcomes would be a treatment with an 
even smaller benefit (e.g., A = 0.001) to capture the existence of a benefit threshold, 
if any. Likewise, to test the achievability of the mixed-strategy outcomes more 
explicitly, it might be useful to construct a setup rendering the envisioned mixed 
strategies more obvious. A further avenue would be the incentivization of the 
receivers’ beliefs, i.e., it would be instructive to extract the receivers’ beliefs in as 
accurate a manner as possible using monetary rewards. The ensuing data could then 
be used to obtain a more accurate demarcation of the forces driving their behavior. 
Nevertheless, even as is, the present setup and analysis yielded a non-negligible 
number of interesting results.  




Appendix 3.1. Summary of the Experimental Protocol  
Arrival & Introduction 
 Students arrive at the laboratory between 0 and 15 minutes before the 
scheduled start of the experiment 
 Distribution of consent forms and instructions, followed by random 
assignment to the computer terminals 
 Brief (oral) greeting and introductory comments 
 De-registration depending on show-up rate 
□ Partitioning Procedure 
- Two “sessions” (subsets of participants) were feasible – created 
via the random assignment of terminals and controlled on 
different servers – if there were a total of 18, 21, 24, or 27 
participants; one “session” was feasible if fewer than 18 
participant attended  
- De-registration was necessary if the number of attendees fell 
short of 9 individuals or was not divisible by three, in which 
case a show-up fee of £5 was paid out (against receipt) with the 
assurance of guaranteed participation in a different session  
 Collection of signed consent forms 
 Students are read the instructions aloud 
 Any clarifying questions are answered (in private); if applicable/useful 
for the whole group, repetition of question(s) and answer(s) to all by the 
experimenter 
 The students are asked to work through the computerized control 
questions (three questions relating to the game’s payoff structure) 
□ The experiment does not proceed to the game phase until all 





36 Decision Rounds 
 At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly allocates each 
subject to a (new) group and assigns each a (new) role 
 Each participant is informed of his/her role  
 Signalers 
□ After receiving information about his/her role, each signaler is 
informed of his/her type  
□ Given this information, (s)he is asked to decide how many quality 
units (s)he would like to invest in his/her prototype 
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□ After confirming his/her choice, each signaler enters a waiting stage 
until the receiver in his/her group has made his/her decision 
 Receivers 
□ After being informed about his/her role for the particular round, 
each receiver enters a waiting stage until the signalers in his/her 
respective group have made their decisions 
□ As soon as both signalers within a given group have confirmed their 
choices, they are displayed on the receiver’s screen along with a 
table indicating his/her possible payoff if (s)he selects either 
signaler (broken down by type) 
 Upon confirmation of the receiver’s decision, the participants of his/her 
group enter a waiting stage. Once all groups within a “session” have 
completed the decision stage, they enter the feedback stage, during 
which they are shown their own payoff, all decisions (including each 
signaler’s type) within their group during that particular round as well 
as a graphical summary of all of the signalers’ decisions (including 
their success in procuring a contract) during that particular round 
□ Note that the subsets (“sessions”) within each timeslot are kept 
strictly separate, i.e., the participants only receive information about 




End of the Experiment 
 At the end of Round 36, the participants are asked to work through a 
brief questionnaire, which comprises (unincentivized) questions about 
generic demographic information and the participants’ experiences 
during the course of the experiment 
 Once all participants have completed the questionnaire, cash payment 
in private (against receipt) in the laboratory’s server room; subjects are 
taken to the room one by one 
 Separate exit after payment 
 
Appendix 3.2. Instructions 
You are about to participate in an experiment investigating decision-making. During 
the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of decisions that will yield you 
“experimental dollars” (denoted $). Your earnings will depend on your decisions as 
well as the decisions made by other participants. At the end of the session, your 
accumulated experimental dollars will be converted into pounds sterling at an 
exchange rate of $1 = £0.01, or equivalently, $100 = £1. The money you earn will be 
paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the session.  
 
Decisions 
In every round, you will randomly be assigned one of two roles, supplier or 
government official. Moreover, in every round, you will randomly be assigned to a 
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group of three, consisting of two suppliers and one government official. You will not 
be told the identity of the other members of your group(s), nor will they be told your 
identity – even after the end of the session.  
 
The experiment consists of 36 rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will 
randomly be assigned a new role and be allocated to a new group. Throughout the 
session, you will be assigned the role of government official in a total of 12 rounds. 
During the course of a particular round, the decisions you will be faced with depend 
on the role you have been assigned.  
 
The setting and sequence of play in each round are as follows. The government 
official is looking to contract out the design and production of a new helicopter fleet 
for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to one of the suppliers in his/her group. 
 
1) Suppliers. A supplier can have low costs or high costs. At the beginning of 
each round, a random draw determines each supplier’s cost level (or “type”). 
The likelihood of being assigned either type is 50%. After the draw, each 
supplier is told his/her own type, but not the type of the other supplier in 
his/her group; the government official is not told the type of either supplier. 
Given this information, each supplier has to produce a prototype of the 
helicopter (s)he would deliver to the government official if awarded the 
contract. In particular, (s)he needs to decide with how much quality to endow 
the prototype. (S)he can invest in any amount between 0 and 125 “quality 
units” (inclusive, with a precision of up to two decimal places). The cost of 
investing in a quality unit depends on the supplier’s type: a low-cost supplier 
has to pay $5 for every quality unit (s)he chooses to invest in his/her prototype, 
while a high-cost supplier has to pay $25 for each unit. 
 
2) Government Official. Once the suppliers in a group have made their 
decisions, the government official in that group is informed of the number of 
quality units each supplier invested into his/her prototype – but not the type of 
either supplier. Given this information, (s)he has to decide which supplier (s)he 




Your payoff in each round is determined as follows. 
 
 Suppliers 
- If a supplier is awarded the contract by the government official, (s)he 
receives $500 minus the cost of his/her prototype. 
- If a supplier is not awarded the contract by the government official, (s)he 
nonetheless has to meet the cost incurred for constructing his/her 
prototype. 
 
 Government Official 
(a) Treatment with   =   : 
- If the government official awards the contract to a high-cost supplier, 
(s)he receives $50. 
- If the government official awards the contract to a low-cost supplier, 
(s)he receives $80. 
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(b) Treatment with   =   [  =  .  ]: 
- If the government official awards the contract to a high-cost supplier, 
(s)he receives $50 and gets to keep that supplier’s prototype, which 
yields additional experimental dollars equal to [one-tenth (10%) of] the 
number of quality units of the prototype (that is, (s)he benefits from the 
prototype’s quality). 
- If the government official awards the contract to a low-cost supplier, 
(s)he receives $80 and gets to keep that supplier’s prototype, which 
yields additional experimental dollars equal to [one-tenth (10%) of] the 
number of quality units of the prototype (that is, (s)he benefits from the 
prototype’s quality). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is given an initial balance of 
$500. Your total earnings at the end of the experiment will be the sum of this balance 
and your payoff in nine rounds chosen randomly for each participant. The nine 
rounds will consist of three rounds in which you played the role of government 
official, three in which you were a high-cost supplier, and three in which you were a 
low-cost supplier. Each participant is guaranteed £3 for completing the session. 
 
For your information, at the end of each round, you will be shown a screen with your 
payoff for that round, a summary of all decisions within your group, and the 
distribution of decisions of a representative set of suppliers in that round – as well as 
whether or not a particular supplier was awarded a contract. 
 
Example 
To clarify the setting, consider the following example. Suppose you have been 
assigned the role of supplier and have been told that you have high costs. You aren’t 
told the type of the other supplier, but you know that there is a 50:50 chance that 
(s)he faces low or high costs. You now have to decide with how much quality to 
endow your prototype. Say you decide to invest in 7 quality units, costing you $175 
($25 per unit × 7 units). If the government official decides to award the contract to 
you, your profit will be $500 – $175 = $325. If, instead, (s)he decides to award the 
contract to the other supplier, you will lose $175 (that is, your profit will be –$175). 
 
Once you and the other supplier in your group have decided on the quality of your 
respective prototypes, the government official in your group will be informed about 
each of your choices. Given this information, (s)he has to decide which one of you to 
award the contract. 
 
(a) Treatment with   =   : If (s)he awards the contract to you, given that you are a 
high-cost supplier, (s)he will earn $50. If (s)he awards the contract to the other 
supplier in the group, his/her payoff will depend on that supplier’s type. For 
illustration, if the other supplier has low costs, the government official will 
receive $80. 
 
(b) Treatment with   =   [  =  .  ]: If (s)he awards the contract to you, given 
that you are a high-cost supplier and invested in 7 quality units, (s)he will earn 
$50 + $7 = $57 [$50 + (0.1 × $7) = $50.70]. If (s)he awards the contract to the 
other supplier in the group, his/her payoff will depend on that supplier’s type 
and investment. For illustration, if the other supplier has low costs and invested 
in 20 quality units, the government official will receive $80 + $20 = $100 [$80 + 
(0.1 × $20) = $82]. 




To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, before the start of the 
experiment, you will be asked to work through a short “Quiz” comprising three 
questions. The experiment will start once everyone has answered all questions 
correctly.  
 
End of Experiment 
Upon the completion of Round 36, the experiment ends. While the computer 
calculates your earnings, you are kindly asked to fill out a brief questionnaire 
inquiring about your experience during the session; please follow the instructions 
provided on the relevant screens. Once all participants have completed the 
experiment, each participant is paid his/her earnings – shown on the final screen of 
the experiment.  
 
Summary Tables          FOR YOUR REFERENCE 
Supplier 
 Cost Payoff if production contract is procured 
Low Costs $5 per quality unit $500 – ($5 per quality unit × x quality units) 
High Costs $25 per quality unit $500 – ($25 per quality unit × x quality units) 
 
Government Official  
(a) Treatment with   =   : 
 
 Payoff if contract is awarded to a … 
Low-Cost Supplier $80 
High-Cost Supplier $50 
 
(b) Treatment with   =   [  =  .  ]: 
 
 Payoff if contract is awarded to a … 
Low-Cost Supplier 
$80 + [(0.1 ×] $ equal to the quality units of the chosen 
supplier’s prototype[)] 
High-Cost Supplier 
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Appendix 3.3. Supplementary Figures 
Figure 3.A.1. Box-and-Whisker Plots of the Signaling Choices within each 
Treatment, decomposed by Signaler Type 
  








































Legend: The plots were created using the raw data on signaling levels from the indicated rounds of 
play. The boxes comprise the sample median (band towards the center of the box), the 25th, and 75th 
percentile (lower and upper limit of the box, i.e., 50% of the sample lies within the bounds of the 
box). The whiskers represent 1.5-times the height of the box, or inter-quartile range. The circles and 
stars beyond the whiskers denote outliers and extreme outliers, respectively. Outliers are sample 
values that do not fall within the whiskers, while extreme outliers are taken to be all those values with 
a size of at least three times the height of the box.  
 
   (ii)   First 18 Rounds of Play    (i)    All Rounds of Play 
   (iii)  Last 18 Rounds of Play    (iv)  Last 9 Rounds of Play 
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Figure 3.A.2. Parameter A = 0 – Average Signaling Levels and Standard 
























































































































































































































Session 6 (n = 9): No Convergence
Low Type: Observed Mean High Type: Observed Mean 
Legend: n denotes the number of subjects in a given session. 
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A = 0 A = 1 A = 0.1
Figure 3.A.3. Parameter A = 0 – Choice of Winning Signal(er) by Signal 
Category (Relative to the Total Number of Decisions within a Signal Category; 
excluding Ties), Session Perspective 
 
 
Legend: This figure is based on group-level data from all 36 rounds of play, namely, the percentage of 
choices in favor of the high(er) or low(er) signal (excluding tied signaling choices) relative to the total 
number of decisions within a particular signal category; correspondingly, the height of the two bars 
within each signal category within a particular session sum to 1 (or, equivalently, the height of the 
bars within each session sums to 3). In this particular figure, “high” and “low” refer to the receiver’s 
choice of the signaler having sent the high(er) or low(er) signal within a given decision scenario as 
his/her ally, not signaler type. x and y, in turn, represent the signalers’ choices within a given group. 
 
Figure 3.A.4. (Accumulative) Percentage of Receivers Choosing the Lower 
Signal Relative to All Signals within the Given Interval and (Cumulative) Total 
Number of Choices in Favor of the Lower Signal for Various Absolute 
Differences between the Observed Signaling Magnitudes (excluding Ties), 















High Low High Lowx, y ≤ 10
x < 10, y > 10
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Absolute Difference Between Signals 
(in Increments of 0.1)
Total Number of Choices of the Lower Signal
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Legend: The figures are based on group-level data from all 36 rounds of play (excluding tied signaling 
choices). For each increment of 0.1 units, the plots on the left-hand side depict the accumulated 
percentage of receivers choosing the signaler sending the lower signal relative to the total number of 
decisions in the particular interval of signaling magnitudes. The values on the horizontal axes denote 
the absolute difference between the signals being considered. For instance, 0.5 indicates the interval 
“smaller signal + 0.5 ≥ larger signal;” the percentage value plotted at 0.5, in turn, represents the sum 
of all decisions in favor of the lower signal for all difference levels up to 0.5 (inclusive) divided by the 
sum of all decisions in the relevant intervals. Therefore, a negative slope indicates that the “current” 
proportion of decisions in favor of the lower signal is lower than the average up to that point. The 
plots on the right-hand side depict the cumulative total number of choices in favor of the lower signal 
for the particular interval of signaling magnitudes.   
 
Figure 3.A.5. Percentage of Receivers Choosing the Lower Signal if One 
Observed Signal is Less and the Other More Than 10 Relative to All Signals 
within the Category, decomposed by Treatment, Session (where appropriate), 
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All Rounds First 18 Rounds Last 18 Rounds Last 9 Rounds
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Figure 3.A.6. Parameter A = 0.1 – Descriptive Statistics on Signaling Behavior 
in Session 2, decomposed by Signaler Type 
Histograms of the Observed Signaling Behavior and Predictions 
 
 
Observed Frequencies and Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (MSE) Probabilities for the Predicted 
Equilibrium Supports 
             Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Observed Frequency 0.53 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.12 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Appendix 3.4. Supplementary Tables 
Table 3.A.1. Parameter A = 0 – Descriptive Statistics on Signaling Activity within 
each Session, decomposed by Signaler Type 




Low Type 3.298 1.2 0.430 
High Type 11.717 10 1.032 
Session 2 
Low Type 2.062 1 0.267 
High Type 8.534 5 1.065 
Session 3 
Low Type 10.543 4.5 17.962 
High Type 36.645 31 27.197 
Session 4 
Low Type 6.702 7 5.666 
High Type 31.543 25.8 19.504 
Session 5 
Low Type 7.212 5 10.831 
High Type 20.232 17.5 16.425 
Session 6 
Low Type 14.242 1.05 32.405 



































































Cumulative Frequency Distribution (%)
Predicted Cumulative Frequency Distribution (%)




































































Cumulative Frequency Distribution (%)
Predicted Cumulative Frequency Distribution (%)
Mean ± StD. = 35.332 ± 17.973
Median = 35
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Table 3.A.2. Descriptive Statistics on Signaling Activity “over Time,” 
decomposed by Treatment and by Signaler Type 
(a) First 18 Rounds of Play 
Statistical 
Measures 
  =     =     =  .  
Low Type High Type Low Type High Type Low Type High Type 
Mean 6.930 21.438 8.781 31.245 7.488 36.038 
Median 2 16 5 26 4 30 
Mode 1 20 0 20 0 20 
Standard 
Deviation 
15.285 23.931 12.105 18.853 11.693 23.168 
Range 125 125 78 100 100 125 
 
(b) Last 18 Rounds of Play 
Statistical 
Measures 
  =     =     =  .  
Low Type High Type Low Type High Type Low Type High Type 
Mean 6.937 19.154 5.016 33.519 4.481 38.303 
Median 1.2 15 3 30 2 31.5 
Mode 1 10 0 25 0 30 
Standard 
Deviation 
16.738 17.809 6.477 18.674 11.308 26.231 
Range 125 125 45 87 125 124 
 
(c) Last 9 Rounds of Play 
Statistical 
Measures 
  =     =     =  .  
Low Type High Type Low Type High Type Low Type High Type 
Mean 6.380 20.088 4.339 35.650 4.365 37.038 
Median 1.35 16 2.27 33.33 2 30 
Mode 1 10 0 35 0 30 
Standard 
Deviation 
14.992 17.141 5.710 18.206 13.307 25.500 
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Table 3.A.3. Comparison of the Signaling Activity across the Various Subsets of 
Rounds, decomposed by Signaler Type 




Test Values of Test Statistics p-value 
A = 0 
Last 18 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.105; T+ = 11 0.500 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.105; T+ = 11 0.500 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.524; T+ = 13 0.344 
A = 1 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 2.023; T+ = 15 0.031** 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 2.023; T+ = 15 0.031** 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 1.753; T+ = 14 0.063* 
A = 0.1 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 1.483; T+ = 13 0.094* 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 1.483; T+ = 13 0.094* 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.674; T+ = 10 0.313 
 




Test Values of Test Statistics p-value 
A = 0 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 0.734; T+ = 14 0.281 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.943; T+ = 15 0.219 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.314; T+ = 12 0.422 
A = 1 
Last 18 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.944; T+ = 11 0.219 
Last 9 vs. First 18 WSR z = 1.483; T+ = 13 0.094* 
Last 9 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 2.023; T+ = 15 0.031** 
A = 0.1 
Last 18 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.674; T+ = 10 0.313 
Last 9 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.674; T+ = 10 0.313 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.944; T+ = 11 0.219 
 
Legend: WSR stands for Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test. The test was carried out using the session-
level mean signaling levels for the indicated subsets of rounds within a particular treatment. The order 
of comparison (and, correspondingly, one-sided alternative hypothesis) was as stated in the 
“Comparison” column. Hence, a positive value for the test statistic indicates that the signaling levels 
within the former subset of rounds exceed those within the latter subset of rounds. The (one-sided)    
p-values are the closest available values by Siegel and Castellan (1988, Table H). * ≡ Significance at 
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Table 3.A.4. Comparison of the Incidence of Tied Signaling Choices across the 




Test Values of Test Statistics p-value 
A = 0 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 0.841; T
+ = 14.5 > 0.219 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.738; T
+ = 14 0.281 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.000; T
+ = 9 > 0.500 
A = 1 
Last 18 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.962; T
+ = 11 0.219 
Last 9 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.813; T
+ = 10.5 > 0.219 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 0.566; T
+ = 8 0.500 
A = 0.1 
Last18 vs. First 18 WSR z = 0.820; T
+ = 10 0.313 
Last 9 vs. First 18 WSR z = 1.089; T
+ = 11 0.219 
Last 9 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 0.283; T
+ = 7 > 0.500 
 
Legend: WSR stands for Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test. The test was carried out using the session-
level percentage of ties (relative to all decisions within the session) for the indicated subsets of rounds 
within a particular treatment. The order of comparison was as stated in the “Comparison” column. 
Hence, a positive value for the test statistic indicates that the incidence of ties within the former subset 
of rounds exceeds that within the latter subset of rounds. The (one-sided) p-values are the closest 
available values by Siegel and Castellan (1988, Table H). * ≡ Significance at the 10% level; 
** ≡ Significance at the 5% level; *** ≡ Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.A.5. Observed Frequencies and Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (MSE) 
Probabilities for the Predicted Equilibrium Supports “over Time,” decomposed by 
Treatment and Signaler Type 
(a) First 18 Rounds of Play 
Treatment 
          Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
A = 1 Obs. Frequency 0.55 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.05 
A = 0.1 Obs. Frequency 0.58 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.11 
 
(b) Last 18 Rounds of Play 
Treatment 
          Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
A = 1 Obs. Frequency 0.67 0.23 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.13 0.07 
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(c) Last 9 Rounds of Play 
Treatment 
          Type & Classes 
Frequencies 
Low Type High Type 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 
MSE Probability 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
A = 1 Obs. Frequency 0.71 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.20 0.12 0.10 
A = 0.1 Obs. Frequency 0.81 0.16 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.14 
 
Legend: The class labels denote the upper bounds of the given intervals. All intervals except for the 
first one are open at the lower end. Note that for signalers of high type in the treatments with A > 0, 
“20” denotes the interval [10, 20].  
 
Table 3.A.6. Selection of the Signaler Sending the Lower Signal by the 
Receivers within each Treatment “over Time” 

















A = 0 76 360 21.11% 30 23.03% 
A = 1 20 306 6.54% 12 6.80% 
A = 0.1 42 324 12.96% 8 13.29% 
 

















A = 0 45 360 12.50% 21 13.27% 
A = 1 17 306 5.56% 21 5.97% 
A = 0.1 30 324 9.26% 11 9.59% 
 

















A = 0 17 180 9.44% 10 10.00% 
A = 1 4 153 2.61% 9 2.78% 
A = 0.1 7 162 4.32% 6 4.49% 
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Table 3.A.7. Comparison of the Receivers’ Behavior across the Various Subsets 




Test Values of Test Statistics p-value 
A = 0 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 2.201; T+ = 21 0.016** 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 2.201; T+ = 21 0.016** 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 2.108; T+ = 20 0.031** 
A = 1 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 0.135; T+ = 8 0.500 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 1.214; T+ = 12 0.156 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 1.905; T+ = 14 0.063* 
A = 0.1 
First 18 vs. Last 18 WSR z = 1.483; T+ = 13 0.094* 
First 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 1.753; T+ = 14 0.063* 
Last 18 vs. Last 9 WSR z = 2.023; T+ = 15 0.031** 
 
Legend: WSR stands for Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test. The test was carried out using the session-
level percentage of choices in favor of signalers sending the lower signals (excluding ties) for the 
indicated subsets of rounds within a particular treatment; the results when using the session-level 
percentages including ties do not differ qualitatively. The order of comparison was as stated in the 
“Comparison” column. Hence, a positive value for the test statistic indicates that the percentage of 
lower signals chosen within the former subset of rounds exceeds that within the latter subset of 
rounds. The (one-sided) p-values are the closest available values by Siegel and Castellan (1988, 
Table H). * ≡ Significance at the 10% level; ** ≡ Significance at the 5% level; *** ≡ Significance at 












SIGNALING GIVEN CHOICE  






While the interests of individuals operating in a (broad) social environment 
will overlap to some degree, they will rarely coincide perfectly, especially among 
strangers. Conflicts and competition are thus as predestined as is the individuals’ 
mutual interest in sharing and gathering information about each other’s intentions 
(e.g., Hawkes 1992; Smith & Bliege Bird 2005). For, in order to reap the benefits 
linked to cooperative social interaction, one must circumvent the hazard of 
exploitation by others. The ensuing care when it comes to choosing one’s interaction 
partners inevitably restricts the availability of profitable social exchanges. To resolve 
the informational asymmetry impeding the initiation of cooperative interaction, the 
individuals therefore clearly have an incentive to communicate with each other about 
their objectives so as to gain access to the most valuable opportunities.   
One means to convey information about one’s unobservable characteristics to 
others, generally and in this sort of competitive setting (cf. Chapter 2), is costly 
signaling. The standard modeling approach in this regard is to impose exogenously 
some signaling activity (or activities) consistent with the setup and to derive 
conditions rendering the exchange of messages reliable. In practice, however, 
individuals trying to convey information to others tend to have a variety of activities 
at their disposal, often more than one at a time, including conspicuous activities such 
as purchasing a flashy car,1 generous behaviors such as donating favors to others, as 
well as harmful deeds such as the destruction of valuable assets. In fact, considering 
                                               
4.1 This type of activity will henceforth be referred to as “(socially) neutral,” as it entails a cost to the 
signaler but no tangible effect on others in his/her social environment. 
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the range of options, one might expect that they tailor their signals to their particular 
circumstances – be it according to their audience, environment, or preferences.2  
Recent psychological evidence (Griskevicius et al. 2007) does suggest just 
that – namely, people tend to opt for different signals and signal intensities in 
different circumstances.3 Rooted in these observations, the objective of this chapter is 
to examine what kind of signaling activity (or set of activities) is most likely to occur 
in a variety of social settings, and how the relevant outcome(s), if any, fare(s) from a 
welfare perspective. The settings being explored vary with respect to the extent of 
the signaling activities’ impact on the agents’ payoffs beyond the signalers’ 
expenditure on them. The analytical foundation to this end will be the signaling game 
developed in Chapter 2, extended to allow each individual signaler to choose 
endogenously a signal from a collection of activities.  
Even though the framework in Chapter 2 comprises competition among the 
signalers (only) and considers beneficent signals, i.e., activities that confer a benefit 
(positive externality) on the receivers, it satisfies the assumptions typifying 
traditional signaling models (Spence 1973, 1974). Namely, self-interested signalers 
differing along a one-dimensional type space can use an exogenously determined 
signaling activity, the cost of which is non-decreasing in the signal intensity (with a 
minimum of zero) but decreasing in a signaler’s type, to convey information about 
their type to incompletely-informed receivers. However, it does not give rise to the 
multiplicity of (Pareto-ranked) equilibria that may be satisfied by various types of 
signals as is common in standard models. Rather, it distinguishes the equilibrium 
configuration when signalers use neutral signals, in which case multiplicity persists, 
vis-à-vis use of beneficent signals, in which case the outcome is unique. The 
introduction of a choice set comprising more than one element into this framework 
permits more precise insight into what kind of signaling activity will arise in 
equilibrium in a given social setting by expressly pitting various signals against each 
other. At the same time, the augmentation expands the receivers’ decision process, 
strategy space, and beliefs, as the messages may now differ in the type of signal and 
magnitude being used, to either of which they may (now) attach significance.  
                                               
4.2 One might, equivalently, think of different individuals excelling in different activities, implying 
that they may want to use the signal(s) that best suit them, provided their feasibility in a given context. 
As such, a particular setting might support several alternative (equilibrium) outcomes.  
4.3 In their seminal work on explaining contributions to charity using a costly signaling framework, 
Glazer and Konrad (1996) also suggest that individuals may ultimately choose among various signals.   
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In the tradition of the literature on multi-dimensional signaling, the additional 
information on type receivers may derive from the extra component of a given 
signaler’s message might be considered a second signal. In its purest form, this 
literature explores whether, and under what conditions, individuals whose type varies 
in more than one dimension can achieve separation using multiple signals (Quinzii & 
Rochet 1985; Engers 1987). Besides the obvious divergences in the type space, 
nature of competition, and variety of signaling activities considered, it is only 
tangentially related to the present work since a given signaler can only (ever) use one 
signaling activity at a time. Despite the fact that the signalers’ messages ostensibly 
comprise multiple components, this implies that once they have settled on a 
particular activity, all that matters is (once more) the magnitude of their signal. 
In this respect, the framework also contrasts with the extensive work involving 
multiple signals in industrial organization.4 Seeking to determine firms’ optimal 
strategies when attempting to communicate to their potential customers the quality of 
their products, frameworks in this literature have explored a variety of scenarios.5 
Following the seminal papers by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Wilson (1985), 
the settings most commonly involve a monopolist with a one- or multi-dimensional 
type looking to convey information about the unobservable quality of its products to 
buyers using a combination of several signals – including price, expenditure on 
advertising, and warranty provisions. Distinctly, even with a one-dimensional type, 
the models consider more than one signal (of the neutral variety) at any one time, and 
tend to assume that the production cost is independent of the products’ quality.6, 7  
                                               
4.4 Theoretical biologists, too, have considered multi-component (or multi-modal) signals (e.g., 
Johnstone 1995, 1996). The relevant literature contrasts with the present framework in that it does not 
consider choice or competition among the signalers, and tends to focus on neutral signaling activities.  
4.5 Signaling is only one approach explored by this literature. A further means, provided that quality is 
exogenous, is disclosure via direct (credible) claims. Among others, the relevant work differs from the 
signaling approach in that it assumes that the marginal cost of production is independent of the 
products’ quality, which rules out separation via signaling (e.g., Daughtey & Reinganum 2008b). 
Marketing research, too, has studied quality signals as means to resolve the uncertainty of buyers 
regarding the quality of the product(s) provided by sellers (see Kirmani & Rao (2000) for an 
overview). The focus of these works, however, tends to be on the specific effects of and conditions 
relating to the successful implementation of individual tools and their classification rather than their 
use in the information transmission process.   
4.6 Ippolito (1990) argues that this assumption is not as incongruous as it may seem (in the sense that 
signaling models in the Spencian spirit depend on type-dependent costs), since firms in most markets 
can quite easily adjust the nature and quality of their products, implying that they can acquire many 
potential signals at equal cost.  
4.7 As one of the most popular signals is price, any assumption on the production cost is effectively 
equivalent to making assumptions on the marginal cost of signaling in a signaling framework. 
Namely, no difference in the production cost according to the quality of the product would correspond 
to there being no difference in the marginal cost of signaling across the signaler types.  
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More recent contributions in this field have extended this basic framework to 
allow for competition among firms (signalers). Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) 
and Fluet and Garella (2002), for instance, develop very similar duopoly models in 
this regard. The firms in their frameworks differ in only one dimension and may use 
price and/or advertising expenditure to signal the quality of their products, although 
the message space being examined is set exogenously. While consumers are 
incompletely informed about the firms’ type, the competitors always differ in type 
and are aware of the quality of each other’s product. Moreover, for tractability, the 
unit cost of production either does not differ across the types (Hertzendorf & 
Overgaard 2001) or is set to zero for low-quality firms (Fluet & Garella 2002). 
Notwithstanding the restrictiveness of their assumptions, in keeping with the 
literature, the frameworks support a multitude of equilibria. The present framework, 
in some respect, expands these approaches by generalizing most assumptions and 
allowing the competitors to choose their signals. 
Daughtey and Reinganum (2007, 2008a) study a more traditional signaling 
environment in that the firms are privately informed about the quality of their 
product and only compete in price. The distinguishing feature of their approach when 
compared to the present work is that the consumers (receivers) have a clear 
preference ranking over the firms’ products even if their quality and price do not 
differ (i.e., the products are horizontally differentiated). In line with all of the other 
works mentioned above, they do not consider choice of signaling activity. 
Hence, the setup developed in the following is distinctive by exploring choice 
of signaling activity in an environment in which individuals differ along (only) one 
dimension and face differential costs such that signaling is more expensive for 
individuals of a low(er) social quality. Although one might contend that individuals 
usually have complex characters that may not sufficiently be conveyed by way of a 
one-dimensional signal, the approach nonetheless has merit since some situations do 
not necessarily require communication about all possible aspects of one’s 
personality. Rather, within a given social setting (e.g., one involving the formation of 
mutually beneficial alliances for some specific purpose (cf. Chapter 2)), awareness of 
a specific attribute, or homogenous composite of attributes, may be fully adequate.  
The results of this chapter indicate that, depending on the parameterization of 
the game, more than one equilibrium may arise, and may do so at the same time. This 
circumstance is independent of the setting being considered. It is moreover the case 
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that inefficient signals may arise in equilibrium, across scenarios. The paper 
therefore, in part, supports the notion that the agents’ skills and preferences may play 
a role with respect to the ultimate outcome. As one may not only obtain more than 
one type of equilibrium co-existing, but in some cases even a continuum of 
equilibria, from a technical perspective, the introduction of choice leads to the sharp 
uniqueness prediction obtained in the environment without choice being lost.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly 
compares and contrasts the present framework with the model developed in 
Chapter 2. Section 4.3 thereupon introduces and solves the model with a restricted 
set of players and signals, generalizes the arguments to an  -player framework, and 
ponders alternative collections of signaling activities. Section 4.4 discusses the 
results, followed by concluding remarks in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Preliminaries 
Before delving into the technical details, it is worth noting that except for the 
fact that the signalers in the present framework can endogenously choose the 
signaling activity they wish to use as a messaging tool from a predetermined “menu” 
of activities, the signaling game explored in the following is effectively the same as 
the interaction analyzed in Chapter 2. This implies that many of the arguments 
developed for that framework also apply here. The modeling section will thus focus 
on the divergences between the setups and be limited to synopses of recurring 
derivations. The purpose of this section is to review briefly the setting of interest, set 
out the main assumptions and restrictions, and outline the central conceptual 
differences between the frameworks. 
The environment to be explored in this paper once again involves two 
populations of risk-neutral players – signalers (he) and receivers (she). The signalers 
are differentiated in social quality along a discrete type space and try to transfer 
information about their type to the homogeneous receivers by simultaneously 
investing in exactly one of a collection of costly signaling activities along a 
continuous message space. Given the signal and signaling magnitude, the receivers 
make an inference regarding the signalers’ information, based on which they choose 
an action from a discrete action space. That is, each receiver decides to which one 
signaler she would like to provide access to a profitable alliance. 
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In the present case, the receivers are thus not only assumed to be worthwhile 
allies but to be able to observe and distinguish the various signaling activities. 
Attention is initially restricted to two beneficent signals (only), although the benefits 
associated with the activities differ in size. The exogenous nature of the elements 
within the signalers’ choice set can be thought of as the limited set of appropriate 
activities in a given situation; for not all viable activities are necessarily always 
suitable and/or feasible in all circumstances. The scenarios to be considered involve 
different configurations of the cost of the signaling activities. In the first setting, the 
cost of the signals is constant, implying that the signaling activity influences the 
interaction via the receivers’ payoffs only. The second setting explores choice 
between activities of distinct cost, ranked according to the level of the associated 
benefit, in which case the activity operates via the signalers’ payoffs as well.  
Recall that the unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the environment 
without choice of signal is symmetric, separating, in mixed strategies, and involves 
separate but adjoining interval supports such that signalers of high type choose 
higher signal intensities than signalers of low type, subject only to a non-decreasing 
beliefs8 restriction on the part of the receivers (Chapter 2). As the structure of the 
interaction can be shown to be equivalent to an incomplete-information all-pay 
auction with discrete types of bidders, who face asymmetric bidding costs, 
competing for a fixed prize, the main attribute determining the signalers’ behavior is 
the relative magnitude of their signals. The present scenario is more complex, 
because the signaler types can separate “within” a particular signaling activity as 
well as “across” signals, i.e., using different activities.  
In view of the intuitive merit of the restrictions, the analytical focus within the 
present framework will again be on symmetric separating equilibria involving non-
decreasing beliefs on the part of the receivers – besides an individual signaler being 
restricted to choosing exactly one signal. One might, accordingly, expect that the 
equilibrium profiles (if any) in the current setting will essentially be analogous to the 
outcome developed in Chapter 2, especially those involving only one of the signaling 
activities. For, if the signalers opt for the same signal, it will once again be the case 
that (only) the signal intensities determine the receivers’ decisions. On the other 
hand, if they coordinate on different activities, the total benefit bestowed on the 
                                               
4.8 In other words, the receivers associate higher signaling magnitudes with a (weakly) higher 
probability of the signal having been sent by a signaler of (the) high(er) type. 
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receivers will move center stage (since the different signals will be of different 
intrinsic worth to the receivers), which may shift their attention away from the 
intrinsic value of their prospective allies. Nevertheless, in keeping with the 
restrictions on the equilibrium, even with both signals in use, the structure of the 
interaction will correspond to an all-pay contest, as the signaling costs are sunk and 
the signal-dependent benefits will induce the receivers to seek to ally with the 
signaler(s) conveying the highest (overall) benefit.  
Beyond extending the signaler types’ options with regard to separating from 
one another, the differing benefits associated with the signals potentially affect their 
propensity to deviate. Given the receivers’ beliefs, in the present environment, 
departure from one’s prescribed strategy may alter the (expected) size of the intrinsic 
value as well as the signal-dependent benefit conveyed to them. A related key point 
regards the receivers’ beliefs about messages they do not expect to observe along the 
equilibrium path. Whereas, in Chapter 2, the beliefs for virtually every signaling 
magnitude the receivers could observe were pinned down by trivial application of 
Bayes’ Rule, the addition of one or more signals to the setting considerably broadens 
the array of configurations for their beliefs, especially off the equilibrium path (and 
thus the potential for deviation). For transparency, the model is initially presented 
with a restricted set of players – two signalers and one receiver – and a choice set 
comprising two beneficent signals. Having established the main arguments of the 
analysis, the framework is generalized to   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 receivers. 
 
4.3 The Model 
4.3.1  The Simplest Case: Two Signalers, One Receiver, and Two 
Signals 
Let   ∈ {  ,   } refer to the set of observable signaling activities regarding some 
unobservable social quality. Signal   is assumed to be associated with a benefit (to 
the receiver) per unit of signal denoted by A and signal   with a benefit denoted by A. 
Let   (  ) ∈ ℝ 
  indicate signaler  ’s signaling magnitude when using signal   . The 
pair    ,   (  )  will be considered signaler  ’s “message” to the receiver. Attention 
is restricted to two types of individuals in terms of their social quality – high (H) and 
low (L). The amount, or value, of the social characteristic held by each type of 
signaler is denoted by θ  ∈ {θ
 , θ }, with θ  > θ  > 0. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) signify the 
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commonly known prior probability that a signaler is of high type. The cost for 
signaler   of sending message    ,   (  )  when endowed with amount θ  of the 
social characteristic is given by c(  ,   (  ), θ ); it is assumed to be linear in   (  ).  
The interaction of the two signalers and the receiver proceeds as follows: 
1) Nature randomly and independently determines each signaler’s type – high 
(H) or low (L) – with probabilities λ and (1 − λ), respectively. 
2) Each signaler is privately informed of his type. 
3) The signalers simultaneously choose a message, comprising a signal 
   ∈   ,    and signaling magnitude   (  ) ≥ 0, contingent on their type.  
4) After observing both messages, the receiver decides which signaler to 
choose as her ally. She can form an alliance with exactly one signaler. 
5) The payoffs are realized.  
The players’ payoffs are as follows. If   ∈ {1, 2} denotes the receiver’s choice 
of Signaler 1 or 2 conditional on having observed both of their messages 
(   ,   (  ) ,    ,   (  ) , respectively), signaler  ’s payoff is given by: 
  
   (  ,   ),    (  ),   (  ) ,  , (θ , θ )  =   ∙[1 − (  −  )
 ]− c(  ,   (  ), θ ). 
As in the environment without choice, entry into an alliance yields a commonly 
known fixed positive “prize” of value   > 0 for the chosen signaler, and a signaler 
only nets a positive payoff if he is, in fact, selected to be the receiver’s ally. The 
receiver’s payoff, in turn, is given by: 
    (  ,   ),    (  ),   (  ) ,  , (θ , θ )  = θ  + A(    ) ∙    (   ), 
where θ   signifies the type-dependent value of the chosen signaler, assumed to be 
independent of the signal, and A(   ) ∙    (   ) represents the receiver’s signal-
dependent benefit, with (fixed) parameter A(   ) ∈ { A, A } such that A > A > 0. 
Namely, without loss of generality, an alliance yields the receiver a benefit in the 
form of the chosen signaler’s type-dependent value (θ) as well as a (private) benefit 
subject in size to the magnitude and type of the chosen signaler’s signal. Observe 
that all this specification requires is once more that the signal benefits the receiver – 
it may or may not benefit other individuals in a signaler’s social environment. 
Likewise, the players’ equilibrium strategies again depend on the signaling activity 
and level employed by the signalers and the configuration of the receiver’s beliefs 
about their type when assessing the messages. 
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4.3.1.1 Optimal Behavior of the Receiver 
By backward induction, turn first to the receiver and consider her decision 
problem, which takes the following form:  
max
 ∈{ , }
  Pr θ  (  ,   (  ))  ∙ θ
  + Pr θ  (  ,   (  ))  ∙ θ
  + A(   ) ∙   (  ) . 
As was the case in the absence of choice, the receiver would ultimately like to ally 
with a signaler of high type and, if the signalers appear to be of the same type, she 
could base her decision on the size of the signal-dependent benefit. In the present 
environment, however, she can also incorporate the signaling activity being used by 
each signaler into her assessment. Considering the differing size of the benefits 
associated with the signaling activities, this additional means brings the total benefit 
conveyed to her by each of the signalers into play. As a result, her main focus is no 
longer necessarily (only) on the intrinsic value of her prospective ally. To establish 
the receiver’s optimal strategy, one must therefore consider three issues.  
For one, one needs to evaluate the impact of the signaling magnitudes on the 
receiver’s decision process. As the objective is to identify symmetric separating 
equilibria involving non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver, given use of 
the same signal ( ) on the part of the signalers, she will believe that if             
  ( ) ≥   ( ), Pr(θ
 |  ( )) ≥ Pr θ
    ( )  for   ≠   ∈ {1, 2}. This implies that the 
only payoff-relevant consideration for a signaler within a particular signal is the level 
of his signal relative to that of the other signaler (Chapter 2). With different signals 
in use, provided that she adopts non-decreasing beliefs within each activity, the 
receiver may associate either signal with either type of signaler. Her judgment in this 
case will be driven by the (total) payoff from each signaler’s message.9  
The second aspect is the instance of out-of-equilibrium signals, i.e., messages 
she does not expect to observe along the equilibrium path. Although alternative 
configurations are feasible, a natural configuration for her beliefs in this context is 
that unanticipated messages are always associated with low type. The third and final 
concern are ties, which can arise in one of two ways: (1) The signalers choose the 
same signaling activity and magnitude, and (2) the signalers choose different signals 
but convey the same (total) payoff to the receiver. Paralleling Chapter 2, attention 
will be restricted to equilibria in which the receiver randomizes 50:50 between the 
                                               
4.9 If all the receiver cared about was her ally’s type, any equilibrium profile featuring both signaling 
activities would fail to exist as one could not formulate a self-confirming profile for her beliefs. 
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signalers when indifferent. In other words, the receiver will optimally want to behave 
as follows; in the following, this generic strategy profile will be specified as needed. 
 
Observation 4.1 If the signalers appear to be of the same type, the receiver will 
ally with the signaler who bestows the highest signal-
dependent benefit on her. In general, she will base her decision 
on the (total) payoff conveyed to her by each signaler. In case 
of a tie, a natural strategy is the random selection of one of the 
individuals as her ally.  
 
4.3.1.2 Equal Cost 
Turn now to the optimal behavior of the signalers, starting (as a benchmark) 
with the scenario in which the cost of sending either signal does not vary between the 
signals. In particular, assume that the cost function takes the following form: 
c(  ,   (  ), θ ) =  
 γ ∙   (  )  if θ = θ
 
 γ ∙   (  )   if θ = θ
 ,
 
where γ  > γ  > 0 denote the signaler types’ marginal cost of signaling, i.e., a given 
message is assumed to be more expensive for a signaler of low type. Besides the cost 
function satisfying the standard assumptions for signaling games, observe that the 
signaler types’ marginal cost does not depend on the type of signal used. Hence, the 
only way in which the signaling activity enters the framework is that one signal has 
more value to the receiver than the other. The issue of particular interest in this 
environment is whether, and under what conditions, an equilibrium can arise such 
that the less beneficent signal ( ) is used.10  
To this end, consider signaler  ’s decision problem, which is given by: 
max
   ,   (   )
[E[   | (  ,   (  ))]− c(  ,   (  ), θ )],    
where         =  
        if  θ  + A (  ) ∙   (  ) > θ  + A      ∙       
1
2
∙    if  θ  + A (  ) ∙   (  ) = θ   + A      ∙       
 0       if  θ  + A (  ) ∙   (  ) < θ   + A      ∙        
      
for   ≠   ∈ {1, 2}. 
Its defining feature is that, in case of a substantial difference between the signal-
dependent benefits, the only payoff-relevant aspect is the signal in use. For, if the 
signalers employ different signals, the signaler choosing the less beneficial activity 
                                               
4.10 One could, equivalently, ask whether one can construct a self-confirming set of beliefs that 
supports use (in equilibrium) of the less beneficial activity. 
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will not (necessarily) wish to choose a signal intensity sufficient to compensate for 
the difference in the benefit provided to the receiver.  
By arguments corresponding to those developed in Chapter 2, in keeping with 
the restrictions on the equilibrium outcome(s) – separation, symmetry, one signal per 
signaler, and non-decreasing beliefs – the setting is fully equivalent to an incomplete-
information all-pay auction with two discrete types of bidders, who face asymmetric 
bidding costs, competing for a (fixed) prize   by submitting the   (  )’s as their 
bids.11 Likewise, the signaler types’ behavior can be analyzed independently. That is, 
except for a fixed exogenous probability of winning (high type) or losing (low type), 
each type of signaler effectively optimizes against the strategy of his own type only. 
Therefore, having settled on an activity, the signalers follow a mixed strategy: If the 
two signalers are perceived to be of the same type, it is always profitable (within the 
bounds of the equilibrium supports) to deviate from a pure strategy by signaling 
slightly more than the other signaler, thereby guaranteeing oneself the prize. 
Importantly, this reasoning holds if the signalers choose the same or different signals.  
For transparency, the approach in the following is two-tiered. In a first step, I 
shall put forward a number of putative equilibria and argue (intuitively) why some 
break down under the restrictions on the framework. Given these insights, in a 
second step, I construct equilibrium profiles for the remaining outcomes, paying 
careful attention to the configuration of the receiver’s beliefs. Note in this regard 
that, from a signaler’s perspective, deviation from a particular magnitude using one 
signal to the same magnitude using the other signal – a step that does not affect the 
deviant’s cost of signaling but may alter his probability of winning – has two effects 
on the receiver. She obtains a different signal-dependent benefit (A) and, subject to 
her beliefs, expects to receive a different type-dependent value (θ) from the deviating 
signaler. Depending on the pre-deviation strategy, either effect may dominate, which 
ultimately controls the profitability of the move. 
In principle, the setup could support the following strategy combinations: 
(1) both types of signaler separate within the less beneficent signal; (2) low types 
choose the less beneficent and high types the more beneficent signal; (3) both types 
of signaler separate within the more beneficent signal; and (4) low types choose the 
more beneficent and high types the less beneficent signal. For purposes of argument, 
                                               
4.11 The equivalence is trivially true if the signalers employ the same signal. With different signals in 
use, the statement is also true on account of the aforesaid restrictions (cf. Footnote 4.16). 
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assume that each of these profiles constitutes an equilibrium (with the signalers 
adopting appropriate mixed strategies), and one-by-one reflect on whether either type 
of signaler can profitably deviate from the proposed outcomes.  
The deduction that the strategies of the first putative profile – i.e., both types of 
signaler choose   – will be analogous to those developed for the case without choice 
of signaling activity is straightforward. That is, in order for this profile to exist, the 
signaler types must randomize continuously on disjoint but contiguous interval 
supports (comprising strictly positive signaling magnitudes) such that high types 
choose strictly higher signal intensities than low types. One configuration of beliefs 
consistent with this outcome would be that the receiver has non-decreasing beliefs 
for signals of type   and associates signals of type   with low type. Yet, (even) if so, 
a signaler of low type will have an incentive to deviate to some message using  , as 
this move will effectively “out” him as a low type. He is considered to be a low type 
to begin with, implying that the deviation cannot make him worse but potentially 
better off since the deviating signal may provide an overall higher payoff to the 
receiver than a high type using  . As the receiver cares about her total payoff, this 
step must render him more attractive to her (despite his type). Markedly, this 
argument does not depend on the exact specification of the receiver’s beliefs off the 
equilibrium path. It goes through as given for all reasonable configurations of beliefs. 
The first strategy profile can thus clearly not constitute an equilibrium.  
Suppose next that the signaler types separate such that low types choose   and 
high types  , using mixed strategies on interval supports consistent with those in the 
scenario without choice, though in this case opting for different signaling activities. 
A set of beliefs in line with this profile assigns signals of type   as well as messages 
off the equilibrium path to low type, and signals of type   beyond some threshold to 
high type. The argument rendering this configuration not sustainable as an 
equilibrium is identical to the one just given. Namely, regardless of the receiver’s 
exact beliefs off the equilibrium path, a signaler of low type can profitably deviate to 
the more beneficent signal. In short, given parity in the signals’ cost, signalers of low 
type always prefer   to  .  
 
Observation 4.2 If the cost of the signaling activities does not differ between 
the signals, there do not exist symmetric separating equilibria 
that involve low types choosing the less beneficent signal. 
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The remaining outcomes cannot be ruled out via the foregoing argument. 
Rather, as shown in the following, one can construct equilibria according to which 
signalers of high type send the highest total benefit to the receiver without signalers 
of low type being able to outdo them by deviating from their purported equilibrium 
strategy. To this end, consider the following auxiliary notation. Let G 
 ( ) denote the 
signalers’ symmetric equilibrium distribution (c.d.f.) of signal intensities using a 
particular signal in equilibrium   when of type τ ∈ {L, H}, i.e., the probability that the 
chosen magnitude is no greater than some level   (Pr(  (  ) ≤  ) ), and let   
 ( ) 
denote the density function associated with G 
 ( ), if it exists. I shall construct 
equilibria in which G 
 ( ) is (absolutely) continuous – meaning density   
 ( ) exists 
and the distribution does not contain any atoms – and the supports of the signaler 
types’ mixed strategies are intervals. In particular, let the support of signalers of low 
type be defined as [   
 ,   
 




 ], where   
  and    
 
 represent the respective lower and upper bounds in 
equilibrium  .12, 13 Turn first to the scenario where both signaler types choose  . 
Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =   ). Taking as given the signalers’ 
choice of the more beneficial activity, it is easy to see that this setting, too, is 
equivalent to the one analyzed in Chapter 2. Therefore, barring a reconsideration of 
the receiver’s beliefs off the equilibrium path, the equilibrium – henceforth (also) 
referred to as E  – will be identical to the unique symmetric separating outcome 
characterized in the absence of choice. To be precise, if   ̂
  denotes the upper bound 
of signalers of low type and   ̂
  that of signalers of high type, low types randomize 
continuously on [0,   ̂
 ], high types randomize continuously on [  ̂
 ,   ̂
 ], where:  
  ̂
  = (1 − λ) ∙
 
γ 
   and     ̂







and the receiver adopts threshold beliefs with the threshold set at   ̂
 . The signaler 




(1 − λ) ∙  








The most elementary configuration of the receiver’s beliefs for signals of 
type   would be that they are deemed to indicate low type (Figure 4.1). If so, neither 
                                               
4.12 Paralleling the setting without choice, if   
 
=    
 , then – for separation – both distributions must 
not contain an atom at this point. 
4.13 This, in effect, entails that the receiver (again) adopts threshold beliefs, with the threshold set at   
 
. 
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type of signaler – especially one of low type – has an incentive to deviate to a 
message involving   as doing so would strictly reduce the signal-dependent benefit 
conveyed to the receiver (Appendix 4.1.a, Section 4.A). In other words, A > A in 
conjunction with parity in the signals’ cost induces the signalers to send   rather 
than  . In fact, this line of reasoning holds even if the receiver’s beliefs are such that 
  is associated with high type for all non-zero signaling levels. Note that the 
arguments verifying existence within the signal as well as those ruling out atoms, 
gaps, and overlaps carry over to the present framework as given in Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 4.1. Equal Cost – The Equilibrium Supports and Beliefs for the Case 
When Both Signaler Types “Pool” on the More Beneficent Signal (E ) 
 
 
The intuition for this outcome, as opposed to the signaler types coordinating on 
the less beneficent signal, is rooted in the fact that signalers of low type are able to 
bestow on the receiver the higher benefit without an additional expenditure relative 
to high types. All that differs between the signaler types is the relative cost of 
signaling within a particular signal; low types are thus not necessarily disadvantaged 
by their low(er) intrinsic value. Only if both signaler types choose the activity with 
the highest associated benefit can low types not “out-maneuver” high types via the 
benefit linked to their deviating message, thereby enabling a balancing of the 
competitive pressures inherent in the setup along the lines of Chapter 2.  
Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =   ). Although the outcome 
involving signalers of low type choosing the more and those of high type the less 
beneficent signal – hereafter (also) denoted E  – might seem counter-intuitive as 
signalers of high type effectively “understate” their messages (or “counter-signal”), it 
can obtain provided that high types are able to convey at least the same payoff to the 
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θ  + A ∙   ( ) ≥ θ
  + A ∙   ( ). 
One would expect, however, that this will only be possible if the difference between 
the signal-dependent benefits is limited and/or the intrinsic value of signalers of high 
type is quite substantial. They will otherwise not be able to offset the (smaller) 
benefit they send by way of their signal. Note in this regard that, given the signalers’ 
choice of signaling activity, the most clear-cut configuration of the receiver’s beliefs 
to support this profile would be the arrangement depicted in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2. Equal Cost – Interval Supports and Beliefs Consistent with the 
Outcome Where Low Types Choose the More and High Types the Less 
Beneficent Signal (E )  
 
 
In view of the close relationship between the equilibrium supports and the 
receiver’s payoff from each signaler, consider the equilibrium support of signalers of 
low type. A strictly positive lower bound cannot be an equilibrium strategy in this 
case either because, taking as given the receiver’s beliefs, a signaler could profitably 
deviate to zero thereby lowering his cost of signaling without affecting his 
probability of winning. Consistency with a mixed-strategy solution, correspondingly, 
obliges that the expected equilibrium payoff also be zero, which fixes the upper 
bound of the support (  ̂
 ) at this type’s expected break-even payoff. As shown in 
Appendix 4.1.b, paralleling E  and the environment without choice, it is given by:  
  ̂




Key in the context of the bounds of the high types’ equilibrium support is that 
the upper bound of the support of signalers of low type is fixed. The reasoning is 
straightforward. Given their lower marginal cost of signaling, in order to be able to 
win the prize, a signaler of high type must be able to outperform all low types. He 
will therefore consider their upper bound a rigid lower boundary when deliberating 
the lower bound (  ̌
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  ̌
  relative to   ̂
 , one needs to distinguish three cases:   ̌
  >   ̂
  (gap scenario), 
  ̌
  <    ̂
  (overlap scenario), and   ̌
  =    ̂
  (separate but adjoining supports).  
At first glance, a gap may seem most intuitive as it suggests that signalers of 
high type will compensate for the smaller benefit associated with their signal by 
choosing strictly higher signaling magnitudes than signalers of low type. Hence, 
suppose that   ̌
  >   ̂
 . Despite the fact that the receiver associates all signals above   ̂
  
and below   ̌
  with low type, high types have an incentive to deviate. In particular, 
when choosing a signal within the gap interval (e.g.,   ̂
  using  ), a signaler of high 
type can reduce his expenditure without affecting his probability of winning – he 
continues to lose against all (other) high types and wins against all low types.14 A 
lower bound such that   ̌
  >   ̂
  can thus not be an equilibrium strategy.15 
Suppose instead that   ̌
  <    ̂
 . This scenario (too) is susceptible to deviation 
because signalers of low type can profitably mimic those of high type. For, rather 
than choosing a signal intensity along his own support (using  ), he could send the 
same magnitude using   without incurring a higher cost of signaling, yet thereby 
strictly increasing his probability of being chosen as the receiver’s ally since she 
would (now) consider him to be of high type. Accordingly, a lower bound such that 
  ̌
  <    ̂
  cannot constitute an equilibrium strategy either. Observe that this argument 
also rules out all possible pooling and partial pooling equilibria. 
Finally, consider   ̌
  =    ̂
 , i.e., the signaler types randomize on disjoint but 
contiguous supports. This is the only configuration not susceptible to deviation since 
– given the receiver’s beliefs – neither type of signaler can improve his situation 
without either affecting his cost of signaling or probability of winning. In short, as in 
the preceding equilibrium (E ) and the scenario without choice, there cannot exist 
gaps between or overlaps of the equilibrium supports.  
On account of the difference in benefits associated with the signaling activities, 
existence of the equilibrium requires that a further condition be satisfied. To be 
precise, the contiguity of the signaler types’ equilibrium supports does not rule out 
the possibility that a low type choosing   ̂
  conveys a higher payoff to the receiver 
than a high type choosing   ̌
  or, in fact, any other magnitude along the high types’ 
equilibrium support. It must therefore in equilibrium also hold that: 
                                               
4.14 This argument hinges on the fact that there is no atom at   ̌
  because, if so, deviation below that 
level would strictly reduce the signaler’s probability of winning. The non-existence of atoms 
throughout the supports can be established via arguments paralleling those developed in Chapter 2. 
4.15 This argument subsumes gaps within the bounds of the supports. 
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θ  + A ∙ ṡ  ≥ θ
  + A ∙ ṡ , 
where   ̇ denotes some signal intensity along the high types’ equilibrium support. 
Manipulation straightforwardly reduces this expression to: 
θ  ≥ θ  +    ̇ ∙ (A− A). 
The “critical” levels of   ̇ are the bounds of the supports. Namely, in order to ensure 
existence, it must be the case that (1) the receiver’s payoff when allying with the 
lowest high type is at least as great as her payoff when allying with the highest low 
type, and that (2) the message of the highest high type is valued less by the receiver 
if it involves the more beneficial activity but is deemed to come from a low type than 
said message along his equilibrium support. Seeing as the latter is the stricter 
requirement, only it is binding. In particular, owing to the infeasibility of overlaps in 
equilibrium, if it is true that a high type’s message involving his upper bound (  ̂
 ) 
using   maps into the receiver’s payoff such that she prefers to ally with him rather 
than his alter-ego using   (but deemed a low type), this preference ranking will hold 
for all magnitudes along the signaler’s equilibrium support (Figure 4.A.2, 
Appendix 4.1.b). Hence, the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium 
where signalers of low type choose   and those of high type   to exist is given by:  
 θ  ≥ θ  +    ̂
  ∙ (A− A).                                              (4.1) 
The algebraic form of the upper bound of the support then follows from the fact 
that a signaler adopting a mixed strategy must make the same payoff at all points 
along his equilibrium support. As shown in Appendix 4.1.b, it is given by:  
  ̂







Having established the signaler types’ equilibrium supports to be on [0,   ̂
 ] for low 
types and on [  ̂
 ,   ̂
 ] for high types, their optimal strategies once again follow 




(1 − λ) ∙  








The arguments ruling out deviation within each signal carry over to the present 
framework as given in Chapter 2.16 Note that the receiver’s beliefs beyond the upper 
bound of signalers of low type are crucial with respect to sustaining this outcome as 
                                               
4.16 In this case, too, competition between the signaler types transpires via the relative level of their 
signals, implying that the setting unambiguously meets the criteria of an all-pay auction. 
Chapter 4. Choice of Signaling Activity  130 
an equilibrium. If she were to associate the relevant magnitudes with high type, 
signalers of high type could profitably deviate to this region for all values of θ . 
Synthesis. Not unexpectedly, the players’ equilibrium behavior is 
fundamentally the same in all cases considered so far, i.e., with and without choice. 
In fact, signalers of low type and the receiver behave the same whether both signals 
are in use (E ) or the signaler types coordinate on the same activity (E ). The only 
divergence in the strategy of signalers of high type is the signaling activity in use; the 
support is of the same dimension in each case. The essential intuitive difference 
between the two scenarios with choice relates to the positioning of the equilibrium 





a positive constant. The relationship indicates that “counter-signaling” (E ) can arise 
if and only if the high types’ support balances the extra benefit to the receiver when 
allying with a high type (via their intrinsic value) with the extra benefit obtained by 
way of the higher signal-dependent benefit when allying with a low type. In line with 
expectation, this may be achievable if the signal-dependent benefits do not differ too 
much while the intrinsic values diverge markedly. If so, the “counter-signaling” 
outcome will co-exist with the equilibrium involving coordination on the more 
beneficent signal, which exists for all values of A and θ. If not, the degenerate nature 
of this outcome is sensible. 
 
Proposition 4.1 The framework with equality in the cost of the signaling 
activities allows for two symmetric separating equilibria with 
non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver and the 
signalers choosing exactly one signal.  
i. For all θ  > θ  > 0 and A > A > 0, the signaler types will 
coordinate on the more beneficent signal.  
ii. In addition, so long as (4.1) holds, the types can 
concurrently separate across the signaling activities such 
that signalers of low type choose the more beneficent and 
signalers of high type the less beneficent signal. Otherwise, 
only the former equilibrium exists. 
 
Choice and Welfare. The final piece of the puzzle relates to the signalers’ 
optimal choice of signaling activity. Although one might expect their decision for 
one activity over the other to be driven by their expected payoff, since the activities’ 
cost does not differ and the structure of the outcomes entails the same behavior and 
therefore expected payoff for each type of signaler, the signalers are indifferent with 
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respect to the signal they end up using. As such, the key player in this setting is the 
receiver – both in terms of her beliefs and her expected payoff.  
To establish her preferred outcome, consider the welfare implications of each 
equilibrium. As costly signaling is inherently wasteful, the matter of interest is one of 
constrained efficiency. Provided both outcomes exist, which one is most beneficial? 
Since A > A > 0, the answer to this question is immediate. The receiver is always 
better off when both types of signaler opt for the more beneficent signal (E ).  
 
Corollary 4.1 Given parity in the cost of the signaling activities, the contest 
on the more beneficent signal is always preferable to the one 
involving both signaling activities. 
 
Inferences. In sum, if the signaling activity in use only affects the agents’ 
interaction via the receiver’s payoff function, the most desirable outcome from a 
welfare perspective coincides with the outcome most likely to obtain in the sense that 
it can arise for the broadest set of parameter values. Nevertheless, as speculated, even 
in this comparatively simple environment, more than one outcome may arise, and if 
the conditions permit, may arise at the same time. As such, in some cases, the 
signalers will in equilibrium opt for the inefficient signal.  
From a technical perspective, the central feature is that signalers of low type 
favor the more beneficial activity as it enables them to compensate, to some extent, 
for their lower intrinsic value, thereby augmenting their chances of entering into an 
alliance with the receiver. This narrows the scope of the equilibrium identified in 
Chapter 2; while it, in principle, holds for any non-zero level of the signal-dependent 
benefit, given endogenous choice, it will only obtain if the signaler types coordinate 
on the most beneficent signal. Even so, observe that the outcomes summarized in 
Proposition 4.1 constitute the complete set of equilibria consistent with the 
restrictions on the framework and equality in the cost of the signals. All alternative 
configurations can be ruled out by arguments akin to those developed in Chapter 2.  
 
Observation 4.3 Proposition 4.1 captures all equilibria consistent with parity in 
the signals’ cost and the (other) restrictions on the framework.  
 
Remarks. Although the choice set underlying the analysis only comprises two 
elements (of the beneficent kind), the results are quite general in that use of a larger 
menu will yield the same set of equilibria. To be precise, as long as all of the signals 
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are inherently beneficent, since each signaler can only ever use exactly one signal at 
a time, the lone change will be that a broader range of signals are being set against 
each other. Since this adjustment does not affect the signaler types’ incentives, the 
set of equilibria will remain unchanged. In a similar spirit, the linearity of the cost 
function is not as restrictive as it may seem (cf. Chapter 2). Provided that the signaler 
types face asymmetric marginal costs in that signaling is more expensive for low 
types, non-linearity in the cost of signaling would not qualitatively affect the pattern 
of the equilibrium outcomes.17 
 
4.3.1.3 Unequal Cost 
A legitimate critique of the analysis up until now is that it is not necessarily 
intuitive that activities with different benefits to the receiver do not differ in their 
costliness to the signalers. One might, instead, expect that the more beneficial 
activity requires more effort – be it in terms of time or money. The objective of this 
section is precisely this modification. In particular, assume that the cost function now 
takes the following form, ceteris paribus: 
c(  ,   (  ), θ ) =  
γ (  )∙   (  )  if θ = θ
 
 γ (  )∙   (  )  if θ = θ
 ,
 
with γ (  ) > γ
 (  ) > 0 and γ
 
> γ , where γ
 
= γ     and γ  = γ     for 
τ ∈ {L, H}. Namely, the signaling activities now differ in cost not only in that a given 
activity is more expensive for signalers of low type, but also in that sending the more 
beneficent signal is more expensive (per se). Accordingly, the signal in use matters 
with respect to its value to the receiver as well as its cost to the signalers.  
Since the underlying structure of the game (e.g., the sunk nature of the 
expenditures on signaling) is unchanged, the revision to the cost function does not 
affect the players’ decision problems, nor does it alter the equivalence of the 
interaction to an incomplete-information all-pay auction (via the   (  )’s). As such, 
the signaler types will once more adopt mixed strategies. It should furthermore be 
obvious that the present setting could, fundamentally, support the same strategy 
combinations as its equal-cost counterpart, i.e., “pooling” on either of the signaling 
activities and/or “separation” such that the signaler types opt for different signals.  
                                               
4.17 Depending on the parameterization of the game, the “intuitive criterion” (Cho & Kreps 1987) may 
eliminate the outcome featuring separation across the signals (E ; Appendix 4.1.c). 
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In view of the results obtained thus far, the issue of interest now is whether, 
and under what conditions, an equilibrium can arise such that the more expensive 
signal ( ) is chosen. As before, I shall begin the analysis by exploring (intuitively) 
the signaler types’ incentives for deviation from the putative equilibrium outcomes, 
whereupon I construct equilibrium profiles for the strategy combinations not 
susceptible to deviation. Hence, for purposes of argument, assume once more that 
each putative profile constitutes an equilibrium (with the signalers adopting 
appropriate mixed strategies), and consider whether either type of signaler can 
profitably deviate from his proposed strategy. 
Turn first to the outcome involving both signaler types choosing  . Since this 
prospective equilibrium involves separation within a particular activity, the strategy 
profile will take the same form as the separating outcome developed for the scenario 
without choice, i.e., the signaler types randomize continuously on disjoint but 
contiguous interval supports (comprising strictly positive signaling levels) such that 
high types defeat all low types and the receiver adopts non-decreasing beliefs for 
signals of type  . The most basic configuration of beliefs for messages off the 
equilibrium path to support this outcome is that all relevant signals are taken to 
indicate low type (cf. Figure 4.1). In contrast to the equal-cost case, where the more 
beneficial activity constitutes the only activity that could arise in equilibrium for this 
type of signaler, a signaler of low type may now have an incentive to depart from his 
purported equilibrium strategy to a message involving the less beneficial activity. 
For, this move will (strictly) reduce his cost of signaling without affecting the 
receiver’s beliefs about him. The activity’s lower cost may moreover enable him to 
choose a higher magnitude, implying that the deviation need not adversely affect his 
probability of winning in this respect either. Key to this end is clearly that the less 
beneficial activity is notably less expensive than its counterpart, while the reduction 
in the signal-dependent benefit is not substantial. Note that this reasoning (too) holds 
for all reasonable configurations of beliefs off the equilibrium path. Thus, counter to 
the setting with parity in the signals’ costs, this profile may fail to be an equilibrium.  
Suppose next that the signaler types separate such that low types choose   and 
high types  , i.e., they “counter-signal” using mixed strategies on interval supports. 
A set of beliefs consistent with this profile assigns signals of type   as well as 
messages off the equilibrium path to low type, and signals of type   beyond some 
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threshold to high type (cf. Figure 4.2). Contrary to the equal-cost case, this profile 
too may break down by the forgoing argument. That is, regardless of the receiver’s 
exact beliefs off the equilibrium path, given a suitable asymmetry in the costs and 
benefits, a signaler of low type can potentially deviate to the less beneficent signal 
thereby reducing his cost without necessarily reducing his probability of winning. 
The pivotal type of signaler in the context of the remaining profiles is the high 
type. To be precise, the primary reason the outcome with both signaler types 
choosing  , which except for the signaling activity in use will have the same 
structure as the outcome with both types choosing the more beneficial activity, may 
break down is not that signalers of low type deviate to the more expensive signal. 
Rather, if the difference in the signals’ cost is not too large and/or the asymmetry in 
the signal-dependent benefits is sizeable, signalers of high type may have an 
incentive to deviate to the more beneficent signal. While said move will increase 
their cost, the associated increase in the benefit conveyed to the receiver may be 
sufficient to compensate the added expenditure via the ensuing rise in the probability 
of being chosen as the receiver’s ally. The outcome involving low types choosing   
and high types choosing  , i.e., the reverse of the aforesaid outcome involving both 
signals,18 may break down on account of the converse of this line of reasoning. That 
is, if the difference in the cost of the signals is large and/or the asymmetry in the 
signal-dependent benefits small, signalers of high type may have an incentive to 
deviate to the less beneficent signal, thereby reducing their cost without inevitably 
reducing their probability of winning as they could afford a higher magnitude.  
In short, depending on the (relative) asymmetry of the activities’ cost and the 
associated benefits, each of the individual strategy profiles may (or may not) arise as 
an equilibrium of the setting with disparity in the cost of the signals. To formalize the 
players’ strategies and the conditions supporting the existence of the various 
outcomes, I shall once again resort to the auxiliary notation introduced in 
Section 4.1.2 and attempt to establish symmetric separating equilibria with 
(absolutely) continuous mixed strategies on interval supports. Turn first to the 
outcomes involving coordination on the same signal.  
                                               
4.18 That is to say, the signaler types adopt mixed strategies on interval support consistent with that 
outcome and the receiver’s beliefs are such that she ascribes signals of type   as well as messages off 
the equilibrium path to low type, and signals of type   beyond some threshold to high type, 
Chapter 4. Choice of Signaling Activity  135 
Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =   ). Taking as given the signalers’ 
choice of signaling activity, the algebraic form of the bounds of the equilibrium 
supports and the equilibrium strategies for the set of profiles where both signaler 
types opt for the same signal does not require much of a prologue. Starting with the 
outcome where both signaler types choose  , henceforward (also) labeled E , if   ̂
  
denotes the upper bound of the equilibrium support of signalers of low type and   ̂
  
that of signalers of high type, it is easy to validate that low types randomize 
continuously on [0,   ̂
 ], high types randomize continuously on [  ̂
 ,   ̂
 ], where:  
  ̂
  = (1 − λ) ∙
 
γ 
   and     ̂







the receiver adopts threshold beliefs with the threshold set at   ̂
 , and the signaler 




(1 − λ) ∙  








Paralleling the case with parity in the signals’ cost, the most obvious configuration of 
the receiver’s beliefs for signals of type   would be the judgment that all relevant 
signals indicate low type (Figure 4.3). Likewise, the arguments ruling out atoms, 
gaps, and overlaps as well as deviations within the signaling activity (again) transfer 
straightforwardly to the present framework as given in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 4.3. Unequal Cost – The Equilibrium Supports and Beliefs for the Case 
When Both Signaler Types “Pool” on the Less Beneficent Signal (E ) 
 
 
The most interesting aspects of the present scenario are the conditions 
precluding deviation across the signaling activities. Observe, in this regard, that if 
deviation is profitable when the marginal cost of sending the deviating message is 
zero (or, equivalently, the cost of signaling following deviation is unchanged), 
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(Appendix 4.2.a.i). In this light, consider a signaler of low type contemplating 
deviation from some   ( ) along his equilibrium support to some   
  ( ) such that                          
γ  ∙       = γ
 
∙   
  ( ). Given her beliefs, this move would induce the receiver to 
expect a payoff of θ  + A ∙   
  ( ). Deviation is not profitable if this level is less than 












.                                                             (4.2) 
Since deviation from a signaling level of zero using the less beneficent signal to zero 
using the more beneficent signal does not affect the signaler’s cost, the benefit 
conveyed to the receiver, or the receiver’s beliefs about the signaler’s type (and thus 
the deviant’s probability of winning), this move is not profitable either. Therefore, if 
Equation 4.2 is satisfied, signalers of low type do not have an incentive to deviate 
from any point along their equilibrium support. Indeed, Equation 4.2 completely 
determines this type’s behavior – it is necessary and sufficient. As such, if the 
condition is violated, only outcomes involving signalers of low type using the more 
beneficial activity will be sustainable as equilibria. The strict-inequality converse of 
Equation 4.2 will hereafter be referred to as Equation 4.2C. 
 
Observation 4.4 If the cost of the signaling activities differs, Equation 4.2 
completely determines the behavior of signalers of low type.  
 
The decisive signaling magnitude for signalers of high type is their upper 
bound. If it is not profitable to deviate from that level, they will not have an incentive 
to deviate from lower levels either (cf. Figure 4.A.2). The reasoning to derive the 
appropriate relationship between the costs and benefits is otherwise analogous to that 
for signalers of low type: Deviation from   ̂
  to some   





  ( ) would induce the receiver to expect a payoff of θ  + A ∙   
  ( ), 
which is to be compared to her pre-deviation payoff of θ  + A ∙  ̂ 






 , deviation is not profitable if: 





∙ A− A  .                                          (4.3) 
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In other words, akin to E , in order to preclude deviation by signalers of high type it 
must be the case that the message of the highest high type is valued less by the 
receiver if it involves the more beneficial activity but is deemed to come from a low 
type than said message along his equilibrium support.19  
The focus on deviations from the upper bound can (furthermore) be justified by 
noting that Equation 4.3 is hardest to satisfy at the upper bound, especially if the term 
in brackets is positive. Yet, even if it is not positive, deviation does not pay because 
the condition rendering deviation unprofitable if the receiver were to believe that 








, the condition rendering the bracket negative (Appendix 4.2.a.ii). 
Nevertheless, contrary to signalers of low type, since it is defined in terms of the 
upper bound of their support, the exact location of which depends on the cost 
parameters, Equation 4.3 only constitutes a necessary condition on the high types’ 
behavior in equilibria involving the less beneficent signal.  
The intuition for this outcome is straightforward. The key element preventing 
deviation by signalers of low type to their “preferred,” more beneficial activity is its 
(absolutely) higher cost, which cannot be offset by a higher probability of winning as 
even maintenance of the pre-deviation cost of signaling entails transmission of a 
lower magnitude. Whereas all that mattered in the equal-cost case was the 
asymmetry in the signal-dependent benefits, in the present setting, a precise balance 
must be struck between the asymmetry in the activities’ marginal cost and the 
associated benefits. Similarly, unless the cost of the more beneficial activity can be 
compensated by a higher benefit to the receiver and the signalers’ intrinsic value (to 
compensate for the choice of a lower signaling magnitude of the deviating signal), 
signalers of high type do not have an incentive to deviate either. Hence, as 
conjectured, this outcome is only viable if the difference in the cost of the activities 
is large and/or the benefits associated with the signals hardly diverge.  
Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =   ). Without further ado, if   ̂
  denotes 
the upper bound of the equilibrium support of signalers of low type and   ̂
  that of 
signalers of high type, the algebraic form of the equilibrium involving “pooling” on 
the more beneficent signal, henceforth (also) referred to as E , takes the now familiar 
                                               
4.19 In fact, given a constant ratio of costs and barring the positioning of the upper bounds, 
Equation 4.3 immediately reduces to Equation 4.1. 
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form. Signalers of low types randomize continuously on [0,   ̂
 ], signalers of high 
types randomize continuously on [  ̂
 ,   ̂
 ], where:  
  ̂




   and     ̂









the receiver adopts threshold beliefs with the threshold set at   ̂
 , and the signalers’ 





(1 − λ) ∙  










The most straightforward configuration of the receiver’s beliefs for signals of type   
would, as indicated, be the assessment that all relevant signals indicate low type 
(cf. Figure 4.1). Note that, in line with the disparity in costs, the equilibrium supports 
in this case are more condensed than those of the preceding outcome (E ).  
It is easy to verify that the condition preventing deviation by signalers of low 
type is indeed given by Equation 4.2C (Appendix 4.2.b). Likewise, deviation from a 
signal at the upper bound by a signaler of high type to some   




  = γ  ∙   
  ( ) is not profitable if θ  + A ∙  ̂ 
  is greater than or equal to 
θ  + A ∙   






  – can be expressed as: 





∙ A  .                                          (4.4) 
Not unexpectedly, Equation 4.4 is nearly identical to Equation 4.3. In fact, the 
brackets have the same sign. Hence, the conditions can hold simultaneously (even if 
the bracket is non-zero). They cannot, however, fail at the same time. Rather, if 
Equation 4.3 fails, which may be the case if its bracket is positive, Equation 4.4 will 
hold, as the relevant relationship between the signaler types’ intrinsic values make it 
comparatively easier to satisfy. Analogously, if Equation 4.4 fails, which may occur 
if its bracket is negative, Equation 4.3 will hold.20 The intuition for this outcome is 
thus essentially the reverse of that for E , i.e., as speculated, it is likely to be 
sustainable if the difference in the signals’ cost is small and/or the benefits associated 
with the activities diverge substantially. In conjunction with the fact that the 
                                               
4.20 Yet, even if the bracket of Equation 4.4 is negative, the condition is not easily broken, for if it is 
satisfied at the upper bound it will hold for all other points along the equilibrium support.  
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conditions determining the behavior of signalers of low type, which cannot hold21 
nor fail simultaneously, these observations entail that the equilibria involving 
coordination on the same signaling activity by the signaler types, may obtain at the 







, in which case one or other of the equilibria must 
obtain, existence of an equilibrium for this setting is not guaranteed. 
 
Lemma 4.1 Depending on the degree of asymmetry in the cost of the 
signaling activities vis-à-vis the asymmetry in the benefits 
associated with them, the framework with disparity in the 
signals’ cost allows for two symmetric separating equilibria 
involving use of the same signaling activity by the signaler 
types and non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver.  
i. If (4.2) and (4.3) obtain, the outcome where both types of 
signaler choose the less beneficent signal constitutes an 
equilibrium.  
ii. If (4.2C) and (4.4) hold, the outcome where both types of 
signaler choose the more beneficent signal constitutes an 
equilibrium. 
Depending on the parameter values, the outcomes may arise or 
fail simultaneously, unless (4.2) holds with equality, in which 
case one or other must obtain. 
 
Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =   ). Having explored the 
outcomes involving only one signaling activity, consider now the outcomes 
involving both signals, starting with the scenario where low types send   and high 
types  , henceforward (also) denoted E . Considering the cost structure, this outcome 
would seem the most natural profile involving both activities. Signalers of low type 
choose the less expensive signal, signalers of high type the more expensive signal, 
and the receiver adopts the beliefs depicted in Figure 4.4.  
The equilibrium support and strategy of signalers of low type will 
unambiguously be identical to that derived for the case when both signaler types 
“pool” on the less beneficent signal (E ), i.e., signalers of low type will randomize 
continuously on [0,   ̂
  =    ̂
 ], where:  
  ̂




                                               
4.21 The conditions cannot hold simultaneously unless they are satisfied with equality, in which case 
the ultimate outcome will depend on the conditions determining the behavior of signalers of high type, 
although it could still happen that both equilibria arise.  
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(1 − λ) ∙  
∙   ( ). 
As established in the context of E , the necessary and sufficient condition precluding 
deviation by this type of signaler to the more beneficial activity is (again) given by 
Equation 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.4. Unequal Cost – Interval Supports and Beliefs Consistent with the 




The inference that the signaler types’ equilibrium supports are likely to feature 
an overlap such that the high types’ lower bound (  ̌
 ) undercuts the low types’ upper 
bound, too, is intuitive. In view of the higher cost (and benefit) of the more 
beneficent signal, signalers of high type will want to position their lower bound at a 
signaling magnitude that is (just) too expensive for signalers of low type while 
concurrently ensuring that they convey at least the same payoff to the receiver as do 
their counterparts, and with the least possible expenditure. As their chosen activity is 
more beneficial and their intrinsic value to the receiver higher, the signal intensity to 
achieve these ends will be relatively lower than the equivalent magnitude of signalers 
of low type (their upper bound in particular). To formalize this intuition, note that it 
can be decomposed into three requisites (or “limits;” Figure 4.5); bear in mind that 
the receiver associates all signals below   ̌
  with low type.   
First, to guarantee victory against all low types, the lower bound of signalers of 
high type must not fall short of the signaling magnitude at which the cost for a low 
type is the same when sending said level using  , call it  “ ,” as when signaling at his 
equilibrium upper bound (using  ), call it “ℰ.” Note that   < ℰ , because the more 
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Figure 4.5. Unequal Cost – The “Limits” on the Lower Bound of the Equilibrium 
Support of Signalers of High Type for the Outcome Where Low Types Choose 
the Less and High Types the More Beneficent Signal (E ) 
 
 
Legend: The dashed box features preference relations on the part of the receiver. Superscripts denote 
the type of signaler being considered. 
 
to stray to intensities below  , since signalers of low type could afford to mimic him, 
thereby increasing their chances of being chosen as the receiver’s ally at his expense. 
In order for an equilibrium involving the present combination of signals to exist, it 
must therefore be satisfied that   ̌
  ≥  , with   ≔  γ
 
∙   = γ  ∙ ℰ . 
Second, it must be the case in any equilibrium consistent with the restrictions 
on the framework (separating, symmetry, one signal per signaler, and non-decreasing 
beliefs) that the receiver’s benefit from a signaler of high type sending a message 
involving the more beneficent signal is no less than her benefit from a signaler of low 
type signaling at his upper bound. That is to say, if the receiver’s point of 
indifference between a high type using   and a low type choosing ℰ is denoted “ℐ” 
(i.e., ℐ ≔ ℰ   ≈   ℐ
 , where the superscripts indicate the type of signaler), it must in 
equilibrium be the case that ℐ  ≽   ℰ
  or, equivalently, that                                 
 θ  + A ∙ ℐ  ≥  θ  + A ∙ ℰ . Signalers of high type will not want to locate their lower 
bound at a magnitude below ℐ as the ensuing benefit conveyed to the receiver would 
fail to match that of the highest low type, implying that   ̌
  < ℐ cannot constitute an 
equilibrium strategy. Even though Figure 4.5 depicts ℐ as greater in magnitude than 
 , it may well be the case that their order is reversed. Since high types will not want 
to send signaling magnitudes below either of these boundaries, the lowest magnitude 
their lower bound can take is max  { , ℐ}. 
The final limit on the high types’ lower bound, the upper boundary so to say, is 
given by the point – call it ℬ  – at which the receiver is indifferent between a low type 
signaling at his upper bound and him sending a message using   that conveys the 






Low Type ℰ 
  ̂
  
Point   :  ℰ  ≻    
  
Point ℐ :  ℰ  ≈   ℐ
  
Point ℬ :  ℰ  ≈   ℬ
  
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same (total) benefit as the equilibrium upper bound; namely, ℬ ≔ ℬ   ≈   ℰ
  or, 
equivalently,  θ  + A ∙ ℬ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ . Signalers of high type will consider ℬ  the 
upper boundary of the range of possible values for their lower bound because 
magnitudes beyond that level are susceptible to deviation. In particular, a high type 
choosing   ̌
  > ℬ  could strictly reduce his cost of signaling without affecting his 
probability of winning, despite the receiver (now) considering him to be a low type 
(i.e., he would still win against all low types and lose against all high types), by 
sending ℬ  rather than   ̌
  – a profitable deviation. A lower bound such that   ̌
  > ℬ  
can thus not be an equilibrium strategy. Observe that Equation 4.2 and A > A, imply 
that ℰ > ℬ >   . Since θ  > θ , it will furthermore be the case that ℬ > ℐ, for the 
higher intrinsic value of a signaler of high type entails that the benefit he conveys at 
ℐ will be at least as great as that of a low type choosing ℬ . 
In short, any outcome with a lower bound between max  { , ℐ} and ℬ  may arise 
as an equilibrium for the scenario involving low types choosing the less and high 
types the more beneficent signal, with the lowest possible equilibrium support 
starting at   ̌(   )
  = min   {max  { , ℐ} , ℬ }. For illustration, consider a lower bound ( ) 
in the interior of this range. While deviation below   would reduce his cost of 
signaling, a signaler of high type would not want to do so as this move would also 
reduce his probability of winning, and more so than his savings in cost. For, he 
would continue to lose against all other high types but the receiver would now 
consider him a low type, implying that she would expect his (total) benefit to fall 
short of that of some (other) low types.  
While it will always be the case that   ̌
  <    ̂
  – all alternative configurations, 
i.e., contiguous and gapped supports, can be ruled out (Appendix 4.2.c.i) – the 
algebraic form of the lower (and upper) bound of signalers of high type depends on 
which of the boundaries obtains (Appendix 4.2.c.ii). Supposing   constitutes the 
binding limit, i.e., the lowest lower bound, the lower bound (  ̌( )
  ) follows from the 












The upper bound of the support (  ̂( )
  ) then, once more, ensues from the fact that a 
mixed strategy entails that a signaler must expect to obtain the same payoff at all 
points along his support. It takes the following form: 
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  ̂( )









Naturally, the support is more condensed than its counterpart in the equilibrium 
involving the less expensive signal only (E ) – both bounds are clearly of a smaller 
magnitude. Indeed, as presented, it is identical to the outcome where both signaler 
types “pool” on the more beneficial activity (E ), although this link depends on the 
limit being considered. Even so, with   binding and the equilibrium support (thus) 
established to be on [  ̌( )
  ,   ̂( )
  ], the optimal strategy of signalers of high type can 











Atoms can be ruled out by the arguments developed in Chapter 2. While the current 
derivations focus on  , the equilibrium supports and strategies for the other 
boundaries can be ranked in the same order as the limits (Appendix 4.2.c.ii).  
In view of the discussion relating to Equation 4.4, the necessary condition to 
rule out deviation by signalers of high type to messages involving   in the context of 
each individual equilibrium will unambiguously take the same form, subject to the 
substitution of the appropriate upper bound. For instance, if   is binding, deviation is 
not profitable if: 





∙ A  . 
It follows that the condition ensuring existence of any equilibrium of this type must 
involve the lowest equilibrium. To be precise, if the intrinsic value of signalers of 
high type is (strictly) sufficient to compensate for the lower signaling magnitude at 
the lowest possible outcome, it will do so for higher levels as well. Accordingly, if 
  ̂(   )
   denotes the lowest upper bound, the necessary condition is given by: 





∙ A  .                                       (4.5) 
Note that the receiver’s beliefs for signals below the lower bound of signalers of high 
type carry some importance with respect to the derivation of the bounds of the 
equilibrium support. Along similar lines, if the receiver deemed signals beyond the 
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, although this condition is (inevitably) satisfied if its bracket is positive.  
 
Observation 4.5 If the cost of the signaling activities differs, there exists a 
continuum of equilibria for the case when low types choose the 
less and high types the more beneficent signal.  
 
Overall, the defining features of E  are the existence of an overlap of the 
equilibrium supports and the viability of a range of equilibria. Fortuitously, the 
intuition for both is quite simple in that the only sensible way to induce a signaler of 
high type to consider sending the more expensive signal is by keeping his 
expenditure as low as possible. As the more expensive signal is inherently more 
beneficial to the receiver than the alternative option and the intrinsic value of 
signalers of high type strictly exceeds that of low types, achieving this end is 
straightforward as a lower signaling magnitude need not entail a lower (total) benefit 
for the receiver. More than one equilibrium outcome is feasible as it may be the case 
that the receiver’s point of indifference between signalers of low and high type (in 
terms of the benefits conveyed by the highest low type and lowest high type) does 
not coincide with the maximum level of the more beneficial activity low types can 
afford. The present configuration is not sustainable as an equilibrium if the cost of 
the signaling activities is constant because signalers of low type can always 
profitably deviate to the more beneficent signal. Still, as surmised, essential in the 
setting with unequal cost is that the disparity in the signals’ cost is not too large 
and/or the asymmetry in the signal-dependent benefits substantial. 
Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =   ). Given the derivations for 
the preceding outcome (E ) and its counterpart in the environment with equal cost 
(E ), the formalization of the “counter-signaling” outcome when the cost of the 
signals differs (hereafter (also) labeled E ) is straightforward. Key is once more that 
signalers of high type convey at least the same payoff to the receiver using the less 
beneficial activity as do signalers of low type using the more beneficial activity. 
Recall that beliefs consistent with this profile assign signals of type   as well as 
messages off the equilibrium path to low type, and signals of type   beyond some 
threshold to high type (cf. Figure 4.2). 
Chapter 4. Choice of Signaling Activity  145 
Paralleling E , the signaler type of particular interest is the high type. For, it is 
a trivial exercise to verify that signalers of low type will behave just like their 
counterparts in the case when both types “pool” on the more beneficent signal (E ), 
i.e., they randomize continuously on [0,   ̂
  =    ̂
 ], where: 
  ̂










(1 − λ) ∙  
∙   ( ). 
Moreover, as established in that context, the necessary and sufficient condition 
precluding deviation to messages involving the less beneficial activity is given by 
Equation 4.2C. 
In sharp contrast to all other outcomes, the present profile will feature a gap 
between the signaler types’ equilibrium supports. The reasoning is virtually identical 
to the argument justifying the existence of an overlap in the companion case with 
both signals in use (E ). Specifically, signalers of high type will want to position 
their lower bound at a signaling magnitude that is (just) too expensive for low types 
while conveying at least the same benefit to the receiver as do they, at the smallest 
possible expense. Since the activity in use by signalers of low type is more beneficial 
and expensive, implying that a given expenditure procures a higher signal intensity 
of the cheaper signal, the magnitude to achieve these ends must be relatively higher 
than the equivalent level of signalers of low type (their upper bound in particular). To 
formalize this intuition, note that it too can be broken down into the three aforesaid 
“boundaries” (Figure 4.6); once again, bear in mind that the receiver ascribes all 
signals below the lower bound of signalers of high type (  ̌
 ) to low type.   
In particular, let   denote the point of indifference of signalers of low type with 
respect to their cost of signaling at their equilibrium upper bound (ℰ) or  , let ℐ refer 
to the receiver’s point of indifference between a high type choosing ℐ and the highest 
low type (at ℰ), and let ℬ  signify the receiver’s point of indifference between a low 
type opting for ℬ  and one choosing ℰ. It is easy to establish that ℰ <   < ℬ  and 
ℐ < ℬ , while the position of ℐ relative to   depends on the parameter values. By 
arguments paralleling those developed for E , any outcome with a lower bound 
between max  { , ℐ} and ℬ , with the lowest lower bound given by                    
  ̌(   )
  = min   {max  { , ℐ} , ℬ }, may arise as an equilibrium for the scenario at hand.  
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Figure 4.6. Unequal Cost – The “Limits” on the Lower Bound of the Equilibrium 
Support of Signalers of High Type for the Outcome Where Low Types Choose 
the More and High Types the Less Beneficent Signal (E ) 
 
 
Legend: The dashed box features preference relations on the part of the receiver. Superscripts denote 
the type of signaler being considered. 
 
It will in this case always be true that   ̌
  >   ̂
 , although the algebraic form of 
the lower (and upper) bound once more depends on which of the boundaries obtains 
(Appendix 4.2.d.i). If   constitutes the binding limit, the lower bound (as before) 











By the now familiar arguments, the upper bound of the support (  ̌( )
  ) amounts to: 
  ̂( )







As may be expected, the support is broader than its counterpart when both types 
coordinate on the more beneficent signal (E ); in fact, as presented, it is identical to 
that in the setting where both types “pool” on the less beneficial activity (E ), 
although this correlation depends on the binding limit. The comparison with the 
equal-cost case (E ), in turn, depends on the relative size of the cost parameters.  
With   binding and the equilibrium support established to be on [  ̌( )
  ,   ̂( )
  ], 
the equilibrium strategy for signalers of high type once more follows from their 









Atoms can be ruled out by the arguments developed in Chapter 2. In view of the 
discussion relating to Equations 4.3 and 4.5, it is easy to corroborate that the 
necessary condition to ensure existence of any equilibrium of this type is given by: 
ℰ 









Point  :  ℰ  ≻    
  
Point ℐ :  ℰ  ≈   ℐ
  
Point ℬ :  ℰ  ≈   ℬ
  
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∙ A− A  ,                                            (4.6) 
where   ̂(   )
   denotes the upper bound of the lowest possible equilibrium profile. 
The same caveats relating to the receiver’s beliefs as for E  and E  apply.  
Intuitively, the defining features of E  are the existence of a gap between the 
equilibrium supports, while said configuration was ruled out in the corresponding 
case with equal cost (E ), and the viability of a continuum of equilibria. In line with 
expectation, the intuition for the attainment of the “counter-signaling” outcome is 
effectively the reverse of the previous case (E ). As construed, it is crucial that the 
difference in the cost of the activities is not too excessive while the divergence in the 
benefits associated with the signals is quite substantial. The equal-cost case (E ) was 
deterministic in the sense that only one outcome could arise, because ℰ =   = ℐ < ℬ . 
To be precise, with parity in the signals’ cost, the equal-cost condition ( ) is trivial as 
the cost of signaling depends exclusively on the signaling magnitude being chosen, 
while the condition ensuring existence effectively corresponds to the receiver’s point 
of indifference with respect to her payoff between the lowest high type and the 
highest low type (ℐ). The point at which the receiver is indifferent between a signaler 
of low type signaling at his upper bound and one conveying the equivalent payoff 
using the less beneficent signal (ℬ ) is not significant in that context because a 
signaler of low type would need to make a substantial investment – since his intrinsic 
value is not sufficient to compensate for the difference in benefits – without a 
corresponding increase in his probability of winning, implying that deviation to his 
equilibrium upper bound would always be more profitable.  
In line with the comparison of the necessary conditions supporting the 
equilibria involving use of only one of the signaling activities, in this case, too, 
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 are inversely related, implying that they may hold but can 
never fail at the same time. This argument is independent of the exact positioning of 
the upper bound; the bound does, however, influence the range of parameters for 
which both equilibria may hold simultaneously. In conjunction with the fact that the 
conditions determining the behavior of signalers of low type, which as before cannot 
hold nor fail simultaneously, these observations indicate that the equilibria involving 
coordination on different signaling activities (E  and E ) may obtain and fail at the 







, in which case one or other of the equilibria must obtain. 
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Lemma 4.2 Depending on the degree of asymmetry in the cost of the 
signaling activities vis-à-vis the asymmetry in the benefits 
associated with them, the framework with disparity in the 
signals’ cost allows for two symmetric separating equilibria 
involving use of different signaling activities by the signalers, 
with each signaler using exactly one signal, and non-
decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver.  
i. If (4.2) and (4.5) hold, there exists a continuum of equilibria 
involving signalers of low type sending the less and those of 
high type the more beneficent signal.  
ii. If, instead, (4.2C) and (4.6) obtain, there exists a continuum 
of equilibria involving signalers of low type using the more 
and those of high type the less beneficent signal. 
Depending on the parameter values, they may arise or fail 
simultaneously, unless (4.2) holds with equality, in which case 
one or other must obtain. 
 
Synthesis. In general, the conditions supporting the outcome where both 
signaler types coordinate on the less beneficent signal (E ) and those ensuring 
existence of the outcome where low types choose the less and high types the more 
beneficial activity (E ) are such that if the condition preventing deviation by 
signalers of high type fails in one case, the chances that the other outcome obtains 
are high – if not both. More precisely, in both cases, the condition preventing 
deviation by signalers of low type is given by Equation 4.2, while the conditions 
ruling out deviation by high types (Equations 4.3 and 4.5, respectively) are inversely 
related. The situation is identical in the context of the outcome involving both types 
“pooling” on the more beneficial activity (E ) and that involving low types choosing 
the more and high types the less beneficent signal (E ). Provided that Equation 4.2
C 
ensures that signalers of low type do not have an incentive to deviate, the inverse 
relationship of Equations 4.4 and 4.6 effectively guarantees that one or the other, if 
not both, of the equilibria arises. Note that, if Equation 4.2 holds with equality, all 
equilibria may arise at once. In other words, at least one of the equilibria must obtain, 
although more than one may obtain at the same time.  
 
Proposition 4.2 In the framework with unequal cost, at least one of the 
equilibria characterized in Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2 must obtain, 
although depending on the parameter values, more than one – 
and, in the extreme, all four – may arise simultaneously.  
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Choice and Welfare. What about the signalers’ optimal choice of signaling 
activity? Contrary to the case with parity in cost, the signal in this setting does affect 
their payoff, implying that the signalers are no longer (necessarily) indifferent vis-à-
vis the activity they use. To establish the most efficient outcome, it is thus essential 
to consider explicitly the welfare implications of the profiles for the receivers as well 
as the signalers. The point of interest in this regard, taken the case that all four 
outcomes exist simultaneously,22 is whether one of them is always most preferable in 
terms of being least costly and/or most beneficial. To this end, consider the expected 
utility of a given player when of either role, starting with his/her preference ranking 
(i.e., in terms of the outcomes’ Pareto-dominance) when appointed signaler.  
While signalers of low type, by construction, expect a payoff of zero in each 
case, implying indifference with respect to the ultimate outcome, signalers of high 
type expect various positive payoffs, entailing that they do care about which 
equilibrium obtains. As such, the expected benefit of a player assigned to be of high 
type amounts to his/her expected payoff in a given equilibrium, weighted by the 
probability that (s)he is of high type (λ). As illustrated in Table 4.A.1 
(Appendix 4.2.e), the player’s expected utility for a given equilibrium is then simply 
the sum of his/her expected benefit when of each type.23, 24 
The derivation of a player’s expected utility when allocated the role of receiver 
follows a similar line of reasoning. One must account for all possible combinations 
of signaler types the receiver may encounter in a given interaction, weighted by the 
events’ appropriate probabilities. Specifically, provided equilibrium behavior by all 
parties, one must determine the expected value of the highest signaling magnitude to 
be expected in each of three possible scenarios – for, she may either encounter two 
low types, one low type and one high type, or two high types.25 Table 4.A.4 
(Appendix 4.2.e) summarizes the receiver’s expectation in each equilibrium. 
Seeing as the expected utility from one outcome must be greater than that of 
another if each element of the former exceeds that of the latter, straightforward mani- 
                                               
4.22 One would ideally want to construct a multi-dimensional space featuring “regions of existence” for 
each equilibrium, including all relevant overlaps (i.e., areas of joint existence), and use it to derive 
general conditions regarding the Pareto-dominance of the various outcomes. Due to the complexity of 
this task, it is left for future work. This section, instead, focuses on necessary conditions in only one 
possible instance, i.e., the situation in which all outcomes exist at the same time.  
4.23 The focus in the cases with multiple equilibria is on limits   and ℬ  (only) for ease of tractability.   
4.24 Table 4.A.2 (Appendix 4.2.e) provides necessary and sufficient conditions establishing various 
preference rankings from the perspective of the signaler(s).  
4.25 Table 4.A.3 (Appendix 4.2.e) illustrates the derivations for E . 
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Table 4.1. Unequal Cost – The Conditions Determining a Player’s Preference 
over the Various Equilibria (Row ≻  Column)  





















































































































































































































































































































(and vice versa) 
 
Legend: The superscripts on the equilibria supporting multiple outcomes denote the limit being 
considered. The two within-outcome comparisons compare the row outcome using limit   to the 
column outcome using limit ℬ , e.g., the value provided for E  gives E 
  ≻ E  
ℬ . 
 
pulation yields the necessary conditions in Table 4.1.26 A brief examination of the 
preference rankings reveals that they are, in fact, quite intuitive. For instance, as one 
might expect, coordination on the more beneficent signal (E ) is favored to 
coordination on the less beneficent one (E ) if A is sizeable and use of the associated 
activity ( ) is more expensive for signalers of low type. This intuition also 
rationalizes E  ≻ E   and E  ≻ E  ; as the receiver is (by construction) in both cases 
indifferent about the signal in use by signalers of low type, with ℬ  binding, all that 
                                               
4.26 Extensive manipulation reveals that a further necessary condition for the comparison of E 
   and E 
   







  alongside  λ > 1 −
 
√ 
  (≈ 0.25) , i.e., in contrast to the other conditions, this ranking 
also depends on the frequency of high types in the population. 
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matters is the relationship between the signal-dependent benefits and the marginal 
cost of signalers of high type.  
The fact that the conditions for E  vs. E 
ℬ , E  vs. E 
ℬ , and those “within” E  and 
E  are mutually exclusive, implying that they cannot be ranked as signalers and 
receiver always prefer different outcomes, too, makes intuitive sense. Take E  vs. E 
ℬ , 
for example; observe that signalers of high type behave the same in both cases. If ℬ  – 
the condition rendering the receiver indifferent between a signaler of low type 
signaling at his equilibrium upper bound and one choosing ℬ  – is binding, the 
signalers will prefer “pooling” on the less beneficent signal because the relevant 
support involves lower signaling magnitudes, while the receiver favors the higher 
signal-dependent benefit. Note that the non-rankability of the range-outcomes 
contrasts sharply with traditional signaling models. The reason for this divergence is 
that the receiver in the present environment retains the benefit associated with the 
message of the signaler she chooses as her ally, whereas in standard frameworks any 
signal-dependent benefit is fully appropriated by the signalers. 
In general, contrary to the scenario with equal cost, all generic rankings depend 
inherently on the parameter values of the particular setting being considered. 








, a natural conjecture as it entails that the more 
beneficent signal is comparatively more expensive for signalers of low type than 
their counterparts of high type. If so, the outcome involving “pooling” on the more 
beneficent signal (E ) or the one with signalers of low type choosing the less and 
those of high type the more beneficial activity (E ) will be most preferable, though 
the ultimate solution depends on the relative size of the signal-dependent benefits.  
 
Corollary 4.2 Given disparity in the cost of the signaling activities, which of 
the equilibria will be most preferable is ex ante ambiguous.  
 
Inferences. Akin to the environment with parity in the signals’ costs, more 
than one equilibrium may arise and, if the conditions permit, may do so at the same 
time. This is the case despite the fact that the signalers’ behavior in this case, too, is 
fundamentally quite simple – low types effectively choose between two strategies 
and high types between a total of four. The results given a difference in the signaling 
activities’ cost therefore further underscores the conclusion that the sharp uniqueness 
prediction of the environment without choice is lost if the signalers may choose the 
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conduit of their messages. For, besides several types of equilibrium potentially co-
existing, one may in some cases even obtain a continuum of equilibria. Moreover, as 
the size of the expected utility of the various outcomes depends on the parameter 
values, not only can one in this case not definitively rank the outcomes (ex ante), but 
a different outcome may be Pareto-optimal at any one time, including (apparently) 
inefficient ones. Even so, since all alternative configurations can be ruled out, the 
equilibria constitute the complete set of outcomes consistent with the restrictions on 
the framework and disparity in the cost of the signaling activities.  
 
Proposition 4.3 Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 characterize all equilibria for the class 
of games involving symmetry among the signaler types, choice 
of exactly one signaling activity by each signaler from a choice 
set involving exactly two elements of a beneficent nature, and 
non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receiver. 
 
Remark. Extension of the choice set to more than two beneficent signals or 
non-linearity in the cost function once again do not qualitatively affect the results.27 
 
4.3.2 A Generalization  
In view of the links between the frameworks with and without choice, it will 
come as no surprise that the generalization of the game to comprise a broader set of 
players,   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 receivers, to be exact, is again effectively trivial. 
Consider a social environment with   ≥ 2 signalers and   ≥ 1 homogeneous28 
receivers, ceteris paribus, and assume that the signalers are not restricted with 
respect to the number of alliances they can enter, i.e., a given signaler could, in the 
extreme, ally with all29   receivers. As before, these assumptions alongside the other 
restrictions on the framework imply that each receiver will ultimately want to ally 
with the same signaler (the one conveying the highest total benefit). To demonstrate 
that these adjustments to the setup do not qualitatively affect the results in either the 
equal or unequal cost setting, I shall briefly outline the main elements of the analysis 
                                               
4.27 As detailed in Appendix 4.2.f, the “intuitive criterion” does not rule out either of the equilibria 
involving coordination on the same signaling activity on the part of the signaler types (i.e., E  and E ). 
In sharp contrast, in the cases featuring separating across the signals (i.e., E  and E ) it does eliminate 
all outcomes between max{ , ℐ} and ℬ , reducing the set of equilibria in both cases to a unique point-
prediction at max{ , ℐ}.    
4.28 This assumption is not unreasonable if one presumes that the average quality of the social goods 
the signalers are competing for is constant (cf. Chapter 2).  
4.29 Refer to Footnote 2.27 (Chapter 2) for a consideration of the implications of this assumption. 
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with many players for the case when the cost of the signaling activities differs and 
the signaler types coordinate on the less beneficent signal – call it E ( ).  
If δ  ∈ {1, … ,  } denotes receiver  ’s choice of signaler   ∈ {1, … ,  } conditional 
on having observed each of their messages (   ,   (  )  through    ,   (  ) , 
respectively), signaler  ’s payoff is given by: 
  
   (  , … ,   ),    (  ), … ,   (  ) , (δ , … , δ  ), (θ , … , θ )  = 
  ∙    (δ ,  )
 
   
− c(  ,   (  ), θ ), 
where  
 (δ ,  ) =  
1  if δ  =   
  0  otherwise
 ,  for    = 1, … ,   . 
Receiver  ’s payoff, congruently, takes the following form: 
  
   (  , … ,   ),    (  ), … ,   (  ) , (δ , … , δ  ), (θ , … , θ )  =  
θ   + A(    ) ∙         . 
Provided non-decreasing beliefs on the part of the receivers, the correspondence of 
the setting to a two-type all-pay auction with incomplete information continues to 
hold. In order to derive the signalers’ equilibrium supports and strategies, let   ( )
  ( ) 
refer to the (absolutely continuous) symmetric equilibrium distribution (c.d.f.) of 
signaling magnitudes when of type τ ∈ {L, H}, and let ℊ ( )
  ( ) denote the associated 
density function. As the signalers’ choice set is limited to two activities, the 
generalized framework once more only supports the now familiar four strategy 
combinations, i.e., “pooling” on the same signal or “separation” across activities. 
Paralleling the environment without choice, by separation and symmetry, a 
signaler of low type sending       will only stand a chance of being chosen as a 
receiver’s ally if all other signalers are also of low type (which occurs with 




Using these insights, the equilibrium support can be shown to be on [0,    ( )
  ], where: 
  ( )




while the equilibrium distribution function takes the following form: 
  ( )
     ( )  =  
γ 
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By a similar logic, the equilibrium support of signalers of high type will be on 
[   ( )
  ,   ( )
  ], where: 
  ( )
  = (1 − λ)    ∙
  ∙  
γ 









∙  λ − 1 +  
γ 
  ∙  
∙    ( ) −  




Essential in this regard is that the intensity of the signal of a given high type relative 
to that of other signalers depends on the number of equally strong signalers in his 
social environment. It is easy to validate that the intuition for this outcome will 
mirror that for the setting without choice while, for   = 2  and   = 1 , the foregoing 
expressions reduce to those derived for the simple case (i.e., E ).    
Arguments analogous to those developed in Chapter 2 can be used to verify the 
existence of the equilibrium within the activity. Given the receivers’ homogeneity, it 
furthermore follows (immediately) that the conditions ruling out deviation across the 
signaling activities are given by Equations 4.2 and 4.3, the latter adjusted with 
respect to the appropriate upper bound (  ( )
  ). The reasoning is straightforward. If 
one receiver prefers to ally with a given deviant, so will all   − 1 other receivers.  
These computations could obviously be reproduced for all other outcomes 
derived for the simple case, which entails that the set of equilibria is again 
exhaustive. The welfare results, too, remain unchanged. Hence, there does not 
necessarily exist a universal “best” under this set of circumstances either.  
 
Proposition 4.4 The results characterized in Propositions 4.1 through 4.3 
generalize straightforwardly to a setting with   ≥ 2 signalers 
and   ≥ 1 homogeneous receivers, ceteris paribus.  
 
Many Signals. Crucial for the simplicity of the extension to many players is 
the compact nature of the signalers’ choice set – comprising only two signals (of 
beneficent nature). With many signals, the analysis would be considerably more 
complicated, although mainly with respect to the signaler types’ incentives for 
deviation. For, given symmetry within the signaler types and the restriction that a 
given signaler can use exactly one signal at a time, the equilibrium supports and 
strategies will not fundamentally be affected. As one needs to consider more than 
one potential “destination” for deviation, however, it will be necessary to establish 
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conditions ruling out deviation to every possible alternative signaling activity, i.e., if 
the setting involved   signals, one would need to construct   − 1 conditions. While 
the conditions will be identical to those developed for the two-signal case, each 
would need to be compared to every other condition, which clearly renders the 
analysis more intricate. Nonetheless, I would expect to be able to construct most of 
the outcomes derived for the simplified settings in this environment as well.30 
 
4.3.3 Alternative Menus of Signaling Activities 
Besides questioning whether the results derived for the setting with two 
signalers, one receiver, and two signals generalize to a broader set of players, one 
may wonder whether they will continue to hold if the choice set comprises 
alternative combinations of signals, particularly ones without benefits to the 
receiver(s). Recall, in this regard, that even if one only considers separating 
equilibria with threshold beliefs, in the scenario without choice, use of neutral 
signaling activities results in a multiplicity of “belief-based” equilibria. In 
consequence, the analysis given choice of messaging tool will be more complex 
because it is ex ante not clear which of the various outcomes will arise, which 
renders the foregoing comparative approach not viable.31 As before, the main 
complicating factor will be the signalers’ incentives for deviation. Rather than a 
formal analysis of this extension, the purpose of this section is therefore to ponder 
briefly the likely adjustments given the two main alternative compositions of the 
choice set, presuming it only comprises two activities.  
Consider first the case of the choice set featuring a neutral and a beneficial 
activity, and suppose hypothetically that both cases (separately) yield the same 
equilibrium.32 If so, the results would unambiguously match those with a choice set 
of two beneficent signals. From a welfare perspective, however, the contest on the 
beneficial activity would always be Pareto-dominant (on account of the non-zero 
benefit to the receiver). Even with other outcomes in the context of the neutral signal 
– say, low types pool on zero, high types pool on some  ∗ > 0, and the receiver 
                                               
4.30 For completeness, rather than considering two separate populations of agents, or equivalently, a 
single population comprising two kinds of agents, it would again be necessary also to consider the 
case when each individual takes both roles, i.e., sends and receives signals (cf. Chapter 2). 
4.31 Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) develop (novel) customized equilibrium refinements to render 
their multi-dimensional signaling approach involving neutral signals (only) tractable. I would expect 
that a similar method be required in this case.  
4.32 As revealed in Chapter 3, this is not only a theoretical possibility but may also arise in practice.  
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adopts appropriate threshold beliefs – one would expect equilibria to obtain, 
including ones involving both signals, although most are prone to be degenerate. 
Hence, all one can conclude for this putative state is that, regardless of the 
positioning of  ∗ (i.e., above or below the equilibrium support of signalers of high 
type), any outcome involving the beneficent signal will be strictly preferable from a 
welfare perspective. More generally, one would expect a multiplicity of equilibria, 
exaggerated by the belief-based nature of outcomes involving neutral signals, with 
equilibria featuring the beneficial activity always considered Pareto-superior. 
How about a choice set comprising neutral signals only? While one would 
certainly expect equilibria to exist (involving coordination on the same and different 
activities), without refinement to limit the number of possible outcomes, predictions 
are virtually impossible. If the signaler types “pool” on distinct magnitudes using 
different signals, the profile is likely to be sustainable by arguments paralleling those 
for the environment without choice. Nevertheless, as in that case, the receiver’s 
beliefs can take countless configurations, potentially leading to a plethora of 
outcomes. From a welfare perspective, given the lack of benefits to the receiver, the 
main aspect will once more be the costliness of the signaling activities (only).33  
 
Observation 4.6 Given a more general choice set, one would expect a 
multiplicity of equilibria, with those involving a beneficent 
signal deemed Pareto-superior.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
One of the most conspicuous findings of this chapter is that the sharp 
uniqueness prediction exemplifying the setting without choice is lost. Besides several 
types of equilibrium potentially co-occurring, some circumstances support continua 
of equilibria, as in Spence’s seminal model (1973, 1974). The main difference 
between the scenarios with and without choice to account for this divergence is the 
option to separate across the signaling activities when given choice, which can be 
supported – be it in a degenerate manner – even if the cost of the signals does not 
differ. Whereas all that matters with respect to the equilibrium if the signaler types 
separate within a particular signaling activity is the relative magnitude of their 
signals, in the cases with more than one activity in use, the overall benefit conveyed 
                                               
4.33 In view of the resemblance to standard models, the outcomes are likely to be Pareto-rankable.  
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to the receiver(s) by a given signaler becomes the driving element, which distorts the 
receiver’s attention away from her ultimate ally’s type. In other words, in these 
cases, the interactants may effectively “marry for money.”  
An associated maxim is that inefficient signals may arise, and may do so in 
equilibrium, regardless of one’s assumption on the asymmetry in the signals’ 
costliness. Markedly, with disparity in their cost, it may under some conditions even 
be the case that an apparently inefficient outcome Pareto-dominates. In fact, 
depending on the parameterization of the game, different outcomes may Pareto-
dominate at different times, entailing that there need not exist a universal “best.” 
Only with parity in the cost of the signaling activities, or a choice set comprising 
neutral and beneficent signals, can one reach a definitive conclusion on the welfare 
implications of the agents’ behavior. Namely, it is in those cases always preferable to 
opt for the most beneficent signal. The purpose of this section is to delineate further 
the intuition and scope of the results of this chapter. 
In some respect, the multiplicity of outcomes and their non-rankability, in 
some cases, from a welfare perspective is neither unexpected nor unintuitive. The 
results in cases with well-defined equilibria, for instance, suggest that different 
situations give rise to distinct outcomes, tailored to the cost-benefit ratios associated 
with the signals. Likewise, in keeping with the literature, the signal intensities – 
while overlapping to some extent – tend to differ across the various profiles. The 
variability in outcomes might furthermore be seen as reflecting the signalers’ 
preferences, while the cases in which the signaler types coordinate on different 
activities can be perceived as (implicitly) capturing those of the receiver(s).  
Even though much of the analysis revolved around beneficial signals, most 
results will tend to hold under broader circumstances as well (besides others, 
possibly). This once again entails that the signaling activity being modeled is not 
incidental to the equilibrium (cf. Chapter 2). Rather, given a link between each signal 
at the signalers’ disposal and some underlying social quality, the framework extracts 
conditions ensuring the achievement of separation of the signaler types for each 
combination of activities. In doing so, it demarcates the “boundaries” of each 
equilibrium, thereby shedding (further) light on the issue that the equilibrium 
profile(s) of many traditional signaling models can, in principle, be satisfied by 
several different types of signaling activities. The essential difference between the 
present approach and the environment without choice in this regard is that the latter 
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extracts conditions for individual types of signals (neutral versus beneficent), while 
the current set of results allows for their co-occurrence.  
Considering the breadth of the analysis, can any of the outcomes be considered 
particularly likely? In the theory, of course, all outcomes are equally plausible, 
provided all relevant conditions are satisfied. From a limiting perspective, however, 
one might perceive the outcomes derived for the equal-cost case as most readily 
achievable – the one featuring coordination on the more beneficent signal (E ) in 
particular. Since they can, under some conditions, also be obtained in the setting with 
disparity in the signals’ cost, and the one involving coordination on the more 
beneficial activity given parity in cost is not only Pareto-dominant but feasible under 
the broadest set of parameter values, one might expect said outcome to be the most 
readily conceivable result as the divergence in cost becomes negligible.  
Resembling the environment without choice, the features that the receiver 
effectively has to “return” the benefit of the signaler she does not choose as her ally 
and that she cannot (per se) reject an alliance are once more not as stringent as they 
may seem. As discussed at some length in Chapter 2, the analysis and equilibria 
straightforwardly extend to the case when the receiver can retain the benefit of all 
signalers. Specifically, as long as the benefit provided by the signaler not chosen as 
the receiver’s ally is lower than that by the chosen signaler, the analysis goes through 
as given. Conversely, if the benefits are identical, the setting effectively corresponds 
to one with neutral signals in that it is driven entirely by the receivers’ beliefs. Note 
furthermore that there is no strategic effect to whether the signalers benefit from each 
other’s signals. They will simply be able to spend more on their signals, which does 
not qualitatively affect the analysis. As before, the assumption that the receiver 
cannot reject an alliance is equivalent to assuming that her outside option is zero or 
even negative, entailing that disregard of information is not reasonable.   
As a final note, turn briefly to the relationship of several of the outcomes to 
findings in the related literature. Not least from an intuitive point of view, two of the 
outcomes (E  and E ) involve “counter-signaling” in the sense that signalers of high 
type effectively “understate” their messages by using the less beneficial (and 
potentially expensive) signaling activity without inevitably diminishing their 
perceived social quality. In this point, the relevant strategy profiles are similar to the 
outcome developed by Feltovich et al. (2002). Yet, their analysis relies on the type 
space comprising three types and, more importantly, the signaler types being 
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stochastically separated via additional (exogenous) noisy information for the 
receivers, assumptions the present analysis does not require. Along the lines of the 
present results, they find that counter-signaling can only arise under fairly stringent 
conditions, as part of a multitude of equilibria, though in their case it may not survive 
equilibrium refinements. While the focus of the analyses differs, i.e., they are striving 
to explain the phenomenon that individuals of high type in some cases avoid 
signaling (to differentiate themselves from low types), whereas individuals of 
intermediate type seem particularly keen to send appropriate signals, the results 
harmonize in that additional information allows for equilibria that involve high types 
voluntarily choosing the “bad” signal, or as in their case not to signal at all.   
The breakdown of the sharp contrast in the number equilibria with frameworks 
in the Spencian tradition even in the setting with equal costs derives from the fact 
that the additional “information” contained in the type of signal being used 
effectively strengthens the receiver’s position in terms of the configuration of her 
beliefs playing a more integral role than in the environment without choice. There, 
the transition to an all-pay contest essentially restricts the set of viable beliefs, 
whereas in the present environment, even non-decreasing beliefs can support a much 
wider range of outcomes, especially ones involving separation across the signaling 
activities. Multiplicity is thus not necessarily unexpected. Involvement of neutral 
signals will tend to expand the set of equilibria even further because the receiver’s 
beliefs (non-decreasing or otherwise) can take yet broader configurations. In this 
regard, the present work also resembles the literature on multi-dimensional signaling.    
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to shed light on what type of signaling 
activity, or set of activities, one might expect to arise under various sets of 
circumstances, and how the outcomes (if any) fare from a welfare perspective. To 
this end, the signalers were allowed to choose freely the vehicle(s) for their 
message(s) to the receivers from a predetermined collection of activities. Although 
the setup is fundamentally quite simple, the uniqueness prediction derived in the 
setting without choice is lost, and the agents may, under some conditions, opt for 
inefficient signals (in equilibrium). Even so, different settings give rise to different 
combinations of signaling activities and involve diverse signal intensities.  
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As ever, although the analysis’ tractability may suffer, one can think of a 
number of extensions to explore further the use of generous behavior to initiate 
cooperative social interaction in environments featuring endogenous choice of 
signaling activity. Besides rendering the receivers heterogeneous by dividing their 
population into subsets that adopt different beliefs (“multiple audiences”) and/or 
exploring some of the other modifications to the setup suggested in Chapter 2, a 
particularly interesting tangent in the present context would be the consideration of 
context-specific signals, potentially in conjunction with multiple audiences. The idea 
would be to investigate whether signaling in the manner explored in this paper (and 
its companion without choice) can also arise in non-social or even non-economic 
settings, or whether it is restricted to social contexts. It would, in this regard, also be 
interesting to explore the effects of additional variations in the cost of signaling, such 
as the instance that the level of one signal influences the cost of another. A similarly 
useful angle might be a test of the practicability of the predictions using experimental 
techniques. From a more fundamental perspective, the game could be modified to 
allow each signaler to use several signals at a time, i.e., to extend it in the direction of 
a multi-dimensional signaling framework, with some of the aforesaid amendments 
used to expand further its scope. For, on top of the equilibria derived in accordance 
with the present restrictions, equilibria involving randomization across the signaling 
activities might arise. In this fashion, the role and merit of choice in social settings 
amenable to costly signaling could be established more completely. 
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4.A Appendices 
Appendix 4.1. The Simplest Case – Equal Cost  
This appendix proves Proposition 4.1. 
(a) Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =  ) 
In order to show that, given the receiver’s beliefs, the signalers do not have an 
incentive to deviate across the signaling activities, i.e., to signaling levels using 
the less beneficial activity, one merely needs to compare the receiver’s pre- and 
post-deviation payoff presuming a signaler deviates such that his cost of 
signaling remains the same. For, if a deviation to a signal intensity of the same 
cost is profitable, so will a deviation to a cheaper magnitude.  
Signalers of Low Type  
Signalers of low type do not have an incentive to deviate to some   
     if 
θ  + A ∙       ≥ θ
  + A ∙   
     for       =   
    , which reduces to A ≥ A  
and is thus satisfied by assumption. 
 Signalers of High Type 
Signalers of high type do not have an incentive to deviate to some   
     if 
θ  + A ∙       ≥ θ
  + A ∙   
     for       =   
    , which can be expressed as: 
θ  ≥ θ  −       ∙  A− A  . 
As long as θ  > θ  and A > A , both of which hold by assumption, this 
expression, too, will inevitably be satisfied for all       > 0 . 
 
Notably, the signaler types do not even have an incentive to deviate if the 
receiver were to believe that non-zero messages involving   indicate high type.  
 
 Signalers of Low Type 
Given the alternative configuration of the receiver’s beliefs, signalers of low 
type do not have an incentive to deviate to some   
     if θ  + A ∙       ≥
θ  + A ∙   
     for       =   
    , which can be expressed as: 
θ  ≥ θ  −       ∙  A− A  . 
While it must ultimately be true that θ  > θ  (by assumption), this 
requirement may be satisfied for some values of      . The most restrictive 
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case in this regard is a signal at the upper bound (  ̂
 ). It is easy to confirm that 




, a positive constant.  
 Signalers of High Type 
Similarly, signalers of high type do not have an incentive to deviate to some 
  
     if θ  + A ∙       > θ
  + A ∙   
     for       =   
    , which reduces to 
A ≥ A  and is thus satisfied by assumption. 
 
Note that the foregoing arguments only encompass non-zero signals because 
signalers of low type would otherwise have an incentive to deviate to  . 
 
In short, given the assumptions underlying the framework, the signaler types do 
not have an incentive to deviate for a broad range of beliefs. 
 
(b)  Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =  ) 
i. Disjoint but Contiguous Supports 
Figure 4.A.1 graphically depicts the (putative) disjoint but contiguous 
equilibrium supports and consistent beliefs on the part of the receiver. The 
sufficient conditions for the outcome can be stated as follows:  
(1) Signalers of low type randomize continuously on [0, ̂ 
 ] using  . 
(2) Signalers of high type randomize continuously on [  ̌
 ,  ̂ 
 ] such that   ̌
  =   ̂
  
using  . To ensure existence, it must furthermore be satisfied that           
θ  ≥ θ  +    ̂
  ∙ (A− A ) (labeled (4.1) in the main text). 
 
Figure 4.A.1. Equal Cost – The Equilibrium Supports and Beliefs for the 
Outcome Where Low Types Choose the More and High Types the Less 














Chapter 4. Choice of Signaling Activity            163 
(3) The receiver believes that all signals of type   as well as signals of type   
below   ̌
  indicate low type, while signals of type   beyond   ̌
  are 
associated with high type.  
 
The restrictions and auxiliary assumptions on the equilibrium entail the 
following expected payoffs for the signalers (cf. Chapter 2). Consider a signaler 
of low type sending some       . Given equilibrium behavior by the other 
players, with probability λ, he faces a signaler of high type and loses with 
certainty; with probability (1 − λ), he faces another low type and incurs a strictly 
positive probability of entering into an alliance with the receiver. Accordingly:  
          
E   
            = Pr(winning) ∙ (payoff as winner) + Pr(losing) ∙ (payoff as loser) 
                        = (1 − λ)∙  G           ∙    − γ
  ∙         +  1 − G
            ∙
                                        −γ  ∙          + λ ∙  −γ
  ∙         
                        = (1 − λ)∙ G           ∙   − γ
  ∙       . 
Similarly, the expected payoff of a signaler of high type can be established to 
take the following form: 
 E   
           =(1 − λ)∙    − γ
  ∙        + λ ∙  G
          ∙    − γ
  ∙        +
                                         1 − G           ∙  −γ
  ∙         
                        =  1 − λ ∙  1 − G            ∙   − γ
  ∙      . 
 
Given the expected payoffs, the bounds of the equilibrium supports follow 
straightforwardly from the fact that players randomizing over a number of 
different strategies must be indifferent (in terms of their payoff) between them. 
Consider first a signaler of low type. As discussed in the main text, the lower 
bound for this type of signaler must be at zero. He must therefore also obtain a 
payoff of zero when signaling at the upper bound (  ̂
 ) of his equilibrium 
distribution. In fact, it must be that E    
            = 0 for all        along the 
equilibrium support. Furthermore, in keeping with the restrictions on the 
equilibrium, a signal at the upper bound of the equilibrium distribution entails 
that the individual wins against all other low types (all mass is below   ̂
 , which 
occurs with probability (1 − λ)), while he loses against all signalers of high type 
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(all mass is above   ̂
 , which occurs with probability λ). Note that under these 
conditions E    
            = E   
 (  ̂
 ) . Therefore:  
(1 − λ)∙ G (  ̂
 )∙   − γ  ∙   ̂
  = 0, 
and, using that G (  ̂
 )= Pr(   ≤    ̂
 )= 1:  
  ̂





By a similar line of reasoning (cf. Chapter 2), it can be shown that the expected 
equilibrium payoff of signalers of high type amounts to:  
E   
 (  ̂
 )  =(1 − λ)∙    − γ  ∙(1 − λ)∙
 
γ 








which too must obtain at every point along the equilibrium support, implying 
that the upper bound of this type of signaler (  ̂
 ) can be shown to be given by:  
  ̂








Having established the equilibrium supports, manipulation of the signaler types’ 
expected payoff functions (accounting for the expected equilibrium payoffs; 
cf. Chapter 2) yields the following expressions for their equilibrium distribution 
functions: 
Low Type.      (1 − λ)∙ G           ∙   − γ
  ∙        = 0      
⟹      G           =
γ 
(1 − λ)∙  
∙        
High Type.      1 − λ ∙  1 − G            ∙   − γ
  ∙       
= (1 − λ)∙   − γ  ∙(1 − λ)∙
 
γ 
                    
⟹      G          =
γ 
λ ∙  





The arguments ruling out atoms and deviations beyond the bounds of the 
equilibrium supports are identical (barring notational modifications) to those 
presented in Chapter 2 and will therefore not be repeated here. Deviations across 
the signals are treated in the main text; Figure 4.A.2 illustrates the reasoning 
underlying the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to exist. 
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Figure 4.A.2. Equal Cost – Mapping of the Choices of Signalers of High Type 




Suppose that, rather than   ̌
  =   ̂
 , the equilibrium bounds feature a gap, i.e., 
  ̌
  >    ̂
 , ceteris paribus. As argued intuitively in the main text, this 
configuration cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because signalers of high 
type have an incentive to deviate. Formally, take a signaler of high type 
choosing   ̌
  (using  ). Since all mass of the support of signalers of high type is 
above its lower bound, the signaler will lose with certainty against all (other) 
high types but will win against all low types, yielding him an expected payoff of 
E   
 (  ̌
 )  =(1 − λ)∙   − γ  ∙   ̌
 . When choosing   ̂
  (using   ), in turn, he 
expects to receive E   
 (  ̂
 )  =(1 − λ)∙   − γ  ∙   ̂
 , as he will continue to lose 
against all high types and win against all low types. Since   ̌
  >    ̂





 ) ; namely, a signaler of high type considering sending   ̌
  
has an incentive to deviate to   ̂
 , thereby reducing his cost of signaling without 
affecting his probability of winning. 
 
iii. Overlaps 
Overlaps of the equilibrium supports, too, have intuitively been shown not 
sustainable in equilibrium because signalers of low type choosing a signaling 
level in the overlapping region have an incentive to deviate. Formally, suppose 
that   ̌
  <    ̂
 , ceteris paribus. Let  ⃛  be situated in the overlapping region and 
consider the expected payoff of a signaler of low type choosing this magnitude 










θ  + A (   )∙  (   ) 
Payoff of Receiver 
  ̂
  
The same mapping holds for 
lower signaling magnitudes. 
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E[  
 ( ⃛ )]= (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛   +  1 − G  
 ( ⃛ ) ∙ −γ
  ∙  ⃛   + λ ∙ −γ
  ∙  ⃛   
                = (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛ , 
where subscript   indicates that the signaler is behaving according to his 
equilibrium strategy. His expected payoff when imitating signalers of high type 
(in the overlapping region), i.e., choosing  ⃛  using  , in turn, is given by: 
E   
 ( ⃛ )  =(1 − λ)∙(  − γ
  ∙  ⃛ )+ λ ∙  G 
 ( ⃛ )∙(  − γ
  ∙  ⃛ )+  1 − G  
 ( ⃛ )  ∙ (−γ
  ∙  ⃛ )  
                =  1 − λ ∙  1 − G 
 ( ⃛ )   ∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛ , 
where subscript   indicates that the signaler is deviating from his equilibrium 
strategy. Deviation is profitable if E[  
 ( ⃛ )]> E[  
 ( ⃛ )], i.e.: 
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G 
 ( ⃛ )   ∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛  > (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛ , 






 ( ⃛ ) < 1. 
Substitution of the relevant distribution functions, which by the nature of the 
setup must hold for this configuration as well, then yields: 





which holds by assumption. 
 
(c) Intuitive Criterion 
As in the setting with neutral signals explored in Chapter 2, the “intuitive 
criterion” (Cho & Kreps 1987) may eliminate some outcomes in the present 
environment. Recall that the refinement can be used to eliminate a given perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if there is a signaler of type θ who is guaranteed a 
deviation payoff strictly greater than his equilibrium payoff for any belief of the 
receiver in response to the deviating message, as long as she does not assign a 
non-zero probability to the deviation having been made by a type θ for whom 
this action is equilibrium dominated.34 
 
Consider first the case when both types of signaler coordinate on the more 
beneficent signal (E ). As discussed in the main text and established in 
                                               
4.34 Since the signal-dependent benefit renders the receiver’s choice of ally deterministic even if she 
assesses the two signalers to be of the same type, the “intuitive criterion” can be applied in its original 
form despite the present framework once more comprising two (competing) signalers.  
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Appendix 4.1.a, this outcome holds for virtually any configuration of beliefs off 
the equilibrium path. It therefore easily survives the “intuitive criterion.”  
 
The scenario when the signaler types separate across the signaling activities (E ) 
is slightly more complicated since, depending on the parameterization of the 
game, there may exist a region of signaling magnitudes that is equilibrium 
dominated for signalers of low type regardless of the receiver’s beliefs. Fix a 
separating equilibrium such that       ∈ [0, ̂ 
 ] and       ∈ [  ̌
 ,  ̂ 
 ], and 
ponder the incentives for deviation of a signaler of low type given various 
configurations of the receiver’s beliefs for messages off the equilibrium path. If, 
as discussed in the main text and depicted in Figure 4.2, the receiver associates 
messages beyond the upper bound of the low types’ equilibrium support with 
low type, neither type of signaler has an incentive to deviate as said move will 
adversely affect their probability of winning. If, on the other hand, she were to 
assign messages in this region to high type, a signaler of low type signaling at 
the upper bound could profitably deviate to, say,   ̂
  + ε, for ε > 0 but small. For, 
on account of the higher signal-dependent benefit associated with   , the benefit 
(to the receiver) of the deviating message would map to a signal intensity strictly 
beyond the lower bound of the high types’ support. The marginal benefit of the 
deviating message would thus clearly exceed the (small) additional cost. Yet, 
depending on the parameter values, there are bound to exist signaling 
magnitudes beyond the low types’ upper bound whose cost exceeds their 
(marginal) benefit even if the receiver were to associate them with high type. 
That is, they are equilibrium dominated for signalers of low type. Provided the 
relevant region lies within their equilibrium support (just involving the more 
beneficial activity), signalers of high type will indisputably profit from deviating 
to messages in this interval. In other words, the “intuitive criterion” may 
eliminate this equilibrium for some parameterizations of the game.   
 
To establish formally the existence of signaling levels that are equilibrium-
dominated for signalers of low type if the receiver deems messages beyond   ̂
  to 
have been sent by high types, consider the following notation. Let   denote the 
deviating message of a low type (using   ), and let   denote the point at which 
the payoff to the receiver associated with   maps into the high types’ support, 




∙  . The additional cost of   relative to a signal at   ̂
  is given by 
γ  ∙ (  −   ̂
 ), while the benefit of the deviating signal in terms of the additional 




.   is equilibrium-
dominated for low types if γ  ∙(  −    ̂
 )> (  −    ̂
 )∙ γ , or: 













Now, in order for the refinement to have bite, it must be the case that   <    ̂
 ; 
otherwise, the equilibrium-dominated signals for signalers of low type lie above 
the upper bound of signalers of high type, rendering them unattractive for the 
latter. Substitution and simple manipulation then yield the following sufficient 
condition for the existence of a region of equilibrium-dominated signaling levels 














Hence, the equilibrium profile is (only) likely to be eliminated by the “intuitive 
criterion” if the marginal cost for signalers of low type is high, that for high 
types small, and/or the ratio of the signal-dependent benefits is small.  
 
Appendix 4.2. The Simplest Case – Unequal Cost  
Parts (a) and (b) of this appendix establish Proposition 4.2, and parts (c) and (d) 
Proposition 4.3. 
(a) Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =  ) 
i. Incentives for Deviation When Maintaining the Signaling Magnitude 
The key signaler when it comes to deviation by signalers of low type such that 
the pre- and post-deviation signaling magnitudes are the same is the one sending 
the highest possible magnitude, i.e.,   ̂
 . For, if deviation from the upper bound 
of the equilibrium support is profitable, deviation from lower magnitudes will 
be, too. It is similarly easy to deduce that deviation in this manner requires an 
increase in the signaler’s expenditure. When starting from the upper bound it 
will moreover be the case that the deviant will be able to defeat some signalers 
of high type, as the benefit (to the receiver) of the deviating message must map 
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to a magnitude along the high types’ equilibrium support. Using these 
observations, to rule out deviation of this nature, it must be the case that: 







  − γ  ∙   ̂
 ,                        (4.A.1)
where   denotes the point at which the receiver’s (true) payoff 35 from the 





 . To be precise, the left-hand side of Equation 4.A.1 signifies the 
marginal benefit of the deviating message (i.e., the extra mass of high types 
defeated), while the right-hand side denotes the deviating move’s (positive) 
marginal cost. Manipulation yields the following simplified expression: 
γ
 






Seeing as it can be shown that for all γ
 
> γ  > 0 and γ  > γ  > 0 : 
γ
 







Equation 4.2 is necessary and sufficient. 
 
ii. Incentives for Deviation Given a Variation of the Receiver’s Beliefs 
Derivation of the condition ruling out deviation across the signaling activities for 
signalers of high type if the receiver were to believe that the deviating message 
indicates high type, once again simply involves comparing the receiver’s pre- 
and post-deviation expected payoff. In the case at hand, deviation from   ̂
  to 
some   




 ( ) is not profitable if: 
 θ  + A ∙  ̂ 
   ≥  θ  + A ∙   
 ( ) , 















                                               
4.35 It is, in this regard, important to note that any condition (and/or argument) comprising θ  < θ  
constitutes a more stringent requirement than a condition involving θ , because the mapping 
comprising θ  will be of a lower magnitude than the one involving θ . 
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(b) Both Signaler Types Choose   (  =  ) 
The purpose of this appendix is to show that deviation by signalers of low type 
are indeed ruled out by the strict-inequality converse of Equation 4.2, i.e., 
Equation 4.2C. To this end, consider a signaler of low type looking to deviate 
from some   ( ) along his equilibrium support to some   
 ( ) such that           
γ
 
∙   ( ) = γ
  ∙   
 ( ). Given the her beliefs, this move would lead the receiver 
to expect a payoff of θ  + A ∙   
 ( ). Deviation is not profitable if this level is 
less than or equal to her pre-deviation payoff of θ  + A ∙   ( ). Accounting for 













which, indeed, has the opposite sign of Equation 4.2. 
 
(c) Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =  ) 
i. Gaps and/or Disjoint but Contiguous Supports 
Suppose that, rather than   ̌
  <    ̂
 , the equilibrium bounds feature a gap, i.e., 
  ̌
  >    ̂
 , ceteris paribus. As argued intuitively in the main text, this 
configuration cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because signalers of high 
type have an incentive to deviate. The formal argument is effectively the same as 
that given in Appendix 4.1.b.ii.  Take a signaler of high type choosing   ̌
  (using 
 ). Since all mass of the support of this type is above its lower bound, he will 
lose with certainty against all (other) high types but will win against all low 
types, yielding him an expected payoff of E   
 (  ̌





  (using  ), in turn, he expects to receive E   
 (  ̂




  , as he will continue to lose against all high types and win against all 
low types. Since   ̌
  >    ̂




 ) ; namely, a signaler of high 
type considering sending   ̌
  has an incentive to deviate to   ̂
 , thereby reducing 
his cost of signaling without affecting his probability of winning. 
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Suppose, instead, that the equilibrium bounds are separate but adjoining rather 
than overlapping, i.e.,   ̌
  =   ̂
 , ceteris paribus. The argument ruling out this 
configuration (also) is essentially analogous to the one just given. In particular, 
take a signaler of high type choosing   ̌
  (using  ), bearing in mind that all 
relevant limits on the positioning of the bounds of the equilibrium support are 
smaller in magnitude than   ̂
 . He will lose with certainty against all (other) high 
types but will win against all low types, yielding him an expected payoff of 
E   
 (  ̌
 )  =(1 − λ)∙   − γ
 
∙   ̌
 . When choosing   
     =   ̂
  − ε, for ε 
sufficiently small so as not to exceed the binding limit on the lower bound of the 
support, he will expect to receive E   
     











      . Hence, in this case, too, 
a signaler of high type contemplating   ̌
  has an incentive to deviate, thereby 
reducing his cost of signaling without affecting his probability of winning. 
 
ii. Overlapping Supports 
The sufficient conditions for the present outcome can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Signalers of low type randomize continuously on [0, ̂ 
 ] using  . Existence 







 (labeled (4.2) in the main text). 
(2) Signalers of high type randomize continuously on [  ̌
 ,   ̂ 
 ] such that 
  ̌
  <    ̂
  using  . To ensure existence, it must furthermore be satisfied that 





∙ A  (labeled (4.5) in the main text). 
(3) The receiver believes that all signals of type   as well as signals of type   
below   ̌
  indicate low type, while signals of type   beyond   ̌
  are 
associated with high type.  
 
Akin to the previous outcomes and the setting with equal cost, the derivations 
for the algebraic form of the equilibrium strategy of signalers of low type 
parallel those developed in Chapter 2. Indeed, with the exception of there 
existing a range of possible lower bounds, the derivations for signalers of high 
type, too, are identical to them. In particular, in keeping with the restrictions and 
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auxiliary assumptions on the equilibrium, the expected payoff of a signaler of 
high type is given by: 
 E   
           =(1 − λ)∙    − γ
 
∙        + λ 
                                             ∙  Gℒ
          ∙    − γ
 
∙        +  1 − Gℒ
           ∙  −γ
 
∙         
                      =  1 − λ ∙  1 − Gℒ
            ∙   − γ
 
∙      , 
where subscript ℒ denotes the relevant “limit” on the lower bound of the 
equilibrium support. That is to say, given equilibrium behavior by the other 
players, with probability λ, he faces another high type, in which case he incurs a 
strictly positive probability of entering into an alliance with the receiver, 
whereas with probability (1 − λ), he faces a low type and wins with certainty. 
The algebraic form for the bounds of the equilibrium supports then follows 
straightforwardly from the fact that players randomizing over a number of 
different strategies must be indifferent (in terms of their payoff) between them. 
The distinctive feature in this case, in contrast to all other cases considered thus 
far, is that the lower bound is determined by three limits relating to the receiver’s 
points of indifference between the signaler types given their chosen signals 
and/or the low types’ cost of signaling (cf. main text). Accordingly, consider 
each of the boundaries in turn, starting with the alternative that   is binding. 
  
1)   is binding 
In view of the simplicity of this limit, all that is required to establish the 
algebraic form for the lower bound (  ̌( )
  ) is a simple manipulation of the 
relevant cost-condition (γ
 
















In order to derive the associated upper bound (  ̂( )
  ) and equilibrium 
distribution  G ( )
           , note once more that a signal at the lower bound 
of the equilibrium distribution guarantees victory against all signalers of low 
type but a loss against all other signalers of high type, while a signal at the 
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upper bound ensures victory against all other signals. In this vein, by the 
now familiar line of reasoning, the expected payoff of a signaler of high 
type for a signal at his lower bound amounts to: 
E   
    ̌( )




















which must obtain at every point along the equilibrium support, implying 
that the upper bound of this type of signaler is given by:  
  ̂( )









Given the equilibrium support, further manipulation of the expected payoff 
function (accounting for the expected equilibrium payoff) then yields the 
following expression for the equilibrium distribution function:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G ( )
            ∙   − γ
 

















The arguments ruling out atoms and deviations beyond the bounds of the 
equilibrium supports for this and both subsequent outcomes are again the 
same (barring notational modifications) as those developed in Chapter 2 and 
will therefore not be repeated here. Deviations across the signaling activities 
are discussed in the main text.  
 
2) ℬ  is binding 
It should be obvious that the gist of the arguments to derive the bounds and 
equilibrium distribution  G (ℬ)
            will be the same as the above if the 
binding limit is ℬ . So as not to be repetitive, this section will therefore be 
limited to the actual algebraic derivations.  
 
Given the definition of ℬ , i.e.,  θ  + A ∙ ℬ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ , straightforward 
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It is easy to corroborate that the expected payoff at this point amounts to: 
E   
    ̌(ℬ)


























implying that the upper bound (  ̂(ℬ)













The equilibrium distribution function is then given by:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G (ℬ)
           ∙   − γ
 






















3) ℐ is binding 
The final alternative is the limit at ℐ, where  θ  + A ∙ ℐ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ . As 
before, simple manipulation of this condition yields the expression for the 
lower bound (  ̌(ℐ)











∙(θ  − θ ). 
A signaler of high type’s expected payoff at this point amounts to: 
E   
    ̌(ℐ)











∙(θ  − θ )    











∙(θ  − θ )    











∙(θ  − θ )  , 
entailing that the upper bound (  ̂(ℐ)
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The equilibrium distribution function  G (ℐ)
            is then given by:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G (ℐ)
            ∙   − γ
 
∙      











∙(θ  − θ )   














∙(θ  − θ )   . 
 
4) Comparison 













  – constitutes the 
necessary and sufficient condition on the behavior of signalers of low type, 
it is easy to verify that   ̌(ℬ)
  >    ̌( )
   and   ̂(ℬ)
  >    ̂( )
  . That is, as one would 
expect, the support when the binding limit is ℬ  compared to the case when 
the limit is   is simply shifted towards higher signaling magnitudes but 
otherwise has the same dimensions. Since 
 
 
∙(θ  − θ ) amounts to a 
positive constant, it will furthermore hold that   ̌(ℬ)
  >    ̌(ℐ)
   and           
  ̂(ℬ)
  >    ̂(ℐ)
  , though the supports will again be of the same size. Likewise, 
as suggested in the main text, the position of the support when the binding 
limit is ℐ relative to the position when   is the relevant boundary depends on 
















∙(θ  − θ ) 














∙(θ  − θ ). 
Given the assumptions of the framework, the first two terms on the left-hand 
side and the second term on the right-hand side will always be positive 
while the remaining terms will be negative, although their relative size is ex 
ante ambiguous.  
 
A final issue is the size and positioning of the aforesaid (range of) supports 
relative to those of the other equilibria discussed in the main text. The 
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outcome of particular interest in this regard is the scenario where both types 
of signaler coordinate on the more beneficial activity (E ). As one might 
anticipate, if    is binding, the equilibrium support of signalers of high type 
is exactly the same as that of E  – in terms of dimension and positioning. In 
the other cases, the support is “shifted” towards relatively higher signal 
intensities in the expected direction.  
 
(d) Low Types Choose   and High Types   (  =  ) 
i. Gapped Supports 
The sufficient conditions for the outcome at hand are as follows:  
(1) Signalers of low type randomize continuously on [0, ̂ 
 ] using  . Existence 







 (labeled (4.2C) in the main text). 
(2) Signalers of high type randomize continuously on [  ̌
 ,   ̂ 
 ] such that 
  ̌
  >    ̂
  using  . To ensure existence, it must furthermore be satisfied that 




  ∙ A− A   (labeled (4.6) in the main text). 
(3) The receiver believes that all signals of type   as well as signals of type   
below   ̌
  indicate low type, while signals of type   beyond   ̌
  are 
associated with high type.  
 
Seeing as all relevant arguments have already been discussed in some detail 
elsewhere (in the context of E  in particular), this section only features an 
abridged version of the derivations, focusing on signalers of high type (only). In 
particular, akin to E , except for the existence of a continuum of possible lower 
bounds determined by three limits (two relating to the receiver’s points of 
indifference between the signaler types given their chosen signaling activities 
and one to the low types’ cost of signaling), the derivations for this type of 
signaler parallel those of the setting without choice (cf. main text). Hence, in 
keeping with the restrictions and auxiliary assumptions on the equilibrium, the 
expected payoff of a signaler of high type is given by: 
 E   
           =(1 − λ)∙    − γ
  ∙        + λ ∙  Gℒ
          ∙    − γ
  ∙        +
                                          1 − Gℒ
           ∙  −γ
  ∙        
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=  1 − λ ∙  1 − Gℒ
            ∙   − γ
  ∙      , 
where subscript ℒ once more signifies the relevant limit on the lower bound of 
the equilibrium support. Consider once again each of the boundaries on the 
lower bound of the equilibrium support. 
 
1)   is binding 
As before, with   binding, the algebraic form for the lower bound (  ̌( )
  ) 
only requires a simple manipulation of the relevant cost-condition             
(γ  ∙   = γ
 
∙ ℰ) to yield: 
  ̌( )




The expected payoff at this point amounts to: 
E   
    ̌( )
     =(1 − λ)∙    − γ  ∙(1 − λ)∙
 
γ 








implying that the upper bound (  ̂( )
  ) takes the following form:  
  ̂( )







The equilibrium distribution function  G ( )
           is then given by:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G ( )
            ∙   − γ
  ∙       = (1 − λ)∙   − γ












with the same provisions regarding atoms and deviations beyond the bounds 
of the equilibrium supports and/or across the signals as in the context of E . 
 
2) ℬ  is binding 
Given the definition of ℬ , i.e.,  θ  + A ∙ ℬ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ , straightforward 
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It is easy to verify that the expected payoff at this point amounts to:  
E   
    ̌(ℬ)























entailing that the upper bound (  ̂(ℬ)













The equilibrium distribution function  G (ℬ)
           is then given by:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G (ℬ)
           ∙   − γ




















3) ℐ is binding 
The final alternative is the limit at ℐ, where  θ  + A ∙ ℐ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ . 
Once again, manipulation of the condition yields the expression for the 
lower bound (  ̌(ℐ)












∙(θ  − θ ). 
A signaler of high type’s expected payoff at this point amounts to: 
E   
    ̌(ℐ)

























∙(θ  − θ )    












∙(θ  − θ )  , 
implying that the upper bound (  ̂(ℐ)
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The equilibrium distribution function  G (ℐ)
           is then given by:  
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G (ℐ)
            ∙   − γ
  ∙      










∙(θ  − θ )   














∙(θ  − θ )   . 
 
4) Comparison 







 is the necessary and sufficient condition on 
the behavior of signalers of low type, it is not hard to confirm that        
  ̌(ℬ)
  >    ̌( )
   and   ̂(ℬ)
  >    ̂( )
  . Hence, the support when the binding limit is 
ℬ  compared to the setting when the limit is   is once more simply shifted 




∙(θ  − θ ) constitutes a positive constant, it will 
furthermore hold that   ̌(ℬ)
  >    ̌(ℐ)
   and   ̂(ℬ)
  >    ̂(ℐ)
  , with the supports again 
of the same size. Likewise, as before, the position of the support when the 
binding limit is ℐ relative to the position when   is the relevant boundary 


















∙(θ  − θ ) 















∙(θ  − θ ). 
In view of the assumptions of the framework, the first two terms on the left-
hand side and the second term on the right-hand side will always be positive 
while the remaining terms will be negative. Their relative size, however, is 
ex ante ambiguous.  
 
Finally, consider the size and positioning of the aforesaid (range of) 
supports relative to those of the other equilibria discussed in the main text. 
The outcome of particular interest in this regard is the scenario where both 
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types of signaler coordinate on the less beneficial activity (E ). In line with 
expectation, if is   binding, the equilibrium support of signalers of high type 
is exactly the same as that of E  – in terms of dimension and positioning. In 
the other cases, the support is “shifted” towards relatively higher signaling 
levels, in the appropriate direction. The comparison to the “counter-
signaling” equilibrium when the cost of the activities is constant (E ), in 
turn, depends on the relative size of the cost parameters (e.g., γ
 
 vs. γ ). 
 
ii. Overlaps and/or Disjoint but Contiguous Supports 
Overlaps of the equilibrium supports can be shown not sustainable in 
equilibrium because signalers of low type choosing a signaling magnitude in the 
overlapping region have an incentive to deviate. The formal argument is, in 
effect, identical to that given in Appendix 4.1.b.iii. Suppose that   ̌
  <    ̂
 , ceteris 
paribus. Let  ⃛  be situated in the overlapping region and consider the expected 
payoff of a signaler of low type choosing this magnitude along his equilibrium 
support (i.e., using   ): 
E[  
 ( ⃛ )]= (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
 
∙  ⃛  +  1 − G  
 ( ⃛ ) ∙ −γ
 
∙  ⃛   + λ ∙ −γ
 
∙  ⃛   
                = (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
 
∙  ⃛ . 
His expected payoff when imitating signalers of high type (in the overlapping 
region), i.e., choosing  ⃛  using  , in turn, is given by: 
E   
 ( ⃛ )  =(1 − λ)∙    − γ
  ∙  ⃛   + λ ∙  G 
 ( ⃛ )∙    − γ
  ∙  ⃛   +  1 − G 
 ( ⃛ )  ∙ (−γ
  ∙  ⃛ )  
                =  1 − λ ∙  1 − G 
 ( ⃛ )   ∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛ . 
Deviation is profitable if E[  
 ( ⃛ )]> E[  
 ( ⃛ )], i.e.: 
 1 − λ ∙  1 − G 
 ( ⃛ )   ∙   − γ
  ∙  ⃛  > (1 − λ)∙ G 
 ( ⃛ )∙   − γ
 
∙  ⃛ . 
Substitution of the distribution functions when the binding limit is   (tentatively 
the most restrictive criterion in this context) yields: 






  >    ̂
 , this condition holds by assumption. Substitution of either of 
the other distribution functions yields similar results.  
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Suppose, instead, that the equilibrium bounds are disjoint but contiguous rather 
than overlapping, i.e.,   ̌
  =   ̂
  , ceteris paribus. The argument ruling out this 
configuration is similarly straightforward as the one just given. In particular, 
take a signaler of high type choosing   ̌
  (using  ), bearing in mind that all 
relevant limits on the positioning of the bounds of the equilibrium support are 
greater in magnitude than   ̂
 . Since the difference in the cost of the signaling 
activities implies that a signaler of low type can, in principle, afford a higher 
magnitude than his upper bound when choosing the less beneficial activity, the 
signaler faces a positive probability of losing against some low types. When 
choosing   ̌
  >    ̂
 , in turn, mimicry is not profitable for signalers of low type, 
implying that the signaler strictly increases his probability of winning – although 
he continues to lose against all signalers of high type, he will now win against all 
low types. Hence, in sharp contrast to the setting with par cost, separate but 
adjoining supports cannot be sustained in equilibrium.  
 
(e) Welfare 
As indicated in the main text, in order to determine a player’s welfare in a given 
equilibrium one must establish and compare his/her expected utility when 
assigned the role of signaler (for each type) and the expected utility when 
assigned the role of receiver.  
 
Given the discussion relating to each type of signaler in the main text, it is not 
only easy to verify the expressions in Table 4.A.1, but also that the conditions 
summarized in Table 4.A.2, which can be shown to be necessary and sufficient, 
give rise to preference rankings (in the sense that one outcome Pareto-dominates 
the other) such that the equilibrium utility achieved via the row outcome is 
favored to that of the column outcome. In fact, they are quite intuitive.  
 
For instance, coordination on the more beneficent signal (E ) is favored to 
coordination on the less beneficent one (E ) if using the former activity is 
relatively less expensive for a signaler of high type than one of low type. This 
intuition also justifies the ranking of E  and E . Similarly, when comparing E  to 
E , in which case signalers of low type behave identically, E  (which involves 
the less beneficial activity only) is favored if use of the more beneficent signal is 
relatively more expensive for signalers of high type. As one might expect, the 
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Table 4.A.1. Unequal Cost – A Player’s Expected Utility from Each Equilibrium 
Where Assigned the Role of Signaler  
Equilibrium Expected Utility 
Both types choose   (E ) λ∙ (1 − λ)∙  − γ











Low Types Choose   and 
High Types   (E ) 
If   is taken to be binding: 







If ℬ  is taken to be binding: 









Low Types Choose   and 
High Types   (E ) 
If   is taken to be binding: 




If ℬ  is taken to be binding: 









difference in the conditions across the limits highlights their relative “foci,” i.e., 
if   is binding, the marginal cost of signalers of low type plays a role, whereas 
the condition when ℬ  is binding involves the signal-dependent benefits to the 
receiver only. The intuition for the rankings for E  and E  is basically the same. 
Lastly, note that the conditions when ranking the equilibria “within” E  and E  
emphasize the tradeoff between the conditions underlying the relevant limits. 
That is to say, in the context of E , if the cost ratio for signalers of low type is 
high in the sense that the more beneficial activity is quite a bit more expensive 
than its counterpart, the equilibrium with limit   – the one involving a lower 
expenditure on the part of signalers of high type – is more preferable. 
 
In general, however, it is not possible to rank the outcomes without auxiliary 
assumptions. Even the briefest examination of Table 4.A.2 suffices to conclude 
that all complete rankings depend on the parameter values. As an example 








, E  or E  will be most preferable from the signalers’ 
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Table 4.A.2. Unequal Cost – The Conditions Determining a Player’s Preference 
over the Various Equilibria When Assigned the Role of Signaler (Row ≻ Column)  




























































































































































































(and vice versa) 
 
Legend: The superscripts on the equilibria supporting multiple outcomes denote the limit being 
considered. The two within-outcome comparisons compare the row outcome using limit   to the 













The derivations for a player’s expected utility when assigned the role of receiver 
involve determining the expected value of the highest signaling magnitude in 
each of three possible scenarios (cf. main text). Table 4.A.3 demonstrates the 
relevant computations for the outcome where both signaler types coordinate on 
the less beneficial activity (E ). Those for the other equilibria follow from a 
similar logic. Table 4.A.4 summaries the results. 
 
Granted that the expected utility of one outcome in Table 4.A.4 has to be greater 
than that of another if each factor of the former expression exceeds that of the 
latter, straightforward manipulation yields the necessary conditions presented in 
Table 4.A.5. Comparing the results in this table to those in Table 4.A.2, one 
finds that most receiver conditions subsume those when assigned the role of sig- 
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Table 4.A.3. Unequal Cost – Derivation of the Receiver’s Expected Utility for the 
Outcome Where Both Signaler Types Choose   (E ) 
Event Preliminaries Computations 
Two low types 
Pr(LL) = (1 − λ)  




































One low type, 
one high type 
Pr(LH	and	HL) 
= 2 ∙ [λ ∙ (1 − λ)] 
 ̂ 
  ≤   ≤  ̂ 
  
  = Pr(   ≤  	and	   ≤  ) = G ( ) 

















⟹ "Benefit" =   ∙ [  ∙ (  −  )]








Two high types 
Pr(HH) = λ  
 ̂ 

















































⟹ Expected Utility of the Receiver (E 
 ): 
E 
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naler. Only E  and E  explicitly require the conditions for both roles. Note 
correspondingly, that the signaler and receiver conditions for E  vs. E , E  vs. E , 
and those “within” E  and E  are mutually exclusive, implying that they cannot 
be ranked as signalers and receivers always prefer different outcomes.  
 
Table 4.A.4. Unequal Cost – A Player’s Expected Utility in Each Equilibrium 
When Assigned the Role of Receiver  
Equilibrium Expected Utility 
Both types choose   (E ) 



























Both types choose   (E ) 
















      










Low Types Choose   and 
High Types   (E ) 
If   is taken to be binding: 
















      









      
If ℬ  is taken to be binding: 
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Low Types Choose   and 
High Types   (E ) 
If   is taken to be binding: 



























If ℬ  is taken to be binding: 


































Nevertheless, from this perspective, too, the conditions make intuitive sense. In 
the cases involving coordination of the signaler types on the same signal, for 
instance, the outcome featuring the more beneficial activity will always be 
preferred (by all parties) if the signal-dependent benefit associated with it is 
relatively sizeable. Along similar lines, if   is binding, the ranking of E  vs. E , 
as one would expect, depends intrinsically on the activities’ relative costliness 
for signalers of high type. Yet, again, generic rankings depend on the parameter 
values. In short, in contrast to the equal-cost case, the welfare implications differ 
subject to the setting being considered. 
 
(f) Intuitive Criterion 
i. Coordination on the Same Signaling Activity 
Even though the equilibria involving coordination on the same signaling activity 
on the part of the signaler types may fail to exist on account of the parameter 
values, the “intuitive criterion,” cannot be used to eliminate either of them. 
Because even if it were possible to construct a region of signaling magnitudes 
that is equilibrium-dominated for signalers of low type regardless of the 
receiver’s beliefs, it would never be attractive to signalers of high type.   
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Table 4.A.5. Unequal Cost – The Conditions Determining a Player’s Preference 
over the Various Equilibria When Assigned the Role of Receiver 
(Row ≻ Column) 






































































































































































































































































(and vice versa) 
 
Legend: The superscripts on the equilibria supporting multiple outcomes denote the limit being 
considered. The two within-outcome comparisons compare the row outcome using limit   to the 




ii. Coordination on Different Signaling Activities 
The situation is different in the instances supporting a continuum of equilibria, in 
which case application of the “intuitive criterion” does eliminate a range of 
outcomes. Take the profiles where low types choose the less and high types the 
more beneficent signal (E ). Recall that any outcome with a lower bound 
between max { ,ℐ} and ℬ  may arise as an equilibrium in this scenario, with   
denoting the point where γ
 
∙   = γ  ∙ ℰ, ℐ the point at which  θ  + A ∙ ℐ  ≥
 θ  + A ∙ ℰ , and ℬ  the point where  θ  + A ∙ ℬ  =  θ  + A ∙ ℰ .  
 
Now, consider an equilibrium with a lower bound for the high types’ equilibrium 
support between ℐ and ℬ , say at point  . Figure 4.A.3 reproduces Figure 4.5 in 
the main text, augmenting it with the receiver’s optimal beliefs for the 
equilibrium starting at  . Given the belief structure drawn in the figure, the argu- 
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Figure 4.A.3. Unequal Cost – Region of Equilibria Eliminated by the “Intuitive 
Criterion” in the Case When Low Types Choose the Less and High Types the 
More Beneficent Signal (E ) and   < ℐ  
 
 
ment to sustain the equilibrium starting at   is that a signaler of high type would 
not want to deviate below his lower bound as he would be assumed to be a low 
type and, since   < ℬ , he would be considered inferior to his alter-ego behaving 
according to the equilibrium strategy. A signaler of low type, in turn, would not 
want to send a message (using  ) at or slightly below   since it would entail a 
strictly higher cost of signaling without a corresponding increase in his 
probability of winning; in fact, he would no longer be able to defeat all (other) 
low types because the benefit to the receiver of the deviating message would fall 
short of the benefit at his equilibrium upper bound (as   < ℬ ). This line of 
reasoning entails that all messages on the interval [ℐ,ℬ] are equilibrium 
dominated for signalers of low type regardless of the receiver’s response to 
them. This, in turn, implies that the receiver should not assign a non-zero 
probability to deviating messages in that interval having been sent by signalers 
of low type. Yet, if she were to assign the relevant messages to high type, 
signalers of high type could profitably deviate to the relevant region thereby 
reducing their expenditure on signaling without affecting their probability of 
winning; they would continue to win against all low types and lose against all 
(other) high types.  
 
Hence, in Figure 4.A.3 the refinement eliminates all equilibria on the interval 
(ℐ,ℬ]. It should be obvious that the same argument can be used to eliminate all 
equilibria on the interval ( ,ℬ] if ℐ <  , and extends straightforwardly to the 
profile where signalers of low type opt for the more and those of high type for 
the less beneficent signal (E ). In other words, the “intuitive criterion” eliminates 
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all equilibria between max { , ℐ} and ℬ , reducing the set of equilibria in both 
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